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Author Comment 
 
 
The secretive realm of today’s substantially concentrated private wealth has largely been off-
limits for scholarly investigation. This is despite the substantial influence that the deployment 
of private wealth has on our society, economy, and the natural environment. 
 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation aims to provide first insights into the dynamics that 
shape whether the owners of private wealth and their advisors consider ethical, social, 
environmental or governance aspects in wealth management decisions. 
 
The dissertation identified a substantial interest in such “sustainable investing” approaches by 
the owners of private wealth – together with important barriers that can limit the realization of 
this interest in practice; barriers such as private investors’ common association of sustainable 
investing with above-average volatility, and advisors that sense their clients’ interest but that 
withhold information due to their narrative of sustainable investing as a complex “nuisance”. 
 
As such, the goal of the dissertation is to motivate and facilitate the development of 
theoretical insights and practical mechanisms to drive the deployment of private wealth for 
the good of the owners of that wealth, society and the natural environment, and not against it. 
 
“As long as the incomes of the various classes of contemporary society remain beyond the 
reach of scientific inquiry, there can be no hope of producing a useful economic and social 
history.”  
First sentence of  “Le movement du profit en France au 19e siècle” by Jean Boivier, Francois Furet, and 
Marcel Gilet, 1965, Paris: Mouton1 
                                                 
1 Translation by Thomas Piketty (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, p. 575 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Structure of the Introduction 
The introduction chapter is structured in four sections.  
The first section outlines the motivation and the research question of this dissertation. 
Both are based on a prevalent gap between the potentially high suitability of sustainable 
investing for the holders of substantial private wealth, and the low level of private capital that 
is invested in sustainable investing; a phenomenon which I call the “Sustainable Investing 
gap”. 
The second section of the introduction outlines the context of this dissertation, namely 
the topics of private wealth concentration and sustainable investing. This section also 
illustrates the “Sustainable Investing gap” phenomenon and why it deserves the provision of 
explanations, as “It might at first seem needless to say that before social facts can be 
“explained”, it is advisable to ensure that they actually are facts. Yet, in science as in 
everyday life, explanations are sometimes provided for things that never were.” (Merton, 
1959, p. 21).  
The third section provides a summary of the three research papers that are included in 
this dissertation. In particular, I present a brief overview on each paper, the applied structure 
and research design, as well as main findings and contributions. 
The fourth section concludes the introduction chapter with a brief conclusion.
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1.2 Motivation and Research Question of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is motivated by an observed phenomenon that combines two contemporary 
topics that are of significance for scholars and practitioners alike.  
On the one hand, this dissertation concerns the concentration of private wealth, which 
is partially based on a trend of increasing income inequality and higher returns on capital than 
on labour (see, e.g., Piketty, 2014; Saez & Zucman, 2014). The focus of this dissertation is 
not, however, private wealth concentration itself, but how this capital is deployed.  
On the other hand, this dissertation relates to the sustainable investing approach. 
Sustainable investing pertains to the integration of traditional financial aspects and 
environmental, social, corporate governance or ethical aspects in investment decisions, in 
order to achieve financial, non-financial, or combined returns (Eurosif, 2014; Sandberg, 
Juravle, Hedesström, & Hamilton, 2008). This dissertation is not focused on the sustainable 
investing process itself, however, but on the determinants of private wealth being allocated to 
sustainable investing. 
Further, this dissertation is based on the argument that sustainable investing currently 
appears to be surprisingly underrepresented in the portfolios of private investors, despite its 
substantial potential to bring merit to wealth holders, investment advisors, firms, society and 
the natural environment. I call this phenomenon the “Sustainable Investing gap”.  
As such, this dissertation explores barriers for sustainable investing in the management 
and deployment of private wealth, in particular in regard to the cognition and decision-making 
processes of private wealth holders (Paper I) and their investment advisors (Paper II and III). 
The research question of this dissertation is as follows: 
 
Research question: “What barriers arise in the cognition and the decision-making 
processes of private wealth holders and their advisors in the context of sustainable 
investing?” 
 
Therefore, the approach of this dissertation is to “start with phenomena in the world that are 
worth explaining” (Davis, forthcoming, p. 12). This is illustrative of  “a shift in orientation 
from paradigm-driven work to problem-driven work” (Davis & Marquis, 2005, p. 323) which 
occurs in the body of organization theory, a literature which this dissertation draws from. 
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1.3 Background on Private Wealth Concentration and Sustainable 
Investing 
1.3.1 Trend and Magnitude of Private Wealth Concentration 
 
Income Inequality. Following a general decline in income inequality from 1910 to 1970, 
income inequality increased substantially in Anglo-Saxon countries, Europe and much of the 
developing world (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011). This trend has led to a substantial 
inequality. By the year 2010, the top 10% of the population in terms of total income received 
more than 45% of total income in the U.S., 40% in the UK, and 35% in Germany (Piketty, 
2014). This trend is robust across countries, albeit regional differences exist, with a 
particularly strong pronunciation in Anglo-Saxon countries, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Income share of top 10% of population in terms of total income in Europe and 
in the U.S. 
Source: Technical appendix to the book “Capital in the 21st century” by Thomas Piketty (i.e., 
Piketty, 2014) 
 
Reasons that appear to drive this development commonly relate to an increased importance of 
financial markets and financial assets in society, or the “financialization” thereof (Krippner, 
2005, p. 174). The increased significance of financial markets and ownership is reflected by, 
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for example, legislation that benefits wealth holders (as the recipients of dividends and 
investment returns) over workers (Piketty, 2014), or an asymmetrical increase in absolute and 
relative incomes in the finance industry (Bakija, Cole, & Heim, 2012).  
In sum, a body of research documents a substantial and increasing inequality in the 
distribution of income within populations. Incomes accumulate over time and build up 
household wealth. Thus, income inequality also drives inequality in household wealth, which 
perhaps has even more pronounced and relevant impacts on economies and societies. 
 
Household Wealth Inequality. Beyond the debate on income inequality, even more 
pronounced is the asymmetry in the much-related distribution of household wealth (Kopczuk 
& Saez, 2004; Piketty & Saez, 2003). The NGO Oxfam calculates that in 2014, the worlds 85 
richest individuals owned as much as the poorest half of the global population, with the 
concentration accelerating as these 85 people grew richer by USD 668 million each day 
(Oxfam, 2014, p. 8). More specifically in the U.S., for example, assessments of income tax 
data (including, for example, capital gains tax) indicate that by 2012, the top 0.1% of 
households governed 20% of total net household wealth, which is as much of total net 
household wealth as the bottom 90% owned at the same time, while the top 1% held 40% of 
total net household wealth (Saez & Zucman, 2014). Figure 2 reproduces the results of the 
aforementioned study by Saez and Zucman (2014). 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of total net household wealth in the U.S.  
Source: Technical appendix to the NBER Working Paper No. 20625 “Wealth Inequality in the 
United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data” by Emmanuel Saez 
and Gabriel Zucman (i.e., Saez & Zucman, 2014) 
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The topic of unequal wealth distribution receives substantial interest beyond the scholarly 
debate. Along economic disadvantages of high levels of wealth inequality and wealth 
monopoly, the business magazine The Economist went as far as to infer a cultural shift; a shift 
wherein this development “could presage the return of an 18th century inheritance society, in 
which marrying an heir is a surer route to riches than starting a company” (2014, p. 71). The 
argumentation is supported by wealth inequality data on the U.S., U.K., Germany and France 
dating back as far as 1700, which indicates that today’s ratio of wealth inequality “appear to 
be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” 
(Piketty & Zucman, 2014, p. 1255). 
 Thus, and against common belief, perhaps, “extreme economic inequality has 
exploded across the world in the last 30 years”, instead of going down, and “seven out of 10 
people live in countries where the gap between rich and poor is greater than it was 30 years 
ago” (Oxfam, 2014, p. 8). 
 In sum, a body of evidence points to a substantial and increasing concentration of 
private wealth amongst a small group of private wealth holders. Representatives of the private 
wealth management industry refer to the holders of such private wealth as High Net Worth 
Individuals; such private wealth holders and their advisors are in the focus of this dissertation. 
 
The Private Wealth Management Client Segment of High Net Worth Individuals. In the 
private wealth management industry, private wealth holders that have more than one million 
USD in freely investable assets (i.e., excluding assets such as real estate property) are 
commonly referred to as High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), or Ultra High Net Worth 
Individuals (UHNWIs) if they govern more than USD 30 million (Capgemini & RBC Wealth 
Management, 2012). About 32 million individuals, which is 0.7% of the world population, 
represent the private wealth management customer segment of HNWIs and UHNWIs; 
together, these individuals hold a total of USD 99 trillion in private household wealth, which 
is 41% of global private household wealth (Shorrocks et al., 2013). The distribution is 
displayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Number of adults and percentage of world population per wealth category 
Source: Databook to the “Global Wealth Report” by Anthony Shorrocks, James Davies and 
Rodrigo Lluberas (Shorrocks et al., 2013) 
 
In terms of further characteristics of this segment, wealthy private investors tend to be, for 
example, older than the general population and better educated (see, e.g., Fidelity 
Investments, 2012). Wealthy private investors often rely on investment advisors in their 
investment decision making, which in turn generate significant revenues from advising their 
wealthy customers (West, 2012).  
Wealthy private investors are in a position to be particularly innovative and to align 
their investments with their personal interests, since they “have access to investments that are 
normally closed to smaller retail investors, and the freedom to move funds quickly without 
having to perform the extensive due diligence required by institutional investors or 
foundations” (Eurosif, 2012b, p. 7). In terms of their investment approach, wealthy private 
investors are often characterized as either venturous entrepreneurs or as “typically long-term 
investors whose aim is to preserve capital for the next generations to come” (Eurosif, 2012b, 
p. 7), and as such might be particularly interested in sustainable investing (Eurosif, 2010, 
2012b). 
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This dissertation is not concerned with the topic of wealth concentration itself, but is 
interested in aspects that determine how the holders of substantial financial assets allocate 
their capital. Specifically, I explore this issue in the context of sustainable investing. 
1.3.2 Sustainable Investing and the Sustainable Investing Gap 
Definition. The term sustainable investing is often used interchangeably with the term 
responsible investing, or socially responsible investing, which leads to concerns that “there is 
no clear consensus of what this term means” (Berry & Junkus, 2013, p. 707). Sustainable 
investing is commonly understood as to “integrate certain kinds of non-financial concerns – 
variously called ethical, social, environmental or corporate governance criteria – in the 
otherwise strictly financials-driven investment process” (Sandberg et al., 2008). Investors that 
are interested in these approaches typically consider environmental, social, and corporate 
governance (ESG) aspects in their investment decisions, invest in specific industries (e.g., 
energy efficient appliances), or exclude firms that generate substantial revenues with the 
production of, or trade with ethically questioned products (e.g., tobacco), amongst other 
approaches that relate to similar aspects (Eurosif, 2014). 
 
Financial rationale. A body of research develops the argument of a positive relationship 
between aspects that are related to the meta-frame of sustainability and the financial 
performance of firms or investment products. The foundation of the “it pays to be green” 
argument commonly evolves around societal demands and limitations to the availability of 
natural resources or the substantial impact of climate change on economies and firms 
(Pachauri, 2014); aspects that incur changes to the business sphere, which, then, provide firms 
with pressing challenges and promising opportunities (e.g., Hart & Milstein, 1999; Orlitzky & 
Swanson, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Shrivastava, 1995).  
On the level of individual firms, the financial performance implications of firm 
managers considering sustainability aspects in their business decisions have been show to be 
rather neutral or positive (Albertini, 2013; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Surroca, Tribó, 
& Waddock, 2010). On the level of financial investments, scholarly findings in regard to the 
financial implications of considering such aspects in investment decision-making vary 
(Orlitzky, Siegel, & Waldman, 2011), yet the financial performance that is achieved by the 
investment managers of mutual funds that consider sustainability aspects appears to be “not 
statistically different from the performance of conventional funds” (Renneboog, Ter Horst, & 
Zhang, 2008, p. 1).  
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Beyond assessments of past performance, however, the decisions of investors depend 
on their expectation of developments material to their investments in the future. The intensity 
of pressures on economies and firms that arise from changes of the natural environment are 
deemed to increase further (Pachauri, 2014). As such, the financial rationale for sustainable 
investing has gained support and legitimacy in financial markets and a growing body of 
practitioner publications outlines the current and future relevance of topics such as climate 
change for financial investments (e.g., GSIA, 2013; Mercer, 2009, 2012; Principles for 
Responsible Investment, 2014). 
 
Extra-financial rationale. Beyond the rationale of improving the financial performance of 
investments through the consideration of sustainability aspects, a growing body of literature 
develops the argument that investors engage in sustainable investing due to extra-financial 
benefits, i.e. investors attach value to the opportunity to align their personal values with their 
investments. For example, investors might avoid cognitive internal conflicts as they refrain 
from investments that are not aligned with their personal values and beliefs and that would 
otherwise cause ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957). In practice, this means that 
investors may decide to refrain from investments in firms that engage in business that the 
investors perceive as standing in conflict with their personal values or ethics, sometimes 
rejecting such investments even if they know that doing so might or will result a reduction of 
financial returns (e.g., Lewis, 2001; Rosen et al., 1991; Webley et al., 2001). 
At the same time, the actual or hypothetical fulfilment of ethical objectives through 
investment decisions could provide investors with the advantage of positive emotions, such as 
the feeling of a ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1990). More from this angle in regard to investors’ 
desire to effect change, some authors refer to investors’ attempts to influence firms by 
directing their investments to more sustainable firms, with the aim of contributing to 
sustainable development, both in regard to social or to environmental aspects (e.g. Beal & 
Goyen, 1998; Eurosif, 2012b).  
Taking yet another angle, other authors such as Meir Statman argue for sustainable 
investing as a means of creating a preferable public image and social identity (Statman, 2004). 
Overall, then, multiple aspects of sustainable investing matter for different investors 
differently, including financial and extra-financial aspects at the same time (Bollen, 2007; 
Cheah, Jamali, Johnson, & Sung, 2011; J. Nilsson, 2009). This points to the possibility that 
sustainable investing is interesting for most private investors, while these individuals might 
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do so based on different attributes that they relate to sustainable investing (Paetzold & Busch, 
2014). 
 
Sustainable Investing gap. During the past decade, sustainable investing has experienced 
substantial attention in financial markets; the relative market share of sustainable investing 
has grow constantly to today between 5% and 10% of total assets under management 
(Eurosif, 2012a; US SIF Foundation, 2012). The growth of the relative markets share of 
sustainable investing is mainly driven by the capital allocation decisions of institutional 
investors (Eurosif, 2014). By the ear 2014, 1260 institutional investors that together represent 
USD 45 trillion in assets under management signed the United Nation’s backed Principles for 
Responsible Investing, thereby committing to aspire for the integration of sustainability 
aspects into their internal investment processes and to encourage other investment firms that 
they work with to do the same (Principles for Responsible Investment, 2014).  
Beyond institutional investors, however, sustainable investing remains largely 
neglected by private investors. Private investors govern a total of about USD 50 trillion in 
financial assets, which is comparable to the sum of USD 80 trillion that is managed by 
institutional investors (Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; Shorrocks et al., 2013). In terms of the 
relative share of sustainable investing assets under management, however, only 3% of the 
total financial assets that are invested in sustainable investing in Europe are controlled by 
private investors, versus 97% of sustainable investing assets under management that are 
controlled by institutional investors (Eurosif, 2014). 
The  magnitude of the observed relative underrepresentation of private investors in 
sustainable investing is a puzzle, in particular in light of two aspects. First, “surveys among 
private investors show that the [sustainable investing-] market potential is far from being 
realized” (Schrader, 2006, p. 200), since it appears that the majority of private investors is 
interested in the consideration of sustainability aspects in their investment decisions (Eurosif, 
2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 2014). Second, it appears that in particular wealthy 
private investors are interested in sustainable investing (Eurosif, 2008, 2012b). The 
engagement of wealthy private investors would imply substantially higher levels of private 
capital in sustainable investing, given the substantial economic significance of wealthy private 
investors, their particular ability to invest according to their personal interests, and their 
preferred access to investment products and advice (Eurosif, 2012b; Schrader, 2006; West, 
2012). 
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Therefore, a gap can be observed between the engagement of private investors in 
sustainable investing, which could be expected to be high, and their actual engagement in 
sustainable investing, which appears to be low. I call this phenomenon the Sustainable 
Investing gap; a phenomenon whose exploration provides an important element for the 
motivation of this dissertation. 
 
Barriers. The Sustainable Investing gap phenomenon points to the existence of barriers that 
keep private investors from deploying their capital in line with their interest in sustainability 
and sustainable investing. In research, a variety of different aspects have been mentioned as 
either supportive or limiting for the engagement of private investors in sustainable investing. 
Such aspects relate to, for example, investors consideration of the future needs and interests of 
their children or heirs (Eurosif, 2012b; Lewis, 2001), or the availability of information about 
sustainable investing products that is sufficient for investors to understand and engage in 
sustainable investing (Hummels & Timmer, 2004; J. Nilsson, Siegl, & Korling, 2012).  
As outlined in detail in Paper I, however, existing findings on potential barriers that 
keep private investors away from allocating capital to sustainable investing are limited and 
often inconclusive (Paetzold & Busch, 2014). As such, a research gap exists in regard to 
explanations for the Sustainable Investing gap, i.e. barriers for the engagement of private 
investors in sustainable investing. As stated by Glac, “The question of “why do some 
investors practice [sustainable] investing and others don’t?” is therefore still largely 
unanswered” (2008, p. 41). Barriers for private investors to engage in sustainable investing is 
a topic that “future research will have to examine in more detail” (Glac, 2008, p. 51).  
This dissertation explores such barriers from different angles and through the 
application of different methods and theoretical concepts, as outlined in the summaries of the 
three research papers and in the research papers themselves, and broadens the scope of 
understanding for barriers to sustainable investing. 
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1.4 Overview and Summary of Research Papers 
1.4.1 Paper I: Unleashing the Powerful Few: Sustainable Investing Behaviour of 
Wealthy Private Investors                                                                      
Overview. The paper explores the cognition of wealthy private investors and related barriers 
in their decision-making process in the context of sustainable investing. We identify 
predominant barriers and develop a decision-making framework based on literature and the 
findings of a qualitative data analysis. The research question is: What are the barriers that 
limit the engagement of private investors in SI? With myself as the first author, the paper is 
co-authored with Professor Timo Busch. I presented and discussed previous versions of the 
paper at various academic conferences, including the United Nations Principles for 
Responsible Investing Academic Network Conference 2013 (Paris; recipient of the Honorary 
Mention award), and the 29th EGOS Colloquium 2013 (Montréal). The paper was published 
in the peer-reviewed journal Organization & Environment in December 2014. 
 
Structure and Research Design. The argument of the paper is build up from a review of the 
literature on motivations and barriers for private investors in sustainable investing, which 
identifies a research gap in regard to barriers. We outline the extant range of topics and 
questions related to the natural environment to which the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 
& Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 1991) has been applied, and adapt the framework to sustainable 
investing based on literature on sustainable investing. We then outline the methodology and 
findings of our empirical analysis. Empirical data was gathered through semi-structured in-
depth interviews with very different profiles of wealthy private investors. This allowed us to 
gather detailed insights about the understanding and interpretation of sustainable investing by 
the interviewees in their own and personal context (Kvale, 2007). The interview transcripts 
were coded and analysed based on the approach of analytic induction and iterative pattern 
matching (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003a). We identify three dominant 
combinations of aspects that form barriers for the engagement of private investors in 
sustainable investing, which we integrate into the theory of planned behaviour framework. 
We close by discussing implications for scholars and practitioners, as well as future research 
avenues. 
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Findings and Contributions. Our findings indicate a high level of either latent or explicit 
interest in sustainable investing amongst wealthy private investors. This adds empirical 
support and richness to the proposed existence of the Sustainable Investing gap phenomenon.  
We then present our findings along the dimensions of the theory of planned behaviour 
model of decision making as adapted to the context of sustainable investing. We propose 
three predominant patterns that constitute barriers for the engagement of wealthy private 
investor in sustainable investing. These barriers limit the realization of the interest in 
sustainable investing amongst wealthy private investors. This provides potential explanations 
for the Sustainable Investing gap, and points to several avenues for future research as well as 
strategies that practitioners could employ to mitigate the identified barriers.  
The first barrier pertains to the effect of interviewees’ common association of 
sustainable investments with a high volatility in financial returns in combination with a short 
investment time horizon that is considered the individual investors. Investors that have a short 
investment time horizon appear to hold back from sustainable investing if they associate it 
with high volatility. This holds true even if the investor perceives the long-term financial and 
extra-financial rationale of sustainable investing as attractive. This finding adds to the 
emerging perspective in management research that the perception of time is an important 
component of the conditions for sustainable development, wherein the compression of time 
and space in financial markets runs against and violates the physical constraints of the natural 
environment (Bansal & Knox-Hayes, 2013; Gladwin, Kennelly, & Krause, 1995).  
The second barrier pertains to the predominant effect of investors’ perception of high 
volatility of sustainable investments in combination with recent financial losses. Investors that 
associate sustainable investing with high volatility appear to hold back from sustainable 
investing if they experienced recent financial losses. This finding, together with our finding 
on the important role of time, indicates interesting future research avenues that could bridge 
findings from behavioural economics to sustainable investing. This applies in particular to 
concepts related to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which we elaborate on in 
the discussion section of the paper. For practitioners, both the first and the second barrier 
indicate the importance of a careful communication with clients about the characteristics of 
sustainable investing, depending on the cognitive pre-disposition of their clients. 
The third proposed barrier indicates that investment advisors withhold information on 
sustainable investing from their clients. We find instances where this holds true even in 
situations where clients actively ask for information that the advisor has been trained and 
motivated to disseminate. This provides detailed empirical evidence related to prior such 
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suggestions by Nilsson (2010), and Hummels and Timmer (2004), and answers to the specific 
call for research on the role of advisors particularly in the context of wealthy private investors 
by Schrader (2006). The financial value of the services that advisors provide for their clients 
is challenged (Hackethal, Haliassos, & Jappelli, 2012), and sustainable investing could allow 
advisors to strengthen their position as valuable partners for their clients (Eurosif, 2012b). 
Thus, our finding could motivate the exploration of the reasons behind the limiting behaviour 
of advisors in the context of sustainable investing.  
The three barriers are consolidated and illustrated in the proposed decision-making 
framework of private investors in the context of sustainable investing based on theory of 
planned behaviour (Figure 4). We thus expand the literature on the application of theory of 
planned behaviour. We add to the emerging field of research on decision-making processes at 
the micro-level of the adoption of sustainable investing, as requested by, for example, Gond et 
al. (2011). Further, we answer to specific calls for research and more empirical richness in the 
context of investors that favour sustainable investing and those that might claim not do so 
(Juravle & Lewis, 2008), and for the expansion of the understanding of barriers for private 
investors in the context of sustainable investing (Glac, 2008). 
 
Figure 4: Theory of planned behaviour framework adapted to sustainable investing (SI) and 
extended based on interview results 
Note: The signs illustrate the proposed directionality of the relation, that is, (-) indicates a 
negative effect on the determinant; SI = sustainable investing 
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1.4.2 Paper II: More than Money: Why Investment Advisors Rarely Talk About 
Sustainable Investing 
 
Overview. Paper II expands on the findings of Paper I, and investigates explanations for the 
Sustainable Investing gap specifically in regard to the role of investment advisors. The paper 
develops hypotheses that relate the level of advisors activity in communicating with wealthy 
private investors about sustainable investing to findings on people’s behaviour in the context 
of the natural environment and the logic of real options. The hypotheses are tested with a 
regression model based on empirical data from a survey with investment advisors. The 
research question of the study is: Do investment advisors neglect to communicate about 
sustainable investing in their client discussions, and, if so, why? With myself as the first 
author, the paper is co-authored with Professor Timo Busch and Professor Marc Chesney. I 
have presented and discussed previous versions of the paper at the Academy of Management 
Annual Meeting 2014 (Philadelphia) and Society for Business Ethics Annual Meeting 2014 
(Philadelphia; recipient of the Founder’s Award). Following the acceptance of a manuscript 
proposal in September 2014, and the subsequent submission of the full paper in October 2014, 
the paper is under review at the peer-reviewed journal Annals of Social Responsibility.  
 
Structure and Research Design. Following a review of the literature on sustainable 
investing and investment advisors, we develop nine hypotheses on the determinants of 
advisors’ level of activity in communicating about sustainable investing in client discussions. 
We do so based on constructs that have been developed to understand peoples behavior in 
regard to decisions in the context of the natural environment or sustainable investing (e.g., 
Jansson & Biel, 2011; McLachlan & Gardner, 2004; Roberts, 1996; Rosen et al., 1991; Stern, 
Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). Further, we develop two hypotheses based on 
applications of the logic of real options to business decision-making and the natural 
environment (Busch & Hoffmann, 2009; Cortazar, Schwartz, & Salinas, 1998; Husted, 2005; 
Wang, Bernstein, & Chesney, 2012). We outline our methodology and the results of an OLS 
regression analysis of a survey with 95 investment advisors. We arrive at a model with good 
explanatory power towards aspects that relate to the level of advisors in communicating about 
sustainable investing with their clients. The implications are outlined in a discussion section 
and summarized in the conclusion. 
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Findings and Contributions. Our results indicate a low level of advisors’ engagement in 
communicating about sustainable investing with their customers relative to the market 
opportunity which sustainable investing might represent. Further, the findings of our analysis 
provide argumentative depth and quantitative evidence for the related indications of Paper I 
and other studies which were thus far based only on qualitative data (e.g., Schrader, 2006). 
Our model of aspects that can help explain differences in advisors’ engagement in 
communicating about sustainable investing has strong explanatory power. This allows us to 
derive a variety of implications for scholars and practitioners, as well as avenues for future 
research. 
 For example, we do not find a significant relation between the volatility that advisors 
associate sustainable investing with and their level of activity in communicating about 
sustainable investing. This is, advisors that perceive sustainable investing as more/less 
volatile are not significantly less/more likely to communicate about sustainable investing with 
their clients. This is surprising and contrary to findings from behavioural finance that risk 
aversion lets individuals disproportionally refrain from investments that are perceived as 
volatile (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Similarly, our finding is 
contrary to prior findings in literature on decision-making in the context of the natural 
environment (e.g., Karp, 1996; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Stern et al., 1999) and sustainable 
investing (e.g., Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000). Interestingly, perhaps, this finding on advisors is 
also contrary to the finding in Paper I that clients’ association of sustainable investing with 
high volatility can importantly limit their engagement in sustainable investing. 
 Further, we find a substantial effect of the perception of sustainable investing as overly 
complex, and of the expected financial performance of sustainable investing. This leads to the 
conceptualization of advisors’ communication on sustainable investing based on the logic of 
real options. The concept indicates that advisors’ deferral of two embedded real options 
related to the gathering of information about sustainable investing leads to their perception of 
sustainable investing as complex. Advisors can be conceptualized as deferring the option to 
learn about sustainable investing in order to reduce the perceived complexity of sustainable 
investing. The result, then, is that advisors refrain from communicating about sustainable 
investing with their clients. This appears to hold true even if advisors perceive sustainable 
investing as a market opportunity, which infers a mismatch between the market opportunity 
that is represented by sustainable investing and advisors’ level of activity in communicating 
about sustainable investing with their clients. As such, this conceptualization can provide an 
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answer to the behavior and the role of investment advisors in the context of the Sustainable 
Investing gap, as requested in Paper I and elsewhere (e.g., Schrader, 2006). The 
conceptualization also expands the application of the real options logic to the context of 
sustainable investing. It also indicates to practitioners the significance of structured training in 
the context of products that are perceived as complex not only by clients, but also by 
salespeople or other staff, such as in the context of sustainable investing. The proposed 
conceptualization is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Advisors deferral of two embedded real options leads to a mismatch between the 
market opportunity of sustainable investing (SI) and the actual level of communication 
 
Note: SI = sustainable investing 
 
Lastly, we generalize our findings to salespeople generally that interact with customers in the 
context of potentially complex topics, such as sustainability. Our findings indicate that 
salespeople in the context of sustainability might react less strongly to their self-transcendent 
values (e.g., Karp, 1996; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Stern et al., 1999) or socio-demographic 
profile (e.g., Cheah, Jamali, Johnson, & Sung, 2011; Deni Greene Consulting Services, 2001; 
McLachlan & Gardner, 2004; Rosen et al., 1991; Schueth, 2003) than what prior research 
would suggest. Therefore, salespeople confronted with interesting yet complex products could 
systematically act differently than what would be in their interest and in the interest of the 
customers. This phenomenon might deserve further exploration beyond the context of 
sustainable investing, and for practitioners indicates the importance of the careful 
management of information in situations of high complexity in order to avoid sub-optimal 
outcomes for firms, clients, society and the natural environment. 
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1.4.3 Paper III: Complex Markets vs. Complex Customer Needs: How Investment 
Advisors’ Narratives Enable or Constrain Sustainable Investing 
 
Overview. This paper explores explanations to the Sustainable Investing gap with a focus on 
investment advisors. Like Paper II, this study is based on the insights of Paper I with regard to 
the important role of advisors, but it employs a different theoretical angle and methodology 
than those applied in Paper II. Paper III is based on organization theory. We take a social 
constructivist approach and explore the narratives that investment advisors use to understand 
their role in the context of sustainable investing. We also look at the potential effect of these 
narratives on the mainstreaming of sustainable investing. Based on interviews with advisors 
of wealthy private clients that work at investment firms that either lead or lag in sustainable 
investing, we identify two antagonistic nuisance and savior narratives that these advisors use. 
The paper raises the following research question: What narratives do investment advisors use 
in the context of sustainable investing, and how do these narratives enable or constrain 
advisors to communicate with customers about sustainable investing? With myself as the first 
author, the paper is co-authored with Emilio Marti. The paper has been accepted for 
presentation and discussion at the Social and Sustainable Finance and Impact Investing 
(SSFII) Academic  
Conference 2015 (Oxford). I await the peer-reviewed responses to the submission of the paper 
for presentation and discussion at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2015 
(Vancouver), the 31st EGOS Colloquium 2015 (Athens), and the 7th Annual ARCS Research 
Conference (Chicago). Depending on further feedback the paper will be submitted to an 
established peer-reviewed journal such as Journal of Business Ethics, or developed towards 
publication in a peer-reviewed A-level journal such as Organization Studies. 
 
Structure and Research Design. We develop the theoretical background of the paper by 
reviewing the literature on sustainable investing, advisors, and organization theory concerning 
financial markets. We outline a research gap as scholars have explored financial markets 
actors other than advisors, and the outcomes of the interaction between advisors and their 
customers, but that the relation and interaction between advisors and their customers remains 
a “black box” that we aim to open.  
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We propose that the appropriate avenue to open the black box is to take a social 
constructivist approach (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and to explore advisors narratives and 
the underlying surface stories (Pentland, 1999; Rhodes & Brown, 2005). The rationale of this 
approach is that actors use narratives in order to help themselves, their peers and customers to 
understand their role and their environment and how to act in that environment, i.e. “the ways 
in which individual narrators come to understand and articulate their social ‘reality’” (Stalker, 
2010, p. 4).  
We then outline the data collection process and the applied iterative approach of 
analytic induction based on an exploratory multi-case study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). We conducted interviews with 22 investment advisors of wealthy 
private investors. We covered a set of interviewee profiles at three different investment firms 
that either lead or lag in offering sustainable investing products. This enabled us to identify 
and to compare patterns in advisors’ stories and narratives (Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 
2012), and to explore predominant differences and similarities herein. 
The findings include two prevalent narratives that either limit or support the 
communication of advisors about sustainable investing. Similar to Paper II, we identify an 
important role of complexity in the context of sustainable investing. We discuss implications 
for the mainstreaming of sustainable investing and beyond. 
 
Findings and Contributions.   
We find two antagonistic narratives, the nuisance narrative and the savior narrative, and their 
underlying stories that either support or limit investment advisors’ appreciation of sustainable 
investing. The nuisance narrative is told by representatives of the laggard case. It consists of 
three consecutive stories that connect with each other as follows. First, the complex markets 
story explains financial markets as increasingly complex due to regulation and erratic market 
developments. The simplistic customers story describes wealthy private clients as mostly 
concerned with personal trust into their advisor and the efficient management of their wealth 
and related family-aspects. Thus, advisors focus on building long-term trusted relationships 
that extend across the families of their customers. Advisors ignore sustainable investing as the 
result of the trusted salespeople story, because advisors perceive sustainable investing as a 
‘Pandora’s Box’ of difficult questions, i.e. as a nuisance, that takes too much time to discuss 
and that challenges their technical efficiency. 
Solely advisors at both leader cases, by contrast, used the savior narrative. The 
narrative starts with the flawed markets story. The story illustrates financial markets as overly 
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complicated by banks and advisors that aim to increase their financial profits at the expense of 
the client and the natural environment. The savior story, then, presents sustainable investing 
as the solution to problems of flawed financial markets, such as conflicts of interest between 
clients and advisors. Lastly, clients and advisors are illustrated as a likeminded community 
that collaborates to implement sustainable investing along the clients’ complex interests and 
expectations of what sustainable investing ought to be in their personal context.  
The description of advisors’ narratives that is developed in this paper contributes to 
the emerging field of organization theory in financial markets (Davis, 2009a; Marti & 
Scherer, 2014; Munir, 2011). We open the black box of the interaction between advisors and 
their clients, and provide insights on how advisors manage and sustain their client 
relationships despite evidence for a limited financial advantage of their services for clients 
(French, 2008; Malkiel, 1973). In particular, we observe a substantial difference in the point 
of reference that advisors at leading or lagging firms choose as a source of complexity. The 
introduction of complexity helps investment firms create higher margins for their services 
(Célérier & Vallée, 2013). It appears that advisors and investment firms whether they are 
focused on sustainable investing or not are similar in that they require a point of “complexity” 
to justify their services. We observe that advisors at firms that lag in sustainable investing 
describe financial markets as highly complex, and their customers as simplistic. Advisors at 
leading investment firms, however, use a narrative that describes financial markets as 
excessively and unnecessarily complicated. They highlight the complex needs of customers 
instead. Thus, we document a “complexity shift” (Figure 6) in investment advisors’ 
narratives, from complex financial markets to complex customer needs. To sell their services, 
either investment advisors have to position their services in relation to complexity, and it 
appears that if one source is dismantled, another one is taken up instead. Future research 
should analyze how narratives of complexity relate to complex financial products in the 
context of sustainable investing and beyond. 
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Figure 6: Complexity shift from complex financial markets to complex customer needs 
 
 
We also add to the literature on sustainable investing (Markowitz, Cobb, & Hedley, 2012; 
Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012). We illustrate strategies taken by advisors at firms that focus on 
sustainable investing as well as incumbents that have not yet succeeded to establish 
sustainable investing in their processes. Selling sustainable investing products might only be 
possible for investment firms whose investment advisors develop certain narratives beyond 
concerns of technical efficiency. Yet narratives might be an integrated component of the way 
a firm operates and its value chain; therefore narratives could be of limited transferability 
from leaders to laggards (Porter, 1985). Therefore, narratives that inhibit sustainable investing 
and that are difficult to modify or transfer could constitute a major impediment for large 
incumbents to increase the activity of their advisors with regard to sustainable investing. On a 
systemic level, this questions the prospects of mainstreaming sustainable investing amongst 
institutional and private investors (Dunfee, 2003). As such, the limitations that narratives in 
incumbent investment firms pose on the mainstreaming of sustainable investing can provide 
an answer to the Sustainable Investing gap. The exploration of the effect and mechanics of 
this limitation that is incurred by narratives, as well as strategies to mitigate or alleviate it, 
provide fertile ground for further inquiry. 
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1.5 Conclusion of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is motivated by the under-representation of private investors and specifically 
wealthy private investors in sustainable investing, a phenomenon that I call the Sustainable 
Investing gap. I employ qualitative and quantitative methods and different theories to identify 
barriers for the engagement of wealthy private investors in sustainable investing. I explore 
barriers in the cognition and decision-making process of wealthy private investors (Paper I2), 
as well as the determinants of investment advisors level of activity in providing their wealthy 
clients with information about sustainable investing (Paper II and III3).  
Paper I identifies a broad interest amongst wealthy private investors in sustainable 
investing, which points to a market opportunity for sustainable investing in private wealth 
management. The individuals’ specific areas of interest in regard to sustainable investing 
vary, however, depending on their professional and personal background. This can hold true 
also for individuals who believe to know what sustainable investing entails and disdain this 
approach; they often routinely but unknowingly engage in sustainable investing practices. As 
such, we find that wealthy private investors have a limited understanding of sustainable 
investing. The provision of training and information for private investors is required to realize 
the latent market potential for sustainable investing. Further, through the application of the 
decision-making framework of theory of planned behaviour to the context of sustainable 
investing, we identify and conceptualize predominant barriers for the realization of private 
investors interest in sustainable investing. 
One particular informational barrier is investors’ predominant cognitive reduction of 
sustainable investing to its sub-topic of thematic investments (e.g., renewable energy), and the 
association with relatively high volatility of financial returns. This common misinformation is 
a barrier for individuals who have a short investment time horizon, or who experienced prior 
losses. These combinations point to the further exploration and application of insights from 
behavioural finance and prospect theory that relate to, for example, peoples’ disproportionate 
aversion to losses and volatility, which is amplified by a short investment time horizon. 
                                                 
2 Paper I is based on interviews with 10 wealthy private investors. 
3 Paper II is based on a survey results from 95 investment advisors at two private banks that, amongst other 
offers, provide sustainable investing products. Paper III is based on 22 interviews with investment advisors at 
three investment firms that either lead or lag in regard to the integration of sustainable investing into their private 
wealth management offering. 
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Another predominant barrier that is identified in Paper I pertains to investment 
advisors that refrain from advising their customers on sustainable investing. Based on the 
important role of advisors as a barrier for private investors, the cognitive barriers for advisors 
are explored in further detail in Paper II and Paper III. In Paper II, the expected volatility of 
sustainable investments appears not to be an aspect of substantial importance for advisors. 
This is surprising and contrary to prior research, including the findings of Paper I in regard to 
private investors, and opens up further research avenues related to behavioural economics.  
It is noteworthy that Paper II and Paper III identify complexity as an important 
determinant of advisors activity in communicating about sustainable investing with their 
wealthy clients. Compared to advisors that are focussed on sustainable investing, it appears 
that the hesitation of those advisors that do not have that focus relates to their perception of 
sustainable investing as prohibitively complex. Such ‘mainstream’ advisors refrain from 
conversing about sustainable investing with clients even if it is perceived as a valuable 
pursuit. In Paper II we argue that this finding points to the logic of embedded real options as 
an avenue to conceptualize advisors’ hesitation. Advisors appear to forgo the first real option 
to learn about sustainable investing ahead of client conversations, which would reduce the 
perceived complexity or ‘cost’ of communicating about sustainable investing. As a result, 
advisors also forgo the second real option to discuss sustainable investing in a client meeting. 
This would hold true even if a financial gain could be expected from doing so – if that gain is 
smaller than the opportunity cost that the advisor is willing to bear in the face of the as high 
perceived complexity of sustainable investing. 
Also in regard to complexity, Paper III finds that advisors that focus on sustainable 
investing undertake a “complexity shift”. These advisors actively deny that financial markets 
are complex, but refer to them as flawed to the detriment of private investors; contrary to the 
argument that is made by advisors who do not focus on sustainable investing. Instead, 
advisors that focus on sustainable investing attach high complexity to their customers’ needs. 
This implies that both types of advisors rely on “complexity” to justify their role. 
Further, in Paper III we identify substantial differences in the narratives that are 
employed by those advisors that are focused on sustainable investing and those that are not. 
Advisors that focus on sustainable investing regard this approach as the savior, or solution to 
many problems of financial markets. Advisors that are not focussed on sustainable investing 
employ the narrative of sustainable investing as a nuisance that is interesting in principle, but 
that challenges their operational efficiency, i.e. that takes too long to deal with, which is a 
substantial barrier for the consideration of sustainable investing by these advisors. Since 
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narratives might be difficult to transfer or modify, such prohibitive narratives that are 
predominantly employed by advisors at mainstream and incumbent investment firms might 
represent a substantial barrier for the potential mainstreaming of sustainable investing on a 
systemic level.  
Overall, this dissertation provides answers to the initial question towards reasons 
behind the Sustainable Investing gap. Many of the aspects that are mentioned in this 
conclusion and throughout the research papers provide ample room for the further exploration 
of this research field, which is largely new, yet bears substantial significance for the further 
development of financial markets, economies, society and the natural environment. 
 34 
 
References 
Abad, A., Clarke, J., & Miller, B. (2005). Using Real Options to Determine the Optimal 
Investment Schedule. In AIAA 5th conference proceedings. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179–211. 
Ajzen, I. (2014). The theory of planned behaviour is alive and well, and not ready to retire: a 
commentary on Sniehotta, Presseau, and Araújo-Soares. Health Psychology Review, 
(July), 1–7. 
Ajzen, I., & Madden, T. J. (1986). Prediction of goal-directed behavior: Attitudes, intentions, 
and perceived behavioral control. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22(5), 
453–474. 
Akerlof, G. A., & Shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
Albertini, E. (2013). Does Environmental Management Improve Financial Performance? A 
Meta-Analytical Review. Organization & Environment, 26(4), 431–457. 
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving. The Economic Journal, 100(401), 464–477. 
Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2011). Top Incomes in the Long Run of History. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 49(1), 3–71. 
Bakija, J., Cole, A., & Heim, B. T. (2012). Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the 
Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data (pp. 1–63). 
Williamstown, MA, USA. 
Bansal, P., & Clelland, I. (2004). Talking trash: Legitimacy, impression management, and 
unsystematic risk in the context of the natural environment. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47(1), 93–103. 
Bansal, P., Gao, J., & Qureshi, I. (2014). The Extensiveness of Corporate Social and 
Environmental Commitment across Firms over Time. Organization Studies, 35(7), 949–
966. 
Bansal, P., & Knox-Hayes, J. (2013). The Time and Space of Materiality in Organizations and 
the Natural Environment. Organization & Environment, 26(1), 61–82. 
Bazerman, M., Tenbrunsel, A., & Wade-Benzoni, K. (1998). Negotiating with Yourself and 
Losing: Making Decisions with Competing Internal Preferences. Academy of 
Management Review, 23(2), 225–241. 
 35 
Beal, D., & Goyen, M. (1998). “Putting your money where your mouth is” A profile of ethical 
investors. Financial Services Review, 7(2), 129–143. 
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1), 73–92. 
Benford, R., & Snow, D. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(2000), 611–639. 
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality. New York, USA: 
Doubleday 
Berry, T. C., & Junkus, J. C. (2013). Socially Responsible Investing: An Investor Perspective. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 112(4), 707–720. 
Beunza, D., & Garud, R. (2007). Calculators, lemmings or frame-makers? The intermediary 
role of securities analysts. The Sociological Review, 55, 13–39. 
Bollen, N. (2007). Mutual fund attributes and investor behavior. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 42(3), 683–708. 
Bowman, E. H., Moskowitz, G. T., Cox, E. L., & Box, P. O. (2001). Real Options Analysis 
and Strategic Decision Making, 12(6), 772–777. 
Busch, T., & Hoffmann, V. H. (2009). Ecology-Driven Real Options: An Investment 
Framework for Incorporating Uncertainties in the Context of the Natural Environment. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 90(2), 295–310. 
Calvert Foundation. (2012). Gateways to Impact - Industry Survey of Financial Advisors on 
Sustainable and Impact Investing. Bethesda: Calvert Foundation 
Capgemini, & RBC Wealth Management. (2012). World Wealth Report 2012. New York: 
Capgemini 
Célérier, C., & Vallée, B. (2013). What Drives Financial Complexity? A Look into the Retail 
Market for Structured Products. Paper presented at the conference A Look into the Retail 
Market for Structured Products (July 1, 2013). Paris, France. 
Çelik, S., & Isaksson, M. (2014). Institutional investors and ownership engagement. OECD 
Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2013(2), 93–114. 
Chang, M. (1998). Predicting Unethical Behavior: A Comparison of the Theory of Reasoned 
Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 1825–1834. 
Chatterji, A. K., Levine, D. I., & Toffel, M. W. (2009). How Well Do Social Ratings Actually 
Measure Corporate Social Responsibility? Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 18(1), 125–169. 
 36 
Cheah, E.-T., Jamali, D., Johnson, J. E. V., & Sung, M.-C. (2011). Drivers of Corporate 
Social Responsibility Attitudes: The Demography of Socially Responsible Investors. 
British Journal of Management, 22(2), 305–323. 
Clark, G. L., & Hebb, T. (2005). Why should they care? The role of institutional investors in 
the market for corporate global responsibility. Environment and Planning A, 37(11), 
2015–2031. 
Cordano, M., & Frieze, I. (2000). Pollution reduction preferences of US environmental 
managers: Applying Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior. Academy of Management 
Journal, 43(4), 627–641. 
Cortazar, G., Schwartz, E., & Salinas, M. (1998). Evaluating Environmental Investments: A 
Real Options Approach. Management Science, 44(8), 1059–1070. 
Couper, M. (2000). Review : Web Surveys : A Review of Issues and Approaches. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 64(4), 464–494. 
Craig, P., Glasser, H., & Kempton, W. (1993). Ethics and values in environmental policy: the 
said and the UNCED. Environmental Values, 2(2), 137–157(21). 
Crane, A. (2000). Facing the backlash: green marketing and strategic reorientation in the 
1990s. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 8(3), 277–296. 
Davis, G. F. (2009a). Managed by the Markets: How Finance Reshaped America. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Davis, G. F. (2009b). The Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of 
Organizations. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(3), 27–44. 
 
Davis, G. F. (forthcoming). Celebrating Organization Theory: The After-Party. Journal of 
Management Studies. 
 
Davis, G. F., & Marquis, C. (2005). Prospects for Organization Theory in the Early Twenty-
First Century: Institutional Fields and Mechanisms. Organization Science, 16(4), 332–343. 
 
Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. (1994). A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate 
Control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1), 141–173. 
Deni Greene Consulting Services. (2001). A Capital Idea: Realising Value from 
Environmental and Social Performance. North Carlton, Australia. 
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. 
Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401–419. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological 
Review, 48(2), 147–160. 
 37 
Dixit, A. K., & Pindyck, R. S. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Dunfee, T. W. (2003). Social Investing: Mainstream or Backwater ? Journal of Business 
Ethics, (43), 247–252. 
East, R. (1993). Investment decisions and the theory of planned behaviour. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 14, 337–375. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory Building From Cases: Opportunities 
and Challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25–32. 
Eurosif. (2008). HNWIs & Sustainable Investments 2008. Brussels, Belgium: Eurosif. 
Retrieved from http://www.eurosif.org 
Eurosif. (2010). HNWIs & Sustainable Investments 2010. Brussels, Belgium: Eurosif. 
Retrieved from http://www.eurosif.org 
Eurosif. (2012a). European SRI Study 2012. Brussels, Belgium: Eurosif. Retrieved from 
http://www.eurosif.org 
Eurosif. (2012b). HNWIs & Sustainable Investment 2012. Brussels, Belgium: Eurosif. 
Retrieved from http://www.eurosif.org 
Eurosif. (2014). European SRI Study. Brussels. Brussels, Belgium: Eurosif. Retrieved from 
http://www.eurosif.org 
Evered, R., & Louis, M. R. (1981). Alternative Perspectives in the Organizational Sciences: 
“Inquiry From the Inside” and “Inquiry From the Outside”. Academy of Management 
Review, 6(3), 385–395. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. The 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383–417. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. (p. 
1957). Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. 
Fidelity Investments. (2012). 2012 Fidelity Millionaire Outlook. Boston, MA, USA: Fidelity 
Investments. 
French, K. R. (2008). Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing. The Journal of 
Finance, 63(4), 1537–1573. 
 
Froud, J., Nilsson, A., Moran, M., & Williams, K. (2012). Stories and Interests in Finance: 
Agendas of Governance Before and After the Financial Crisis. Governance, 25(1), 35–59. 
 38 
Gallie, W. B. (1956). Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
54, 167–198. 
Gallup. (2009). Europeans’ attitudes towards the issue of sustainable consumption and 
production. Flash EB Series #256. Washington, DC: European Commission—Flash 
Eurobarometer. 
Gibbert, M., & Ruigrok, W. (2010). The What’' and How’' of Case Study Rigor: Three 
Strategies Based on Published Work. Organizational Research Methods, 13(4), 710–
737. 
Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W., & Wicki, B. (2008). What passes as a rigorous case study? 
Strategic Management Journal, 29(13), 1465–1474. 
Girerd-Potin, I., Jimenez-Garcès, S., & Louvet, P. (2013). Which Dimensions of Social 
Responsibility Concern Financial Investors? Journal of Business Ethics, 121(4), 559–
576. 
Glac, K. (2008). Understanding Socially Responsible Investing: The Effect of Decision 
Frames and Trade-off Options. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(S1), 41–55. 
Gladwin, T., Kennelly, J., & Krause, T. (1995). Shifting paradigms for sustainable 
development: Implications for management theory and research. Academy of 
Management Review, 20(4). 
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 
research. Chicago, USA: Aldine Pub. Co. 
Godfrey, P. C., Merrill, C. B., & Hansen, J. M. (2009). The relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and shareholder value: an empirical test of the risk management 
hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 30(4), 425–445. 
Gond, J.-P., & Piani, V. (2013). Enabling Institutional Investors’ Collective Action: The Role 
of the Principles for Responsible Investment Initiative. Business & Society, 52(1), 64–104. 
 
Gond, J.-P., Louche, C., Slager, R., Juravle, C., & Yamahaki, C. (2011). The institutional and 
social construction of responsible investment. In Proceedings of the 2011 IABS Conference 
(pp. 524–531). 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481–510. 
GSIA. (2013). Global Sustainable Investment Review 2012. GSIA. Retrieved from 
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/ 
Haack, P., Schoeneborn, D., & Wickert, C. (2012). Talking the Talk, Moral Entrapment, 
Creeping Commitment? Exploring Narrative Dynamics in Corporate Responsibility 
Standardization. Organization Studies, 33(5-6), 815–845. 
 39 
Hackethal, A., Haliassos, M., & Jappelli, T. (2012). Financial advisors: A case of babysitters? 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(2), 509–524. 
Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2010). Discourse, Field-Configuring Events, and Change in 
Organizations and Institutional Fields: Narratives of DDT and the Stockholm Convention. 
Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1365–1392. 
Hart, S. L., & Milstein, M. B. M. (1999). Global Sustainability and the Creative Destruction 
of Industries. Sloan Management Review, 41(1), 23–33. 
Hawkes, J. (2001). The fourth pillar of sustainability: Culture’s essential role in public 
planning. Melbourne, Australia: Cultural Development Network (Vic). 
Henry, A. D., & Dietz, T. (2012). Understanding Environmental Cognition. Organization & 
Environment, 25(3), 238–258. 
Hofstede, G. (1984). Cultural dimensions in management and planning. Asia Pacific Journal 
of Management, (January), 81–99. 
Hummels, H., & Timmer, D. (2004). Investors in Need of Social, Ethical, and Environmental 
Information. Journal of Business Ethics, 52(1), 73–84. 
Husted, B. W. (2005). Risk Management, Real Options, Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 60(2), 175–183. 
Inderst, R. (2011). Consumer protection and the role of advice in the market for retail 
financial services. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 167, 4–21. 
Jansson, M., & Biel, A. (2011). Motives to engage in sustainable investment: a comparison 
between institutional and private investors. Sustainable Development, 19(2), 135–142. 
Juravle, C., & Lewis, A. (2008). Identifying impediments to SRI in Europe: a review of the 
practitioner and academic literature. Business Ethics: A European Review, 17(3), 285–
310. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263–292. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, Values, and Frames. American Psychologist, 
341–350. 
Kaiser, F., Wölfing, S., & Fuhrer, U. (1999). Environmental attitude and ecological 
behaviour. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 19, 1–19. 
Kalafatis, S. P., Pollard, M., East, R., & Tsogas, M. H. (1999). Green marketing and Ajzen’s 
theory of planned behaviour: a cross-market examination. Journal of Consumer 
Marketing, 16(5), 441–460. 
Karp, D. G. (1996). Values and their Effect on Pro-Environmental Behavior. Environment 
and Behavior, 28(111), 111–133. 
 40 
Kopczuk, W., & Saez, E. (2004). Top Wealth Shares in the United States: 1916-2000: 
Evidence from Estate Tax Returns. National Tax Journal, LVII(2-2), 445–487. 
Krippner, G. R. (2005). The financialization of the American economy. Socio-Economic 
Review, 3(2), 173–208. 
Krychowski, C., Que, B. V, & Quélin, B. V. (2010). Real Options and Strategic Investment 
Decisions: Can They Be of Use to Scholars? Academy Of Management Perspectives, 
24(2), 65–78. 
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Kvale, S. (2007). Doing interviews. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Lewis, A. (2001). A focus group study of the motivation to invest: “ethical/green” and 
“ordinary” investors compared. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 30(4), 331–341. 
Lewis, A. (2002). Morals, markets and money: Ethical, green and socially responsible 
investing. London: Prentice Hall/Financial Times. 
Lewis, A., & Mackenzie, C. (2000). Morals, money, ethical investing and economic 
psychology. Human Relations, 53(2), 179–191. 
Lok, J. (2010). Institutional Logics as Identity Projects. Academy of Management Journal, 
53(6), 1305–1335. 
Lulfs, R., & Hahn, R. (2014). Sustainable Behavior in the Business Sphere: A Comprehensive 
Overview of the Explanatory Power of Psychological Models. Organization & 
Environment, 27(1), 43–64. 
Lynne, G., & Casey, C. F. (1995). Conservation technology adoption decisions and the theory 
of planned behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 16, 581–598. 
Malkiel, B. G. (1973). A Random Walk Down Wall Street. New York, USA: Norton. 
Marcus, A., Malen, J., & Ellis, S. (2013). The Promise and Pitfalls of Venture Capital as an 
Asset Class for Clean Energy Investment: Research Questions for Organization and 
Natural Environment Scholars. Organization & Environment, 26(1), 31–60. 
Markowitz, L., Cobb, D., & Hedley, M. (2012). Framing Ambiguity: Insider/Outsiders and 
the Successful Legitimation Project of the Socially Responsible Mutual Fund Industry. 
Organization, 19(1), 3–23. 
 
Marti, E., & Scherer, A. G. (2014). Financial Regulation and Social Welfare: The Critical 
Contribution of Management Theory. UZH Business Working Paper Series No. 340. 
Maula, M., Autio, E., & Arenius, P. (2005). What Drives Micro-Angel Investments? Small 
Business Economics, 25(5), 459–475. 
 41 
McLachlan, J., & Gardner, J. (2004). A Comparison of Socially Responsible and 
Conventional Investors. Journal of Business Ethics, 52(1), 11–25. 
Mercer. (2009). Shedding light on responsible investment: Approaches, returns and impacts. 
Finance. New York. 
Mercer. (2012). Through the looking glass: How investors are applying the results of the 
climate change scenarios study. System. New York. 
Merton, R. (1959). Notes on problem-finding in sociology. In R. Merton, L. Broom, & L. S. 
Cottrell (Eds.), Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects. New York, USA: Basic 
Books. 
Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations : Formal Structure as Myth 
and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. 
Milfont, T. L., & Gouveia, V. V. (2006). Time perspective and values: An exploratory study 
of their relations to environmental attitudes. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 
26(1), 72–82. 
Moon, J. (2007). The Contribution of Corporate Social Responsibility to Sustainable 
Development. Sustainable Development, 15, 296–306. 
Mullainathan, S., Noeth, M., & Schoar, A. (2012). The market for financial advice: An audit 
study. NBER Working Paper Series, 17929. 
Munir, K. A. (2011). Financial Crisis 2008–2009: What Does the Silence of Institutional 
Theorists Tell Us? Journal of Management Inquiry, 20(2), 114–117. 
Munk, N. (1999). How Levi’s Trashed a Great American Brand. Fortune, 82–89. 
Nilsson, A., & Biel, A. (2008). Acceptance of climate change policy measures: role framing 
and value guidance. European Environment, 18(4), 203–215. 
Nilsson, J. (2008). Investment with a Conscience: Examining the Impact of Pro-Social 
Attitudes and Perceived Financial Performance on Socially Responsible Investment 
Behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(2), 307–325. 
Nilsson, J. (2009). Segmenting socially responsible mutual fund investors: The influence of 
financial return and social responsibility. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 
27(1), 5–31. 
Nilsson, J. (2010). Consumer decision making in a complex environment: Examining the 
decision making process of socially responsible mutual fund investors. Umeå: Umeå 
University. 
Nilsson, J., Nordvall, A.-C., & Isberg, S. (2010). The information search process of socially 
responsible investors. Journal of Financial Services Marketing, 15(1), 5–18. 
 42 
Nilsson, J., Siegl, S., & Korling, F. (2012). The complex decision making environment of 
socially responsible mutual fund investors: Introducing a disclosure framework focusing 
on information quality (No. 12-01) (pp. 1–30). 
Nunnally, J. (1967). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Okoye, A. (2009). Theorising Corporate Social Responsibility as an Essentially Contested 
Concept: Is a Definition Necessary? Journal of Business Ethics, 89(4), 613–627. 
Orlitzky, M. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility, Noise, and Stock Market Volatility. 
Academy of Management Perspectives, 27(3), 238–254. 
Orlitzky, M., & Benjamin, J. D. (2001). Corporate Social Performance and Firm Risk: A 
Meta-Analytic Review. Business & Society, 40(4), 369–396. 
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., & Rynes, S. L. (2003). Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Organization Studies, 24(3), 403–441. 
Orlitzky, M., Siegel, D. S., & Waldman, D. a. (2011). Strategic Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability. Business & Society, 50(1), 6–27. 
Orlitzky, M., & Swanson, D. L. (2008). Toward Integrative Corporate Citizenship: Research 
Advances in Corporate Social Performance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Oxfam. (2014). Even it up: Time To End Extreme Inequality. London: Oxfam 
Pachauri, R. K. (2014). Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report. IPCC. 
Paetzold, F., & Busch, T. (2014). Unleashing the Powerful Few: Sustainable Investing 
Behaviour of Wealthy Private Investors. Organization & Environment, 27(4), 347–367. 
Park, H., Russell, C., & Lee, J. (2007). National culture and environmental sustainability: A 
cross-national analysis. Journal of Economics and Finance, 31(1), 104–121. 
Pentland, B. (1999). Building Process Theory with Narrative: From Description to 
Explanation. Academy of Management Review, 24(4), 711–724. 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the 21st century. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2003). Income Inequality in the United States. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, CXVIII(1), 1–39. 
Piketty, T., & Zucman, G. (2014). Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 
1700-2010. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3), 1255–1310. 
Polonsky, M. J., Bailey, J., Baker, H., Basche, C., Jepson, C., & Neath, L. (1998). 
Communicating Environmental Information : Are Marketing Claims on Packaging 
Misleading ? Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 281–294. 
 43 
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance. New York, London: Free Press, Collier Macmillan. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy & society: The link between competitive 
advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 48(12), 78–92. 
Presser, S., Couper, M. P., Lessler, J. T., Martin, E., Rothgeb, J. M., Bureau, U. S. C., & 
Singer, E. (2004). Methods for testing and evaluating survey questions. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 68(1), 109–130. 
Principles for Responsible Investment. (2014). Report on progress 2014. London, UK: 
Principles for Responsible Investment. 
Rabinovich, A., Morton, T., & Postmes, T. (2010). Time perspective and attitude-behaviour 
consistency in future-oriented behaviours. British Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 69–
89. 
Ramayah, T., Lee, J. W. C., & Lim, S. (2012). Sustaining the environment through recycling: 
an empirical study. Journal of Environmental Management, 102, 141–147. 
Rao, H., Greve, H., & Davis, G. (2001). Fool’s Gold: Social Proof in the Initiation and 
Abandonment of Coverage by Wall Street Analysts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
46(3), 502–526. 
Renneboog, L., Ter Horst, J., & Zhang, C. (2008). The price of ethics and stakeholder 
governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 14(3), 302–322. 
Rhodes, C., & Brown, A. D. (2005). Narrative, Organizations and Research. International 
Journal of Management Reviews, 7(3), 167–188. 
Roberts, J. a. (1996). Green consumers in the 1990s: Profile and implications for advertising. 
Journal of Business Research, 36(3), 217–231. 
Rogers, E. (2003). The Diffusion of Innovations (Fifth Edit.). New York: The Free Press. 
Rosen, B., Sandler, D., & Shani, D. (1991). Social Issues and Socially Responsible 
Investment Behavior: A Preliminary Empirical Investigation. Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 25(2), 221–234. 
Russo, M., & Fouts, P. (1997). A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental 
performance and profitability. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 534–559. 
Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2014). Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence 
from Capitalized Income Tax Data (No. 20625) (pp. 1–56). 
Sandberg, J., Juravle, C., Hedesström, T. M., & Hamilton, I. (2008). The Heterogeneity of 
Socially Responsible Investment. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(4), 519–533. 
 44 
Sandberg, J., & Nilsson, J. (2011). Conflicting Intuitions about Ethical Investment: A Survey 
Among Individual Investors (No. 10). 
Scholtens, B. (2006). Finance as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 68(1), 19–33. 
Schrader, U. (2006). Ignorant advice – customer advisory service for ethical investment 
funds. Business Strategy and the Environment, 15(3), 200–214. 
Schueth, S. (2003). Socially Responsible Investing in the United States. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 43, 189–194. 
Schultz, P. W., & Zelezny, L. (1999). Values as predictors of environmental attitudes: 
Evidence for consistency across 14 countries. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 19, 
255–265. 
Sharpe, W. (1964). Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions 
of Risk. The Journal of Finance, 19(3), 425–442. 
Shorrocks, A., Davies, J., & Lluberas, R. (2013). Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 
2013. Zurich: Credit Suisse 
Shrivastava, P. (1995). Environmental Technologies and Competitive Advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, 16(1 995), 183–200. 
Shu, L., & Bazerman, M. (2010). Cognitive barriers to environmental action: Problems and 
solutions. HBS Working Paper Series No. 11-046. Retrieved from 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6576.html  
Slager, R., Gond, J.-P., & Moon, J. (2012). Standardization as Institutional Work: The 
Regulatory Power of a Responsible Investment Standard. Organization Studies, 33(5–6), 
763–790. 
Sievänen, R., Rita, H., & Scholtens, B. (2012). The Drivers of Responsible Investment: The 
Case of European Pension Funds. Journal of Business Ethics, 117(1), 137–151. 
Sijtsma, K. (2009). On the use, the misuse, and the very limited usefulness of Cronbach’s 
alpha. Psychometrika, 74(1), 107–120. 
Stalker, L. L. (2010). Narratives. In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (pp. 595–597). 
2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications, 
Inc. 
Statman, M. (2004). What do investors want? Journal of Portfolio Management, 30(5), 153–
161. 
Stern, P. C. (2000). Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior. 
Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 407–424. 
 45 
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A., & Kalof, L. (1999). A Value-Belief-Norm 
Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism. Research in 
Human Ecology, 6(2), 81–97. 
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., & Guagnano, G. a. (1998). A Brief Inventory of Values. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, 58(6), 984–1001. 
Surroca, J., Tribó, J., & Waddock, S. (2010). Corporate responsibility and financial 
performance: The role of intangible resources. Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), 
463–490. 
Swiss Bankers Association. (2014). The Swiss financial centre. Basel: Swiss Bankers 
Association 
Thaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break 
Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice. Management Science, 36(6), 
643–660. 
The Economist. (2014). Free exchange: Forget the 1%. The Economist, p. 71. London, UK. 
Tong, T., & Reuer, J. (2007). Real Options in Multinational Corporations: Organizational 
Challenges and Risk Implications. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(2), 215–
230. 
UNPRI. (2013). PRI Annual Report 2013. United Nations Principles of Responsible 
Investing. London: UNPRI 
US SIF Foundation. (2012). Report on Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends in the 
United States 2012. Washington: US SIF Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://ussif.org/resources/pubs/documents/USSIFTrends2012ES.pdf 
Van de Venter, G., & Michayluk, D. (2008). An Insight into Overconfidence in the 
Forecasting Abilities of Financial Advisors. Australian Journal of Management, 32(3), 
545–557. 
Wang, M., Bernstein, A., & Chesney, M. (2012). An experimental study on real-options 
strategies. Quantitative Finance, 12(11), 1753–1772. 
Webley, P., Lewis, A., & Mackenzie, C. (2001). Commitment among ethical investors: An 
experimental approach. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22(1), 27–42. 
West, J. (2012). Financial advisor participation rates and low net worth investors. Journal of 
Financial Services Marketing, 17(1), 50–66. 
Williams, K. (2000). From shareholder value to present-day capitalism. Economy and Society, 
29(1), 1–12. 
Wins, A., & Zwergel, B. (2014). Comparing those who do, might and will not invest in 
sustainble funds - A survey among German retail fund investors. University of Augsburg 
 46 
Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443721 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443721 
Woods, C., & Urwin, R. (2010). Putting Sustainable Investing into Practice: A Governance 
Framework for Pension Funds. Journal of Business Ethics, 92, 1–19. 
Yin, R. (2003a). Applications of case study research (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Yin, R. (2003b). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. Annual Review of Sociology, 13, 
443–464. 
Zuckerman, E. (1999). The categorical imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy 
Discount. American Journal of Sociology, 104(5), 1398–1438. 
 
 47 
 
Chapter II – Research Papers 
 
 
 48 
 
 49 
2 Unleashing the Powerful Few: Sustainable Investing Behaviour 
of Wealthy Private Investors                                                                      
Abstract 
 
Despite their apparent interest, private investors are surprisingly disengaged from sustainable 
investing, an observation that has received limited scholarly attention. This theory building 
study draws on the theory of planned behaviour to conceptualize the decision-making process 
of private investors towards sustainable investing. Findings from literature provide some 
insights but do not yield a comprehensive answer as to why private investors refrain from 
sustainable investing. Interviews with wealthy private investors led us to identify a generally 
high interest in sustainable investing and dominant barriers that prevent actual engagement. 
Barriers are the perception of high volatility within sustainable investments in combination 
with, first, a short investment time horizon and, second, recent financial losses. Third, we find 
that investment advisors withhold required information from their clients. We suggest a 
decision-making framework that facilitates a better understanding of the engagement of 
private investors in sustainable investing, and outline avenues for future research and 
implications for practitioners. 
 
Keywords: sustainable investing, private investors, theory of planned behaviour, investment 
decision making, time orientation 
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Introduction 
Academic- and practitioner-oriented literature has paid significant attention to the 
incorporation of sustainability criteria into capital market investment decisions, or sustainable 
investing (SI; Global Sustainable Investment Alliance [GSIA], 2013). The amount of assets 
and the number of market participants engaged in SI has grown substantially worldwide, and 
accounts for approximately USD 14 trillion in investments (GSIA, 2013) and over 1,100 
institutions committed to SI to date (UNPRI, 2013). However, in Europe, the region where SI 
is most prominent, institutional investors, such as pension funds, govern 97% of the total 
assets under management in SI while only 3% are held by private investors (Eurosif, 2012a; 
GSIA, 2013). Therefore, we disagree with claims that SI is a mainstream practice widely 
applied in capital markets (e.g., Eurosif, 2012a; Sievänen, Rita, & Scholtens, 2013). While 
this claim may hold true for institutional investors, it does not for private investors. For 
private investors there seems to be a dichotomy between interest in SI and actual engagement 
in SI. Empirical evidence shows that the majority of people, including wealthy private 
investors, are potentially interested in SI (Eurosif, 2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 
2014). However, surveys find that the SI-market potential amongst private investors is far 
from being realized (Schrader, 2006) as they face barriers that limit their engagement in SI. 
The observed asymmetry between the engagement in SI by institutional and private investors 
cannot be explained by the distribution of assets either, as institutions govern an estimated 
USD 80 trillion compared to USD 50 trillion in private financial wealth (Çelik & Isaksson, 
2014; Shorrocks et al., 2013). In light of this “SI gap” – the gap between expected and actual 
engagement of private investors in SI – this study is motivated by the question, “What are the 
barriers that limit the engagement of private investors in SI?” 
This study is a theory-building effort that aims to understand the reasoning behind the 
SI gap. It also provides answers to specific calls for research: As SI is still an emerging field, 
research on decision-making processes at the micro-level of SI adoption is required (Gond et 
al., 2011; Juravle & Lewis, 2008), especially on barriers (Glac, 2008) and wealthy private 
investors (Schrader, 2006). This paper develops a decision-making framework based on the 
theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 1991). This theory has proven 
useful to explain variations in individual behaviour in regard to, for example, environmental 
cognition (Henry & Dietz, 2012), sustainable behaviour in the business sphere (Lulfs & Hahn, 
2014), or equity investments (East, 1993). By applying the extant SI literature to the 
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framework we show that some answers are given but explanations for the SI gap remain 
limited. In our empirical work, we conducted interviews with wealthy private investors that 
have more than one million USD in freely investable assets; a very small, secretive segment 
that governs 40% of total household wealth (Shorrocks et al., 2013). Our analysis points to a 
high interest in SI and three dominant barriers. Two barriers pertain to the perception of the 
volatility of SI. Investors who perceive SI as overly volatile were unlikely to engage in SI 
when they had a short investment time horizon or when they had experienced prior general 
losses. The third barrier relates to investment advisors that withhold SI information. Through 
the application of our exploratory empirical data we develop a framework that allows for a 
more fine-grained understanding of the decision-making process of private investors in the SI 
context. 
The next section provides a background on sustainable investing, followed by the 
conceptual decision-making framework used in this study and the application of SI literature 
to it. Further sections outline the empirical method applied and present the interview results 
along the structure of the framework. We close with a discussion and conclusion. 
 
2.1 Background: Sustainable Investing 
The general understanding of what sustainable investing (SI) entails is to “integrate certain 
kinds of non-financial concerns – variously called ethical, social, environmental or corporate 
governance criteria – in the otherwise strictly financials-driven investment process” 
(Sandberg et al., 2008, p. 519). This can be achieved through a focus on certain industries 
(e.g., renewable energy), and likewise their exclusion (e.g., weapons, tobacco), or by the 
integration of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria into investment 
decisions. The advantage of our broad definition of SI beyond the ‘responsible’ or ‘ethical’ 
terminology is that it does not restrain the discussion to any narrow interpretation of SI. In 
practice, SI is a broad field of investment approaches. Most prominent are the application of 
exclusion criteria and the integration of ESG criteria in mainstream security selection. A 
much smaller tranche of assets is invested in more volatile industries or themes such as water 
or renewable energy, or in new asset classes such as microfinance (GSIA, 2013). 
The SI literature is focused on the financial performance of SI on the level of firms or 
mutual funds (Gond et al., 2011). On the level of SI mutual funds, the risk-adjusted 
performance is found to be “not statistically different from the performance of conventional 
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funds” (Renneboog et al., 2008, p. 1). Also on the level of individual firms no negative 
performance implications are found (Albertini, 2013; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Surroca et al., 
2010). Beyond financial performance, literature on non-financial aspects of SI discusses a 
range of arguments for engaging in SI, from a ‘warm glow’, or positive feelings, to ethical 
concerns and social status (e.g., Andreoni, 1990; Dunfee, 2003; Statman, 2004). 
Regarding the segment of private investors, some studies cover investor 
characteristics, motivations, and, to a lesser degree, barriers of SI-investors, as well as 
comparisons with non-SI investors (e.g., Cheah, Jamali, Johnson, & Sung, 2011; Nilsson, 
Nordvall, & Isberg, 2010; Nilsson, 2009; Sandberg et al., 2008; Sandberg & Nilsson, 2011). 
However, there is no clear answer to the SI-gap. It remains unclear why some individual 
investors practice SI while others do not (Glac, 2008). The literature does not provide a clear 
picture of what the dominant barriers are, if and how barriers and other aspects relate to each 
other, and what kind of combinations matter.  
Among private investors, particularly interesting are individuals with more than one 
million USD in freely investable assets, known as High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) 
(Eurosif, 2012b). HNWIs make up 0.7% of the world population, yet they govern more than 
40% of global household wealth (Shorrocks et al., 2013), and thus can substantially contribute 
to more SI engagement. HNWIs appear to be interested in considering sustainability topics 
such as climate change in their investment decisions since they “are typically long-term 
investors whose aim is to preserve capital for the next generations to come” (Eurosif, 2012b, 
p. 7). Further, HNWIs are in a preferable situation to invest along their interests, since they 
“have access to investments that are normally closed to smaller retail investors, and the 
freedom to move funds quickly without having to perform the extensive due diligence 
required by institutional investors” (Eurosif, 2012b, p. 7). However, the observed SI gap 
persists, and although that puzzle lends itself to scholarly work, research into this group that is 
well-guarded by private banks and their advisors appears to be non-existent. Insights on 
HNWIs in the context of SI are therefore required (Schrader, 2006), which is where this study 
contributes with empirical work.  
In light of the observed gaps in literature we undertake a corresponding theory 
building effort. We draw from literature and our empirical work with HNWIs to develop a 
decision-making framework for private investors´ engagement in SI based on the theory of 
planned behaviour, including a perspective on dominant barriers. Next, we outline the initial 
framework. 
 
 53 
2.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour in the Context of Sustainable Investing 
To predict behaviour, scholars focus on frameworks to link evaluative criteria to the 
formation of an intention towards a specific behaviour, coupled with the factors that limit the 
realization of that behaviour (Kalafatis, Pollard, East, & Tsogas, 1999). Most prevalent 
among these frameworks is the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 
1991). Theory of planned behaviour (TPB) has been found to provide high explanatory power 
and is useful in understanding a wide range of individual behaviours (Ajzen, 2014). In regard 
to sustainability, TPB is applied to understand the determinants of individual behaviour in the 
context of, for example, pollution reduction preferences (Cordano & Frieze, 2000), 
sustainable behaviour in the corporate sphere (Lulfs & Hahn, 2014), unethical behaviour 
(Chang, 1998), green marketing (Kalafatis et al., 1999), recycling (Ramayah, Lee, & Lim, 
2012), water saving technology (Lynne & Casey, 1995) and environmental attitude (Kaiser, 
Wölfing, & Fuhrer, 1999). These studies demonstrate the suitability of TPB to explain and 
predict the variance in the behaviour of individuals in activities related to sustainability. 
However, they also show that different factors matter to understand behaviour in different 
contexts. In regard to the application of TPB in the general context of investment decisions – 
i.e., without a specific link to sustainability – East (1993) discusses the role of relatives and 
friends, easy access to funds, expected financial profit and the risk of the investment. Also in 
the investment context, Maula et al (2005) shows that whether individuals invest in new 
businesses owned by others is influenced by the personal familiarity with entrepreneurs, 
status as an owner-manager in a firm, perceived skills in starting a new business, and gender. 
We are not aware of an application of TPB to SI. In TPB, behaviour is predicted by intention, 
which is predicted by three determinants - attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norm 
and perceived behavioural control. We relate these determinants of behaviour of the TPB 
framework to SI, with the result shown in Figure 1. 
Attitude towards the behaviour refers to the attributes, outcomes and consequences 
that are associated with the behaviour, i.e. if the behaviour is deemed attractive or not. For 
example, an individual might associate the behaviour of eating a chocolate cake with a great 
sweet taste and feeling satisfied, but also with calories and feeling guilty for becoming fat. 
Whichever association weighs more strongly will determine if attitude towards the behaviour 
is positive or negative. In investment decisions, associations that matter for the formation of a 
positive attitude are, for example, high financial profits and low volatility (East, 1993). In 
regard to SI, several studies point to financial performance, risk, and non-financial factors as 
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important to investors (Beal & Goyen, 1998; Bollen, 2007; Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009; 
Eurosif, 2012b; J. Nilsson, 2009; Rosen et al., 1991; Statman, 2004). Thus, we expect that 
high financial profits and investment security or low volatility are supportive factors in the 
decision-making process in the SI context. Since SI also covers non-financial factors such as 
ethical considerations and personal values, we infer along the findings of the psychologist 
Festinger (1957) that investors will seek to align their beliefs with their investments. Thus, 
investors evaluate those opportunities that align with their values more positively. As 
literature points to a neutral risk/return implication of SI, and SI should be positioned 
positively in regard to non-financial considerations, we expect a positive attitude towards the 
behaviour in SI. 
Subjective norm, the second predictor of intention, refers to the social pressure that the 
individual perceives towards the behaviour. Subjective norm results from the perception of 
what important peers or groups think about the behaviour, and the motivation to comply with 
these views. Eating a chocolate cake might be approved of by a person’s office colleagues, 
but frowned upon by his marathon-running manager. As for investment decisions, East (1993) 
shows that the intention of a person to invest in shares is significantly influenced by the 
opinion of rela-tives and friends. Surveys find that the majority of Europeans consider 
sustainability impor-tant (Gallup, 2009); a representative study for Germany indicates that 
more than half of the citizens are generally interested in SI (Wins & Zwergel, 2014). Also 
wealthy private investors appear interested in SI (Eurosif, 2012b). Thus, we expect that there 
is some sort of perceived public pressure to invest in SI, and this subjective norm is 
supportive towards the intention to invest. 
Perceived behavioural control, the last predictor of intention, is the perceived ease or 
difficulty to actually implement the behaviour of interest. That includes the person’s 
perception of resources that are required, such as sufficient information, as well as 
opportunities or challenges to implement the behaviour. Consider that the bakers in the entire 
neighbourhood are perceived incapable of making proper cake. A supportive attitude towards 
the behaviour and subjective norm will result in a less strong intention to eat cake in such a 
situation compared to a situation where an artisan cake shop is found just down the street. In 
the investment context, East (1993) finds that investors who feel that they can’t easily buy 
shares do not do so. Thus, we expect perceived behavioural control, the perception of 
sufficient information, opportunities, and low barriers, to impact private investors’ formation 
of the intention to invest in SI. 
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In addition to its role as one of the three factors that determine intention formation, 
perceived behavioural control can also influence the behaviour in another way: A factor called 
actual behavioural control relates to perceived behavioural control, but pertains not to 
perceived barriers yet rather actual real-world barriers and opportunities that the person faces 
once the intention for a certain behaviour is formed. Such external aspects can hinder or 
facilitate the translation of that intention into action. As an example, consider the person who 
formed the intention to eat cake and went to the artisan cake shop down the street, but found it 
closed. East (1993) argues that investment decisions are so fact-based that no major difference 
between actual control and perceived control should exist. However, SI can be complex and 
new to some investors. Unanticipated regulatory barriers, advisors that are not accustomed to 
SI, or other roadblocks could limit people’s ability to move from intention to behaviour. Thus, 
we expect that also the last determinant of behaviour, actual behavioural control, matters in 
the SI context. 
In sum, we can relate each determinant of behaviour in the TPB framework to SI. We 
propose a correspondingly adapted wording of the framework as shown in Figure 1. As in 
other contexts related to sustainability, with this framework we expect to understand why 
individuals invest in SI, or why they do not invest, as observed in the SI gap, and to explain 
such variation.  
 
Figure 1: Theory of Planned Behaviour framework adapted to the context of sustainable 
investing 
Source: Adapted from Ajzen & Madden (1986) 
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2.3 Literature Related to the Determinants of Private Investors’ 
Behaviour in SI  
Depending on the balance of positive and negative connotations, three determinants of 
behaviour in the TPB framework either support or limit the formation of the intention to 
invest in SI. The intention leads to the behaviour of investing in SI, if no limitations from 
actual behavioural control constrain that. In our effort to develop a framework that helps to 
understand the decision-making process of private investors in SI, we relate insights from the 
SI literature to positive and negative connotations of each determinant of behaviour. Since the 
observed SI gap indicates that barriers keep investors from investing in SI, we focus our 
review on barriers, which we define as “departures from rational thought in predictable 
directions” (Shu & Bazerman, 2010, p. 3). An overview of studies that pertain to barriers for 
private investors in SI is presented in Table 1. Further, Table 2 outlines studies on 
motivations, as well as our results of inferring barriers by negating the aspects that these 
studies identified as motivations for SI. 
In regard to attitude towards the behaviour, empirical work with private investors has 
identified the perception of a low financial performance or high risk of SI as a potential 
barrier (Eurosif, 2012b; Glac, 2008). Financial risk was recognized as a barrier in SI because 
it conflicts with the moral obligation to bequeath wealth to heirs (Lewis, 2001). In regard to 
non-financial aspects, the perception that SI products fail to comply with expectations on 
ethics, irresponsible business practices, or support for sustainable development could also be a 
barrier. Such aspects have been found to matter for private investors, sometimes more so than 
financial performance (Beal & Goyen, 1998; Lewis, 2002; Rosen et al., 1991; Webley et al., 
2001).  
Subjective norm relates to public pressure to invest in SI. It appears that the public 
including HNWIs are likely interested in SI (Eurosif, 2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 
2014). Further, literature suggests that some investors engage in SI in the expectation of a 
preferable public image (Chatterji et al., 2009; Statman, 2004). Yet, the literature does not 
indicate potential barriers that could negatively influence this subjective norm.  
In perceived behavioural control, investors, in their thought process about the ease of 
investing in SI, can perceive a number of barriers related to the availability of SI products. 
One barrier could be a perceived mismatch between the focus of SI products on excluding 
industries and peoples’ own interests, since “investors seem to prefer to reward firms who 
display overall positive social behaviour rather than to exclude firms on the basis of certain 
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products or practices” (Berry & Junkus, 2013, p. 707). Nilsson (2008) points to the barrier of 
mistrust towards the marketed merits of SI products; thus investors could refrain from even 
looking for a suitable product. Similarly, a survey by Eurosif (2012b) amongst private and 
institutional investors identifies a perceived lack of SI-information and SI-products as 
barriers.  
As for actual behavioural control, the last determinant of behaviour, barriers have 
been found in the search for a suitable product. This search takes place after investors have 
formed the intention to invest in SI. Literature points to barriers in the form of a lack of 
financially relevant SI information published by listed companies (Hummels & Timmer, 
2004), an overwhelming breadth of sustainability information offered by SI mutual funds (J. 
Nilsson et al., 2012), or investment advisors that withhold SI information from private 
investors in retail banking (Schrader, 2006).   
Overall, a variety of potential barriers are identified in the literature that can be applied 
to the TPB framework. However, there are inconsistencies and knowledge gaps. In terms of 
inconsistencies, for example, concerns about moral obligation to bequeath to heirs, and 
therefore long-term performance concerns, are inconsistent with peoples’ extremely high 
discount rates regarding the future and a strong focus on short-term returns (Shu & Bazerman, 
2010). Concern for sustainable development as an important aspect is challenged by the 
tendency of individuals to blame others instead of taking action themselves, overly high 
optimism for the development of the future and human’s ability to control uncontrollable 
events such as climate change, and mental reliance on future technology (Bazerman, 
Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998). 
More important, however, are the following knowledge gaps. Amid the breadth and 
quantity of proposed barriers, it remains inconclusive what the dominant barriers are, i.e. what 
aspects matter most, if interrelations and/or combinations amongst barriers or other aspects 
exist, and where in the decision-making process these barriers appear. 
The disparate findings and gaps of the extant literature reiterate the need for empirical 
work. This study applies insights from interviews with HNWIs to inform a framework that 
conceptualizes the decision-making process of private investors in the context of SI. This 
requires a more comprehensive and complete understanding of dominant barriers and the 
resulting SI-gap. The method applied in our empirical work is outlined in the following 
section.
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Table 1: Studies Related to SI Barriers for Individual Private Investors 
 
Study Aim, research 
question(s) 
Methodology  Barrier(s) identified Comment 
Lewis 
(2001) 
What motivates 
ordinary, neutral and 
SI-investors to 
invest? 
Focus groups 
(94 private 
investors) 
Fear of low financial 
return of SI conflicts 
with moral obligation to 
bequeath; inertia 
Heirs as a barrier is 
contrary to Eurosif 
(2012b) (see Table 2) 
Hummels 
and 
Timmer 
(2004) 
Does ESG or ethical 
(SEE) reporting meet 
shareholders’ needs? 
Multi-case 
study (3 
companies) 
Insufficient corporate 
SEE reporting for 
financially motivated 
investors 
“Insufficient 
information” as a barrier 
is contrary to Nilsson, 
Siegl and Korling (J. 
Nilsson et al., 2012) 
Glac 
(Glac, 
2008) 
Why do some 
individual investors 
practice SI and 
others do not? 
Experimental 
survey (240 
students) 
Some investors might be 
less willing to sacrifice 
financial returns and 
associate these with SI  
No clear barrier 
identified but inferred; 
calls for further research 
on barriers 
Schrader 
(Schrader, 
2006) 
What role do 
advisors at retail 
banks play as 
diffusion agents of 
ethical funds? 
Mystery 
shopping (21 
advisors) 
Retail advisors do not 
inform retail clients 
about ethical funds 
Limited to retail 
investors; calls for 
further research on other 
regions and wealthy 
investors  
Berry and 
Junkus 
(2013) 
What is the attitude 
and understanding of 
individual investors 
toward SI? 
Survey (5,000 
individual 
investors) 
Exclusionary SI 
approaches could 
mismatch investors’ 
interest in more holistic 
approaches 
Specific barrier inferred 
from survey results; 
contrary to Nilsson et al. 
(J. Nilsson et al., 2012) 
Nilsson et 
al. (J. 
Nilsson et 
al., 2012) 
How do consumers 
evaluate pro-socially 
positioned mutual 
funds in the post-
purchase stage? 
Literature 
review 
Overwhelming 
heterogeneity and 
varying quality of SI 
mutual fund data 
Specific barrier inferred 
from literature rather 
than by empirics; covers 
only the retail market  
Nilsson (J. 
Nilsson, 
2008)  
What is the impact of 
pro-social or 
financial 
performance, socio-
demographic factors 
on SI investors’ 
behaviour? 
SI customer 
data (528 
private 
investors) 
Mistrust towards the 
various marketed merits 
of SI 
Specific barrier inferred 
from a non-SI study by 
Crane (2000) 
Eurosif 
(2012b) 
Practitioner study on 
the status of SI for 
HNWIs, family 
offices and banks  
Survey 
(undisclosed 
respondents) 
Lack of products; 
mistrust; lack of advice; 
financial performance 
and risk concerns 
Utility of sample is 
limited due to an 
undisclosed number, 
type and distribution of 
respondents  
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Table 2: Studies Related to SI Motivators for Individual Private Investors; Inferred SI-
Barriers 
 
Study Aim, research 
question(s) 
Methodology SI motive(s) identified SI barrier(s) inferred 
Rosen et 
al. (1991) 
Identify 
characteristics of 
socially responsible 
investors, salient 
issues and 
expectations 
Survey (4,000 
individual 
investors of two 
funds that 
incorporate social 
screens) 
Avoid poor 
environmental and/or 
labour relations practices 
and achieve a satisfactory 
financial performance 
and way of life 
Poor ethical, labour 
relations, financial 
performance or fit 
with lifestyle  
Eurosif 
(2012b) 
Practitioner study 
on the status of SI 
for HNWIs, family 
offices, banks 
Survey 
(undisclosed 
number, type and 
distribution of 
respondents) 
Contribute to sustainable 
development, financial 
opportunity, wealth 
preservation  
Poor contribution to 
sustainable 
development or 
financial return; no 
heirs 
Bollen 
(2007) 
Does the behaviour 
of SI investors 
differ from the 
behaviour of 
investors in 
conventional funds? 
Regression on fund 
flows within SI 
funds versus 
conventional funds 
Utility from owning 
securities of companies 
consistent with personal 
values and societal 
concerns 
Products inconsistent 
with personal values 
or societal concerns 
Nilsson 
(2009) 
Identify reasons for 
investors to invest 
in SI-profiled 
mutual funds 
Cluster analysis of 
survey data (563 
individual 
investors) 
Positive financial 
performance, satisfy 
social responsibility aims 
Poor financial or 
social performance  
Beal & 
Goyen 
(1998) 
What are the 
motivations for 
investors to invest 
in a nature 
conservation firm? 
Survey (739 
individual 
shareholders of a 
nature conservation 
firm) 
Counter environmental 
concerns, positive 
financial performance  
Poor environmental 
contribution or 
financial performance 
Lewis 
(2001) 
What motivates 
ordinary, neutral 
and SI-investors to 
invest in SI? 
Focus groups (94 
private investors) 
Avoid investments in 
firms with unacceptable 
ethical or environmental 
practices 
Poor ethical or 
environmental 
performance of firms 
prevalent in SI 
products  
Statman 
(2004) 
Analogy from 
restaurants to 
financial products 
and investors 
Theoretical work Utilitarian benefits 
beyond low risk and high 
expected returns; social 
status 
Poor utilitarian and/or 
expressive benefits 
Chatterji 
et al. 
(2009) 
How well do KLD 
ratings inform about 
past and likely 
future 
environmental 
performance? 
Regression 
analysis (588 US 
firms) 
Theory-derived motive 
clusters: Good financial 
performance, ethical 
concerns, desire to 
punish/reward firms, 
social status 
Poor financial or 
ethical performance, 
rewarding/ punishing 
effectiveness, or 
effect on social status  
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2.4 Methods and Data 
In light of the research gaps, we chose an inductive, theory-building research approach rather 
than a deductive, theory-testing method. Our empirical data was gathered through semi-
structured face-to-face interviews with ten HNWIs. We followed an interview guide with 
open-ended questions to obtain the subjects’ points of view in their own words (Kvale, 1996, 
2007). Following an exploratory multi-case study approach we iteratively added empirical 
insights and through analytic induction moved toward concrete and empirically supported 
propositions (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003a). We will now outline our approach 
in more detail including the case selection, data collection and analysis. 
 
2.4.1 Case Selection 
Access to the secretive segment of HNWIs can be a challenge for scholars. HNWIs and their 
intermediaries commonly place a high value on confidentiality, given security concerns and 
the curiosity of colleagues, relatives, media, authorities and the public. This study accessed 
HNWIs through a Swiss private bank. In order to avoid selection bias the bank chosen for the 
interviewee solicitation is medium-sized in terms of assets under management and not 
branded as more or less ‘sustainable’ than others. The bank offers SI-products in the form of 
mutual funds, structured products and as a portfolio-management approach, on which the 
investment advisors have been trained alongside other traditional services and products. There 
is no (dis-) incentive to recommend one or the other product. The bank’s HNWI clients serve 
as our cases. The selection of cases that contribute substantially to the theory-building quality 
of the whole sample is essential to ensure the external validity and therefore the 
generalizability of findings (Yin, 2003a). Accordingly, our case selection process followed 
the concept of theoretical sampling, where, following each interview, we reflected on 
worthwhile questions and interviewee profiles to investigate in order to develop theoretical 
ideas (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We obtained a list of potential cases through an interview 
request letter that was framed as a general investigation of interviewees’ investment interests 
and sent by the bank to its HNWI clients in Switzerland. We then conducted the interviews 
and iteratively developed the characteristics of our sample, as we obtained the most valuable 
insights in talking to polar types that are contrarily characterised by their high or low 
engagement in SI, investment knowledge and sustainability knowledge, as well as older or 
younger age versus the average age of HNWIs, 61 years (Fidelity Investments, 2012). We 
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stopped the data collection once additional theoretical insights gained through the interviews 
became small and a replication logic was secured (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003a). To ensure interviewees’ privacy we refer to cases as PRIV_01 to 
PRIV_12. PRIV_01A to PRIV_02B were test-interviews (round 1) with persons that were 
both HNWIs and private banking professionals, which served to triangulate, calibrate and 
refine our understanding of the topic as well as the interview guide. We then conducted 
interviews with ten HNWIs for data collection purposes, named PRIV_03 to PRIV_12 (round 
2). Table 3 provides an overview of the interviewee profiles (the additional information 
relates to results and is discussed later). 
 
Table 3: Interviewee Profiles and Descriptives 
Inter-
viewee Sex Age 
Inv. time 
horizon 
(years or 
heirs, if 
focus) Occupation 
Invest-
ment 
know-
ledge 
SI 
know-
ledge 
SI practices 
applied  
SI in-
terest 
SI data 
source 
SI share 
in port-
folio 
Exclusio
ns ESGŦ 
Round 1: Initial interview guide development        
PRIV_01A m 55 2-3 Private Banker > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
PRIV_01B m ~65 No info Private Banker > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
PRIV_02A m 65 3-5 Accountant > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
PRIV_02B m ~45 No info Fund manager > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Round 2: Interview data gathering 
 
       
PRIV_03 m 60 20-30 Lawyer o o * * E O 7-8% 
PRIV_04 m 72 Heirs Consul general < <   L None None 
PRIV_05 m 61 20 Banking exec.  > > * * E O Some 
PRIV_06 m 83 Heirs Chemistry exec. > > * * E O 10% 
PRIV_07 m ~75 Heirs Energy exec. < o * * L None Some 
PRIV_08 m 63 1 Consulting exec. o o * * L None Low 
PRIV_09 m 63 Heirs Banking exec. o o * * E A 100% 
PRIV_10 f 68 Heirs Ballet teacher o o * * E A 100% 
PRIV_11 m 87 1 Engineer o o * * L A None 
PRIV_12 m 65 3-5 Lawyer, investor > o * * L None Low 
Note: Investment- / SI knowledge: ‘<’ = None; ‘o’ = Some; ‘>’ = Good level of knowledge 
relative to other interviewees 
 Ŧ: ‘ESG’ = environmental, social and governance factors considered in investment decisions 
SI-interest: ‘E’ = explicit; ‘L’ = latent interest in sustainable investing products and processes 
SI-data source: ‘A’ = client advisors; ‘O’ = other SI-data source, e.g. external SI-product 
vendors, media. 
 
 
2.4.2 Data Collection  
We conducted semi-structured interviews following the process proposed by Kvale (2007) 
that allows subjects to freely share their perception and experience on a topic. We iteratively 
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reviewed each interview for recurring patterns before the next interview was conducted in 
order to interpret findings and identify emerging theoretical ideas (Yin, 2003a). As a result, 
the interview guide was updated four times, strengthening the internal and construct validity 
of our empirical work (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). Following the open questions 
included in the interview guide, the interviewee was first asked what general aspects he or she 
considers when setting up an investment portfolio, which elicited information on the 
individual family situation, investment knowledge, and investment time horizon. That was 
followed by a question on what trends or topics are considered as potential threats or 
opportunities, which elicited whether topics related to sustainability were part of the person’s 
thinking generally and as an investor. If the interviewee mentioned aspects related to 
sustainability, interviewers would inquire on the understanding of what sustainability is, and 
whether the person invests accordingly. That would elicit the understanding of and 
engagement in SI, and would be followed by a question on the motivation to invest in SI, data 
sources, and, lastly, perceived barriers to invest in SI. We asked about these aspects only 
when the interviewee did not mention them by herself. Thus, sustainability or SI was not 
defined by the interviewers, but by the interviewee through a discussion about financial 
investments in general. The goal was to avoid social desirability or framing effects. Three 
researchers conducted the interviews. One researcher attended all of the interviews, one 
attended the test-round and one the data collecting interviews.  
 
2.4.3 Data Analysis 
Following Gibbert et al. (2008), all of the one- to two-hour interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. The data analysis had two phases. In the first phase, the two researchers who had 
attended all the data collecting interviews went through the interview manuscripts and 
independently identified quotes that outlined characteristics of each case related to the polar 
type characteristics, the perception of sustainability and SI, and reasons to engage in SI. The 
results were discussed and matched together with the third researcher who had attended the 
test interviews. The process revealed a high interest in SI, different motivations and a high 
variety in investors’ perception of SI. In the second phase of the analysis, we applied the 
iterative and systematic concept of analytical induction and specifically pattern matching to 
identify similarities and differences between cases, as well as to develop concrete and 
empirically supported propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The same two researchers 
independently went through the interview manuscripts again and highlighted aspects related 
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to barriers in the involvement of interviewees in SI. The quotes were grouped under second 
and third-order codes and potential interrelations between barriers and other aspects were 
indicated. The three researchers compared the results and identified central patterns. The 
iterative, inductive process identified the three highly prevalent and dominant barriers that are 
outlined in the results section below. 
 
2.5 Results 
The results section presents interviewees’ interest in SI, their investment motives and topics 
that they relate to SI. Furthermore, we present insights related to the determinants of 
behaviour, including propositions for three dominant barriers and their integration into the 
proposed framework. 
 
2.5.1 HNWIs and SI: Interests, Motivations, and Topics 
We found that all of the interviewees were interested in SI. With the exception of one 
interviewee who delegates all investment decisions to his advisor, each person considered 
sustainability aspects by excluding certain industries and considering environmental, social or 
governance aspects in their investment decisions. That includes interviewees that openly 
disdain SI, as the following persons did: “PRIV_08: Sustainable investing is nothing but ‘hot 
air’”; or ” PRIV_12: Sustainable investing is a fashion-word, it is useless and a bad 
investment strategy. I have nothing against sustainable living and such, but as an investment 
concept it’s a sales argument.” Despite their severe commentary, both are engaged in SI. For 
example, the latter interviewee consciously excludes the tobacco industry from his direct 
investments and invests in renewable energy mutual funds. However, he was not aware of the 
fact that SI includes what he routinely engages in through his own investment approach. 
Similarly, one interviewee (PRIV_07) had never heard of SI, yet invested in renewable 
energy funds. Another person (PRIV_04) attentively reads corporate water reports, but does 
not know about the possibility to invest in funds or mandates that consider water aspects. 
Thus, some individuals may invest in SI, or are interested in SI, but don’t know what SI is or 
what it entails. They can be categorized as ‘latently’ interested in SI, versus those investors 
that know about SI and are ‘explicitly’ interested. The categorization of interviewees in these 
terms is provided in Table 3, together with their level of investment in SI, and an indication if 
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the person excludes investments due to ethical reasons and if environmental, social or 
governance aspects are considered in investments. Notably, almost all interviewees consider 
SI aspects, and even ‘latently’ interested persons invest up to 10% of their portfolio along SI 
considerations. 
Further, the interviewees mentioned their motives to engage in SI. A mix of ethical 
and financial motives was brought forth by interviewees, for example: “PRIV_03: I don’t 
have British Tobacco in my portfolio anymore. Q.: For ethical reasons?; PRIV_03: No, due 
to smoking bans. […] I consider sustainable investing for diversification, profits and 
sympathy for a careful use of resources.” Ethical arguments were at the centre for two 
interviewees who were explicitly interested in SI and who invest 100% of their assets with 
financial objectives along SI criteria: “Q.: What percentage of your portfolio is invested along 
sustainability criteria [and why]? PRIV_09: Everything, except cash. […] We want to invest 
with a good conscience”; or “PRIV_10: I simply want to stand behind where I make money 
and where I don't." Overall, all interviewees mentioned mixed motives, yet ethics were more 
prominent than financial motives.  
The sustainability topics that our interviewees were interested in varied strongly 
among individuals. On the one hand, an interviewed consul general with experience on water 
projects in Africa (PRIV_04), for example, placed a focus on natural resources and 
specifically water topics, yet considers wind and solar energy as something “that doesn’t lead 
to much”, or “a disgrace for landscapes.” An energy executive (PRIV_07), on the other 
hand, put a strong focus on renewable energy, which he predicts to “have a great future.” 
Overall, the most prominent topics were natural resource scarcity, followed by the rise of 
renewable energy, corruption and a recession of ethics in business, the rise of energy 
efficiency technology, and climate change. Interviewees associated SI with thematic 
sustainability topics and specific industries, rather than, for example, microfinance or the 
consideration of environmental, social or governance aspects in security selection or portfolio 
construction. Thus, they focus on a small segment out of the much broader scope of SI. The 
specific topics that interviewees relate to SI varied widely and could often be traced to their 
professional background. 
In sum, we find support for the existence of the SI gap: While many interviewees had 
little or no understanding of SI, we observe a high interest in considering sustainability 
aspects in their investment decisions. Even those interviewees that openly disdained SI do in 
fact invest in SI products and consider to some degree ethical or sustainability aspects in their 
investment decisions. We could thus infer that a large share of private investors is generally 
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interested in SI; however, their actual engagement can still be fostered. Further, different 
individuals have different motivations to invest in SI, yet purely financial concerns appear 
rare or unlikely. That supports the case for SI given its financial and non-financial qualities. 
As such, a substantial potential may exist for more SI engagement depending on better 
information on SI and its versatility. Lastly, people relate different topics to SI. The high 
heterogeneity in individuals’ perceptions of SI and their motivations stresses the need to 
conceptually understand the decision-making process in SI. Adding to these general insights, 
we now outline findings related to the determinants of behaviour to develop a more fine-
grained decision-making framework. 
 
2.5.2 HNWIs’ Engagement in SI: A Decision-Making Framework 
Based on the SI-gap and our interviewees’ high interest in SI, we were particularly interested 
in understanding the decision-making process of private investors and the reasons why they 
refrain from being more engaged in SI. Thus, we outline our interview results along the 
determinants of behaviour of the proposed TPB framework adapted to SI as displayed in 
Figure 1. We focus on dominant barriers and propose their consideration in the framework 
displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Theory of planned behaviour framework adapted to SI and extended based on 
interview results 
Note: The signs illustrate the proposed directionality of the relation, that is, (-) indicates a 
negative effect on the determinant 
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Attitude towards the behaviour. As expected from the findings of East (1993), the 
interviewees frequently voiced opinions about the volatility of SI. Typical interviewee 
statements highlighted SI aspects as worthwhile, yet the financial performance of SI as overly 
volatile, as illustrated by the following statement: “PRIV_10: Sustainable firms will be the 
better investment in the long run. But most of them do not exist that long and are risky in the 
short term”. Most interviewees related SI to specific industries that are rather volatile, 
specifically to investments in small firms that are active in the renewable energy or water 
sector. A substantial impact of the perception of SI as overly volatile was identified when it 
appeared either in combination with individuals’ investment time horizon or with significant 
past financial losses, as detailed below.  
Research in the field of psychology emphasizes that the future time orientation of 
individuals affects their pro-environmental behavior (Milfont & Gouveia, 2006; Rabinovich, 
Morton, & Postmes, 2010). Similarly, organizational research has found that the compression 
of time – e.g., by discounting – can lead to an imbalance between business practices and the 
relatively slower underlying cycles of the natural environment (Bansal & Knox-Hayes, 2013). 
These insights about individuals’ time orientation help also understanding their financial 
decision making with regard to SI. The individual’s investment time horizon ranged in our 
sample from one year to the consideration of following generations. We found clear evidence 
that the investment time horizon matters when individuals perceive SI to be volatile. When 
individuals have a long investment time horizon, their perception of SI to be volatile does not 
matter: "PRIV_06: The investments shall serve my children. […] Of course I've invested. 
Long term, as that [volatile water-] fund will do well in 20, 30 or 50 years. […] It’s an 
interesting topic for people that invest long-term, like me"; or "PRIV_07: I invest [in as 
volatile perceived renewable energy funds] and my heirs reap the benefits". In contrast, we 
identified a dominant cognitive barrier when individuals have a short investment time horizon 
and consider SI to be rather volatile. This can be illustrated by the following exemplary 
quotes: “PRIV_12: In my age now, I will be more critical [towards as volatile perceived SI]”; 
or “PRIV_11: I just see the stock-price drawdowns. To invest in solar would respond to my 
heart. […] [But] when I think about my [investment time horizon], it is rather short, based on 
my vintage.” This combination of short-termism and high perceived volatility of SI has a 
negative effect on attitude towards the behaviour (Figure 2). We summarize this in the 
following proposition: 
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Proposition 1: Private investors that associate SI with above-average volatility and 
have a short investment time horizon are less likely to invest in SI. 
 
Further, the interviews showed that general and rather recent financial losses such as from the 
‘global financial crisis’ beginning in 2008 combined with perceived high volatility matter as 
well. For example, one interviewee perceives SI as more volatile than average but aims to 
invest 100% of her wealth in SI. Following general financial losses she shifted some assets 
into non-SI investments: “Q.: Has your investment behaviour changed due to the losses? 
PRIV_10: Yes, definitely. […] we have invested a bit in some big [non-SI] firms as well, 
something stable.” Similar reasoning for a low SI engagement was provided in the following 
statement by an interviewee who perceives SI as overly volatile: “PRIV_12: […] and it all 
went down a lot in 2008. I don’t want to experience that again.” Contrary to that, 
interviewees who experienced losses yet did not regard SI as volatile showed an unchanged 
interest in SI (e.g., PRIV_06, PRIV_09). The recurrence of the pattern throughout the 
interviews and the direct impact on the individual engagement in SI points to a cognitive 
dominant barrier. Conceptualised in the context of TPB, the perception of high volatility of SI 
in combination with financial losses has a negative effect on attitude towards the behaviour. 
The barrier is illustrated in Figure 2 and leads to the second proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: Private investors that associate SI with above-average volatility and 
have experienced general recent financial losses are less likely to invest in SI. 
 
Subjective norm. Our interviewees outlined that they discuss their investment decisions in 
private, with their wife or husband, and seldom with other family members or friends. Most 
active was an interviewee who stated the following: “PRIV_08: I call two or three experts 
before I take a new investment decision.” More common were responses that indicate a very 
small circle of people with whom investments are discussed: “Q.: Do you discuss your 
investments with someone else than your advisor? PRIV_05: Well, with acquaintances, I have 
two or three, but that comes and goes.” Others only mention the agreement of their partner: 
“PRIV_09: Every firm, in which we invest, must get the ok from my wife.” Some interviewees 
aim not to be involved in their investments and delegate as much as possible to their advisors, 
for example: “PRIV_04: We don’t really care for it. The bank knows what we are looking for, 
but we don’t get involved in the daily business. […] I trust the bank”; or “PRIV_07: It’s 
simply [name of client advisor] who I discuss with, and he recommends me this and that. […] 
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And then I do what is recommended. I don’t know better.” Overall, we find that interviewees 
discuss their investments with a rather small group of people, and thus are rarely, if ever, 
exposed to peer pressure. Therefore, subjective norm might be less relevant in the context of 
private investors’ investment decisions than what could be expected from literature (e.g. 
Rosen et al., 1991; Statman, 2004). Since we cannot propose a specific dominant barrier in 
the context of subjective norm, we do not derive any corresponding implication for the 
decision-making framework. 
 
Perceived behavioural control. As for perceived limitations to the investment in SI, some 
clients did mention a lack of viable SI products, as illustrated in the following examples: 
“PRIV_03: I just don’t see the right [renewable energy] products”; or “Q.: Are there sectors 
where you would like to invest, but have not found SI products? PRIV_06: The things that I 
use every day. Like paper. I have worked with that as a chemist. Or the food industry. That 
will change a lot”; or “PRIV_07: There are few [SI-] products. I mean climate change. What 
can you do there?” We infer that private investors appear to perceive a limited availability of 
products that relate to some specific topics of their interest. However, most interviewees were 
actually invested in SI products that – more or less – pertain to the topics of their main 
interests. Thus, we did not identify a dominant barrier that pertains to perceived behavioural 
control.  
 
Actual behavioural control. Prior research argued that actual behavioural control should not 
play a prominent role in investment decision-making (East, 1993). However, we found that 
the occurrence of actual limitations that investors could encounter following the formation of 
an intention to invest in SI could be important towards their actual behaviour of investing in 
SI. For example, the following interviewees explicitly sought to invest in SI yet received 
insufficient information from their advisors, information that was available to the advisors: 
“PRIV_11: If I knew a firm is involved in wrongdoings, such as disposing of waste into the 
sea or Africa, then I would probably divest from that firm. Q: Do you have that information? 
PRIV_11: I do not have that information”; or “Q.: Has your advisor brought SI forward to 
you? PRIV_03: No. He thinks I have enough sources […] and that I get these monthly reports 
from [name of bank].” Others received SI information, yet still lack SI advice that they can 
implement, as illustrated here: “Q.: After you voiced your interest, have you received 
information on SI products from your advisor? PRIV_11: I received some information on SI. 
But I don’t know how to act on it now.” 
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In sum, we found a dominant barrier in advisors who appear to withhold SI 
information from their clients. This barrier was found despite the fact that all of the HNWIs’ 
advisors were trained on SI and were encouraged to advise their clients accordingly. Reasons 
for the hesitant behaviour could include advisors’ concern or fear of the high heterogeneity in 
clients’ view of SI. In the decision-making framework (Figure 2) we conceptualise this barrier 
accordingly: advisors reduce actual behaviour control, i.e. their clients’ ability to act upon 
their intention to invest in SI. Accordingly, this is reflected by the last proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: While private investors may have the intention to invest in SI, the 
ability to invest in SI is restricted by investment advisors that withhold relevant SI-
information. 
 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
2.6.1 Potential Explanations for the SI Gap 
Our results offer new explanations for the observed SI gap. While we find a high interest of 
HNWIs in SI, our results highlight important barriers in the decision-making process that 
keep private investors from engaging in SI.  
Barrier one pertains to a combination of the perception of SI as volatile together with a 
short investment time horizon; barrier two describes the perception of high volatility of SI 
together with financial losses. Both combinations appear to have a direct negative effect on 
the person’s attitude towards investing in SI, which predicts the formation of the intention to 
invest in SI.  
These barriers could be of significant relevance for explaining the SI gap: First, the 
cognitive barrier stemming from volatility and short-termism could inherently affect many 
older people – such as, for example, many representatives of the highly economically relevant 
segment of HNWIs. With an average age of over 60 years this segment is relatively old 
(Fidelity Investments, 2012) and, thus, may have a tendency towards a shorter investment 
time horizon. Second, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is very likely that many 
private investors experienced financial losses. Thus, the cognitive barrier related to volatility 
and recent losses could apply to many private investors.  
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Finally, the third barrier – that advisors withhold SI information – comes into effect 
once a private investor has formed the intention to invest in SI. Sufficient information on how 
to act upon that intention is a prerequisite for the actual behaviour of investing in SI. Thus, SI 
information being withheld is a direct and – given the far-reaching reliance on investment 
advisors – a potentially rather powerful contributor to the SI gap.  
 
2.6.2 Contributions to the Organization and Environment literature  
To our knowledge, this is the first assessment of dominant barriers in the decision-making 
process towards SI engagement, as well as of combinations of aspects that form such 
dominant barriers. This study contributes conceptually through a framework of the decision-
making process of private investors in SI, providing detailed empirical insights on the 
determinants of behaviour as proposed by the theory of planned behaviour.  
As one key result, we find that while most HNWIs consider SI as rather volatile, they 
differ in the length of their investment time horizon; those HNWIs with a longer investment 
time horizon are more likely to engage in SI. This insight adds to the perspective that the 
consideration of time in management research is important for understanding the conditions 
for sustainable development (Gladwin et al., 1995). Bansal and Knox-Hayes (2013) argue that 
time is being compressed by organisations; this becomes obvious through financial 
instruments such as futures and derivatives. The resulting short-termism stands in conflict 
with the relatively slower underlying cycles of the natural environment. We observed this 
conflict in our interviews. Some interviewees were generally interested in considering 
ecological aspects within their investment decisions but their investment time horizon 
dominated this initial intention: investments that are aligned with natural environment 
considerations took too long for them to materialize. Others accepted a long investment time 
horizon and engaged in SI.  
Beyond HNWIs, the effect of time on the engagement in SI has been observed for 
other types of investors as well. One example are Venture Capital (VC) firms. VCs typically 
raise large sums of capital and invest in promising start-ups that they nurture until they can be 
sold for a large profit. Similarly to our observation that those HNWIs with a long investment 
time horizon were more likely to engage in SI, Marcus and colleagues indicate that VC firms 
that engage in investments related to sustainability are “stretching out their timetables” 
(Marcus, Malen, & Ellis, 2013, p. 31). While we can identify this similarity between long-
term oriented HNWIs and VCs they differ in one specific aspect that also matters in SI: VCs 
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typically are not willing to sacrifice financial returns for ethical or other non-financial 
benefits; for HNWIs this depends on the individual preferences. In sum, our findings add a 
piece to the puzzle of barriers and motivations for SI: for the economically highly relevant 
investor type of wealthy private investors there is no unequivocal picture; there are many 
individual aspects and differing perceptions that determine their SI engagement. This, in turn, 
implies that there is a huge potential for unleashing the powerful few and moving towards 
closing the SI gap. 
Our findings on the important role of advisors in individual investors´ engagement in 
SI add detailed empirical evidence to prior suggestions on that topic in the SI literature 
(Hummels & Timmer, 2004; J. Nilsson, 2010). From the work of Schrader (2006), we know 
that advisors that withhold SI information are potential barriers for less wealthy retail 
investors. Schrader points to the logic that advisors of wealthy clients might have a better 
knowledge of SI and inform their clients accordingly, yet we show that even some HNWI 
advisors who have been trained on SI withhold that information. Thus, we add to literature 
with the notion that hesitant advisors might be an important SI barrier for private investors 
overall, both retail and HNWI. 
 
2.6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
In terms of the limitations of this exploratory study, the geographical focus and limited size of 
our sample have to be considered. We encourage future research to extend our results and to 
test and specify the impact and relevance of our propositions and the TPB framework adapted 
to SI. Comparisons of different types of investors or markets may provide valuable additional 
insights. In terms of generalizability, we suggest that studying HNWIs, on the one hand, 
imposes limitations due to their privileged access to investment solutions and advice; on the 
other hand, the lack of these privileges by retail investors means that some of the barriers that 
HNWIs face might be encountered by ordinary retail investors as well, if not even to a larger 
extent.  
Our findings call for further research that links SI with behavioural economics. 
Combining individual´s time orientation with volatility perception and financial losses offers 
a bridge from SI engagement to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, 
the myopic loss aversion concept (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) explains why people invest more 
in securities that they perceive as volatile if they reduce the frequency with which they 
evaluate the investment’s financial performance, or consider a longer investment time 
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horizon. Applied in the context of SI, the concept could show that investors who consider SI 
as overly volatile might have a more positive attitude to SI not only if they consider a longer 
investment time horizon, as suggested in our study, but also if they reduce the frequency of 
evaluating the financial performance of their investments. Future research might find that the 
frequency with which performance is reported is fixed by bank operations or regulation, 
maybe to the detriment of privates’ engagement in SI. Likewise, the house money effect 
concept (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) shows that investors are more risk-seeking following a gain 
compared to a situation after a financial loss. Applied to SI, the concept could provide a 
theoretical foundation to assess the effect of volatility not only with losses, as outlined in our 
study, but also with financial gains.  
Further, our observation that investors state that they have the general intention to 
invest in SI, but they did not invest in SI due to short-term financial concerns, points to the 
want/should distinction of Bazerman et al. (1998). The framework pertains to similar conflicts 
between what people want to do versus what they think they should do. An assessment of the 
want/should distinction in the context of SI and the TPB framework might, for example, 
identify a moderating effect of the want/should distinction between intention and behaviour. 
Lastly, advisors’ neglect for SI is surprising since the general benefit of their work for clients 
is increasingly challenged (Hackethal et al., 2012). Here, providing detailed SI related 
information might be an opportunity to add new value to their advisory services. For scholars 
it would be of interest to investigate why advisors do not provide this information, i.e. what 
are the perceptions, frames, barriers, and motivational aspects that determine the advisors’ 
engagement in discussing SI with private investors.  
 
2.6.4 Implications for Practitioners 
Our results reveal insights about investors´ behaviour that are vital for practitioners when 
promoting SI funds and investment products (Dunfee, 2003). Our results regarding HNWIs’ 
high interest in SI point to a substantial market opportunity for SI. However, due to differing 
investor preferences, a ‘one size fits all’ strategy in product development and placement is not 
advisable. Private investors have different motivations to invest in SI. These motivations 
range from considering investment approaches that only exclude certain industries to holistic 
approaches that encompass a full range of different environmental, social, and governance 
criteria.  
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This is an important finding for practitioners who seek to balance the way products are 
tailored to the interest of clients and attract substantial amounts of assets. Similarly, 
practitioners might consider clients’ investment time horizon or history of financial losses for 
the strategic positioning of SI offerings. For example, clients that experienced losses may be 
interested in more conservative SI approaches that seek to reduce risks by considering 
environmental, social and governance factors. More volatile renewable energy investments 
could attract investors with a long investment time horizon. However, one requirement is that 
they have not experienced recent financial losses.  
Finally, practitioners might consider our finding on advisors as a critical roadblock in 
the development and distribution of SI offerings. It appears important to train and motivate 
advisors to inform clients about SI and to be prepared to adequately respond to their clients’ 
heterogeneous understanding of SI. Overall, this study shows that the general availability of 
information about SI, the individual perception of SI, and specific characteristics of investor 
types are of importance for SI engagement. These aspects determine the decision-making 
process in SI and go beyond the usual “does it pay to be green” debate that so far dominated 
the discussion in academic and practitioner literature. 
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3 More than Money: Why Investment Advisors Rarely Talk 
About Sustainable Investing 
Abstract 
 
Most private investors are interested in sustainable investing; yet their actual engagement is 
low. Based on a survey with 95 investment advisors, this study explores their important role 
and finds that advisors are hesitant to communicate about sustainable investing. We develop a 
model that explains differences in that behavior. A significant effect shows for advisors’ 
perception that sustainable investing is very complex and their expected financial 
performance. This leads to the dynamic real options logic as an avenue to conceptualize 
advisors’ behavior. Contrary to literature, no significant effect is found for advisors’ expected 
volatility of sustainable investing, self-transcendent values and socio-demographics. As such, 
this study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between private investors and 
investment advisors in sustainable investing. Further, these findings and their generalization 
indicate that salespeople might systematically deviate from their clients’ interests, and provide 
insights into the micro-foundations of decision making by salespeople in regard to social 
responsibility. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Empirical evidence shows that the majority of people are potentially interested in sustainable 
investing (SI) (Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 2014). Through SI, these individuals in their 
role as private investors aim to “integrate certain kinds of non-financial concerns – variously 
called ethical, social, environmental or corporate governance criteria – in the otherwise 
strictly financials-driven investment process” (Sandberg et al., 2008, p. 519).  
A dichotomy exists, however, between the high interest in SI and the observation that 
just 3% of financial assets under management in SI are governed by private investors 
(Eurosif, 2012a). 97% of assets in SI are governed by institutional investors, although the 
overall amount of assets governed by institutional and private investors are comparable (Çelik 
& Isaksson, 2014; Shorrocks et al., 2013). The dichotomy is amplified by the observation that 
40% of private wealth is governed by wealthy private investors (Shorrocks et al., 2013), who 
are particularly interested in SI and enabled to invest in SI (Eurosif, 2012b). Thus, we observe 
a gap between the expected and the actual engagement of private investors in SI. We call this 
gap the ‘SI gap’, which provides the motivation for this study. The gap has been indicated in 
literature (e.g., Eurosif, 2012a; Jansson & Biel, 2011; Paetzold & Busch, 2014), yet the 
mechanisms behind it remain opaque (e.g., Glac, 2008; Juravle & Lewis, 2008).  
One potential explanation for the SI-gap lies with the role of investment advisors, the 
connection point between a bank’s investment professionals and its clients. Private investors 
rely on investment advisors to engage in SI (Eurosif, 2012b; Schrader, 2006), as the 
combination of financial and non-financial information can be challenging (Bansal, Gao, & 
Qureshi, 2014; Girerd-Potin, Jimenez-Garcès, & Louvet, 2013). The observed SI-gap 
indicates an underserved interest for SI amongst private investors, and thus a disparity 
between advisors and their clients when it comes to SI. This leads to the research question of 
this study: Do investment advisors neglect to communicate about SI in their client 
discussions, and, if so, why? 
Based on a survey with 95 investment advisors we identify their level of activity in 
communicating about SI in client discussions, which we call their level of ‘SI 
communication’. We test a model of constructs that help explain differences in advisors’ level 
of SI communication. We find a significant effect of the expected financial return and the 
perceived complexity of SI, and a high level of potential non-financial benefits of SI 
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communication. As such, advisors’ SI communication might be conceptualized through the 
logic of real options; a logic that is helpful in the context of business decision-making 
considering risks in the natural environment (Busch & Hoffmann, 2009; Cortazar et al., 1998; 
Husted, 2005; Wang et al., 2012). We do not find a significant relationship between advisors’ 
SI communication and the expected volatility of SI, socio-demographics, self-transcendent 
values, or the investment time horizon of clients. These findings are surprising and contrary to 
an established body of literature on the behavior of people (e.g., Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Karp, 1996; Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000; Schultz & Zelezny, 
1999; Stern et al., 1999). 
Beyond the context of SI, the generalization of our findings indicates that salespeople 
in the context of social responsibility focus on financial aspects and omit self-transcendent 
values, for example, and might systematically deviate from the interest of their clients. As 
such, this study answers to calls in literature to explore the micro-foundations of decision 
making in regard to SI and social responsibility (Glac, 2008; Gond et al., 2011; Juravle & 
Lewis, 2008), as well as on the relationship between private investors and investment advisors 
(Inderst, 2011; Mullainathan, Noeth, & Schoar, 2012; West, 2012). 
The study unfolds as follows. The next section provides a background on private 
investors and SI, the motivation to invest in SI, and the role of investment advisors. We then 
draw from literature on individuals’ decision-making when considering the natural 
environment or SI, and develop hypotheses that pertain to constructs that may determine 
advisors level of activity in communicating about SI, or their ‘SI communication’. Following 
that, we outline the applied methodology and our results. We then discuss our findings and 
their relevance to scholars and practitioners in regard to SI and social responsibility. We close 
with a brief conclusion. 
 
3.2 Sustainable Investing and Investment Advisors 
3.2.1 Underrepresentation of Private Investors in SI 
The interest and financial assets invested in SI have grown steadily. SI accounts for 
approximately USD 14 trillion in investments globally (GSIA, 2013) and over 1,100 
investment houses committed to SI to date (UNPRI, 2013). As such, SI has been pointed to as 
a mainstream practice that is widely applied in capital markets (e.g., Eurosif, 2012a; 
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Sievänen, Rita, & Scholtens, 2013). However, in Europe, the region where SI is most 
prominent (GSIA, 2013), 97% of the total assets under management in SI are governed by 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, while just 3% are owned by private investors 
(Eurosif, 2012a). This marginal share of private investors in SI is at odds with the interest of 
the majority of privates, including the wealthy, in SI (Eurosif, 2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & 
Zwergel, 2014). It cannot be explained by the distribution of assets either. Institutions govern 
an estimated USD 80 trillion, compared to private financial wealth which stands at USD 50 
trillion (Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; Shorrocks et al., 2013). Thus, the mainstreaming argument 
might apply only to institutional investors, and less so to private investors. This reiterates the 
‘SI-gap’ observation of surprisingly few private investors actually being engaged in SI, which 
is where this study aims to derive answers from the perspective of advisors. 
 
3.2.2 Financial and Non-Financial Motivations for SI  
Private investors engage in SI because of financial and/or non-financial motivations (e.g., 
Beal & Goyen, 1998; Bollen, 2007; Chatterji et al., 2009; Eurosif, 2012b; J. Nilsson, 2009; 
Rosen et al., 1991; Statman, 2004). In regard to non-financial aspects, SI can provide benefits 
such as a ‘warm glow’ feeling (Andreoni, 1990) and social status (Statman, 2004), answer to 
ethical concerns (Sandberg & Nilsson, 2011), or prevent discomfort from investments that are 
incoherent with personal values and beliefs (Festinger, 1957). This can be achieved through a 
focus on certain industries (e.g., water, renewable energy), and likewise the exclusion of 
others (e.g., weapons, tobacco), or the integration of environmental, social, and corporate 
governance (ESG) criteria into the selection and valuation of securities (GSIA, 2013).  
Investors that focus on financial benefits might focus less on exclusions, but seek to 
reduce risks by considering ESG criteria, or aim for outsized gains by focusing on specific 
industries or sectors (Marcus et al., 2013). The debate on the financial benefits of SI continues 
(Orlitzky et al., 2011). On a systemic level, Orlitzky (2013) highlights that some of the data 
used to categorize a security in terms of SI might not be related to firms' economic 
fundamentals. As SI, in the long run, becomes mainstream amongst a sufficiently large group 
of investors, the compound effect of the utilization of such data could be conceptualized as 
endogenously generated noise in equity markets, “which in turn leads to excess market 
volatility” (Orlitzky, 2013, p. 238). So far, the risk-adjusted performance on the level of SI 
mutual funds appears to be, at least, “not statistically different from the performance of 
conventional funds” (Renneboog et al., 2008, p. 1). Also on the level of individual firms, no 
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negative performance implications are found, yet positive implications are indicated 
(Albertini, 2013; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Surroca et al., 2010). The underlying logic for a 
positive relationship between sustainability and corporate financial performance follows from, 
for example, the adaptation of businesses to sustainability-related changes in business-sphere 
conditions (e.g., Orlitzky & Swanson, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2006).  
Overall, SI offers a multi-attribute utility (Bollen, 2007); investors derive utility from 
financial and non-financial motivations, and their relative importance varies between 
individuals (Cheah et al., 2011; J. Nilsson, 2009). This study contributes insights to the 
corresponding positioning of investment advisors. 
 
3.2.3 The Role of Investment Advisors in SI 
The financial crisis in 2008 led to calls for a better understanding of the relationship between 
private investors and investment advisors (Inderst, 2011; Mullainathan et al., 2012; West, 
2012), which is where this study aims to add insights based on the case of SI. Moreover, in SI, 
a specific research gap needs to be addressed. Prior research showed that private investors 
lack information on SI and suitable products (Eurosif, 2012b; Hummels & Timmer, 2004). 
This is a dichotomy in light of the broad landscape of available SI products and solutions 
(Eurosif, 2012a). For example, private investors have also been found to suffer from an 
overwhelming breadth of sustainability information on SI mutual funds (J. Nilsson et al., 
2012). 
A potential explanation for the dichotomy between too much and too little SI-
information as a barrier for private investors lies in the fact that SI combines financial and 
non-financial criteria. This can be rather complex and new to investors. It is in such situations 
where professional investment advice plays an important role; a role that has not yet been 
explored in-depth in the academic literature (Inderst, 2011). 
The observed SI-gap points to a low level of the communication about SI between 
advisors and their clients. Advisors that behave hesitant or even counter-productive on SI, 
however, would be a dichotomy as well. The general benefit of their work for clients is 
increasingly challenged (Hackethal et al., 2012; van de Venter & Michayluk, 2008). Thus, 
discussing topics related to sustainability that speak to a client’s conviction from a financial 
and non-financial perspective, and that many private investors appear to be interested in, 
could add new value to their advisory services and allow for more salient business 
relationships. 
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This study explores this potential dichotomy of advisors that appear less active in SI 
than what the potential market opportunity of SI would suggest. It provides the first 
quantitative assessment of advisors level of SI communication, and aspects that explain 
differences herein. 
 
3.3 Potential Explanations for Differences in Advisors’ Level of Activity in 
SI Communication 
Why do some advisors communicate about SI while others do not? To derive an answer to 
that question, this study draws from constructs that have been shown to be valuable to explain 
the behavior of people in decision-making related to SI or the natural environment (e.g., 
(Jansson & Biel, 2011; McLachlan & Gardner, 2004; Roberts, 1996; Rosen et al., 1991; Stern 
et al., 1999), which we relate to advisors’ level of SI communication. 
 
Financial return. The expectation of appropriate risk adjusted financial returns is a 
fundamental driver for the investment of financial assets (Sharpe, 1964). This applies in the 
context of SI as well, where some investors are motivated primarily by financial returns (J. 
Nilsson, 2009). Investors differ in how much financial return they expect from SI, however, 
and some investors expect and accept lower returns from SI than from traditional investments 
(Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000). For investment advisors, a positive financial return generated by 
their clients typically links to a higher income due to higher management fees. Further, an 
explorative practitioner survey indicated that the financial performance of SI matters for 
advisors in the context of SI (Calvert Foundation, 2012). Therefore, a higher value in the 
expected financial performance of SI relative to traditional investments may relate positively 
to advisors’ level of activity in communicating about SI with clients.  
 
H1: The perception of a higher financial return of SI relative to traditional 
investments relates positively to advisors’ SI communication. 
 
Volatility. From behavioral finance we know that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984, p. 346). Investors dislike volatility disproportionally to stability in financial 
returns, and as a result tend to deviate from mathematically rational levels of volatile stock 
equity relative to stable bond paper (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). Sustainability related activities 
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of firms might reduce such risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; 
Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001) or incur outsized costs and increase risk (Munk, 1999). A 
seminal meta analysis on the effect of sustainability activities and corporate financial return 
outlined modest positive financial return effects of sustainability activities, yet together with a 
very high variation in these returns (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Further, a small segment of SI that 
received substantial public attention pertains to rather volatile investments in themes such as 
renewable energy or water (GSIA, 2013). Thus, advisors might perceive a high volatility of 
SI, which could reduce their interest in SI. Conversely, the expectation of a lower volatility of 
SI relative to traditional investments may support advisors’ SI communication. 
 
H2: The perception of a lower volatility of SI relative to traditional investments relates 
positively to advisors’ SI communication. 
 
Complexity. The concepts of sustainability and SI are complex in that they mean different 
things to different people, and by some definitions can even be viewed as ‘radically confused’ 
or as an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956; Moon, 2007; Okoye, 2009; Woods & 
Urwin, 2010). Even amongst mainstream actors and scholars “there is no clear consensus of 
what this term [SI] means” (Berry & Junkus, 2013, p. 707). The result can be “endless 
disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie, 1956, p. 169). Further, 
Nilsson et al. (2012) point to a highly complex search process due to the breadth and quality 
of financial and non-financial information that is available to describe SI products. Thus, 
advisors might face both a high level of complexity in figuring out what SI means for their 
individual clients, and in identifying appropriate SI products. As such, the complexity of SI 
infers the need for a lot of work, and puts advisors at the risk of appearing little informed in 
front of their clients. Therefore, the perception of SI as a highly complex field could have a 
negative impact on advisors’ level of SI communication. 
 
H3: The perception of SI as highly complex relates negatively to advisors’ SI 
communication. 
 
PR stunt. The use of “green”, “ethical”, “sustainable”, etc., attributes that are added to the 
communication around a large variety of products has increased substantially. With it, the risk 
of the misuse of these attributes rose accordingly (Polonsky et al., 1998), and has become a 
serious threat for those recommending related products or services (Crane, 2000). SI has not 
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been left out, and “scepticism toward ethical and social claims is […] likely to be a major 
concern for marketers of [SI] products” (J. Nilsson, 2008, p. 310). Advisors might appear to 
market SI as an investment topic in the very moment that they mention it in a client 
discussion. Therefore, they are exposed to the risk of being associated with the 
disappointments or negative associations that would result from SI as a topic turning out to be 
a PR stunt, i.e. promising more than it claims to. This would jeopardize the relationship with 
the client, which is an important asset for the advisor. Thus, we assume that a higher 
perception of SI as a topic that is more marketing related, or a ‘PR stunt’, to reduce advisors’ 
SI communication. 
 
H4: An increased perception of SI as a PR stunt relates negatively to advisors’ SI 
communication. 
 
Self transcendent values. Self-transcendent values relate to individuals’ varying concern for 
aspects related to the natural environment and society at large, such as pollution or inequality. 
The importance of self-transcendent values varies amongst individuals, and its effect on 
individuals’ interest in environmental concerns has been well documented (e.g., Karp, 1996; 
Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Stern et al., 1999). First evidence relates investors’ relative 
importance of self-transcendent values to their behavior in regard to SI (Jansson & Biel, 
2011). Advisors in their daily work can align or leverage their own self-transcendent values, 
or else act in defiance of them. We expect that advisors aim to reduce the potential cognitive 
dissonance between their personal values and their daily actions in their professional role 
(Festinger, 1957). Therefore, we expect a higher prominence of self-transcendent values to 
relate to a higher level of SI communication. 
 
H5: A higher consideration of self-transcendent values relates positively to advisors’ 
SI communication. 
 
Perceived consumer effectiveness. Perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) refers to 
individuals’ varying belief in the possibility to influence society or the natural environment 
through their own purchase or investment decisions. PCE is valuable in explaining pro-
environmental consumer behavior (Roberts, 1996) and the behavior of private investors in SI 
(J. Nilsson, 2008, 2009). Investors that believe in the effectiveness of their investment 
decisions attempt to influence firms along their personal values by directing their investments 
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to more sustainable firms, with the aim of contributing to sustainable development, both in 
regard to social or to environmental aspects (e.g., Beal & Goyen, 1998; Eurosif, 2012b). As 
such, they replace or complement financial motivations with a values-based and ethical 
approach (e.g., Lewis, 2001; Rosen et al., 1991; Webley, Lewis, & Mackenzie, 2001). As 
with the self-transcendent values construct, advisors in their daily work, specifically in regard 
to SI, might be influenced by their belief in the significance of investment decisions in the 
real world. 
 
H6: A stronger belief in the effect of investment decisions on society or the natural 
environment relates positively to advisors’ SI communication. 
 
Trust in providers. Similar to the argumentation regarding the perception of SI as complex, 
or a PR stunt, advisors might fear to recommend specific providers of SI products that turn 
out as a fraud or disappointment. That applies to traditional investment solutions as well, yet 
the risk is amplified in SI as sustainability related investment processes are still rather 
undefined (Berry & Junkus, 2013). Nilsson (2008, p. 310) outlines that, whereas confidence 
has been shown to have an important influence in a breadth of industries, “the impact of trust 
in the (SI) context is largely unknown”; yet mistrust is a specific barrier for private investors 
in SI (Eurosif, 2012b). The belief in the trustworthiness of providers of SI products varies 
amongst private investors, and has an influence on their positioning towards SI (J. Nilsson, 
2008); we expect to observe the same mechanism in the context of advisors. 
 
H7: Less trust in the providers of SI products or services relates negatively to 
advisors’ SI communication. 
 
Client wealth. Advisors are more keen to advise wealthy clients compared to less wealthy 
private investors (West, 2012). In regard to SI, private investors’ wealth appears to be 
positively related to their interest and engagement in SI (e.g., Cheah et al., 2011). Wealthy 
investors are also more flexible in allocating some of their wealth to investments that might 
be associated with SI, and have access to more such investment options (Eurosif, 2012b). Past 
assessments of the relationship between client wealth and the activity of advisors were limited 
to investor categories that are well below the lowest category covered in this study. This is 
probably due to the limited data availability for wealthy private investors. We expect that 
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differences exist even within the segments of wealthy private investors whose advisors are 
covered in this study. 
 
H8: Advisors whose clients are in a higher wealth category show a higher level of SI 
communication. 
 
Client investment time horizon. Some sustainability topics such as climate change and 
resource scarcity relate to long term trends, and research in the field of psychology 
emphasizes that the future time orientation of individuals affects their pro-environmental 
behavior (Milfont & Gouveia, 2006; Rabinovich et al., 2010). As such, investors’ individual 
investment time horizon likely relates to their positioning towards SI. First evidence for that 
mechanism is provided by a survey amongst Swedish investment institutions that was carried 
out by Jansson and Biel (2011), who outline that SI could resonate better with investors that 
have a long investment time horizon. In addition to that and specific to the context of our 
study, wealthy investors “are typically long-term investors whose aim is to preserve capital 
for the next generations to come” (Eurosif, 2012b, p. 7). Thus, we expect that advisors whose 
clients have a rather long investment time horizon might show a higher level of SI 
communication. 
 
H9: Advisors whose clients have a longer investment time horizon show a higher level 
of SI communication. 
 
3.3.1 Real Options Logic as a Perspective to Conceptualize Advisors’ Activity in SI 
Communication  
The common logic for advisors to decide whether they want to communicate about SI in their 
client discussions can be the estimation of the net present value (NPV) of that decision. Along 
the logic of NPV, the advisor could mentally estimate the resulting potential future cash flows 
and discount the future value of these cash flows. The advisor would decide to communicate 
about SI if the cumulative NPV value appears to turn out positive. 
In settings that are complex and dynamic, however, the static logic of NPV reaches its 
limits (Abad, Clarke, & Miller, 2005; Bowman, Moskowitz, Cox, & Box, 2001; Krychowski, 
Que, & Quélin, 2010; Tong & Reuer, 2007). In settings like SI, that contain complex 
uncertainties related to sustainability aspects such as climate change or the natural 
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environment, it is particularly the logic of real options that provides a helpful conceptual 
frame to make investment decisions (Busch & Hoffmann, 2009; Cortazar et al., 1998; Husted, 
2005; Wang et al., 2012). In the real options logic, the NPV logic is extended with the value 
that can be assigned to the option to wait with a decision until more information is available 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Thus, the value of that option increases with uncertainty, which can 
generate incentives to delay otherwise profitable investment decisions. 
This might be the case of SI; advisors might perceive it financially attractive to 
communicate about SI, but decide against it because they attach a higher value to the (real) 
option to defer that decision. They might rather wait until more information becomes 
available and complexity or risk is reduced. We argue that four conditions, if fulfilled, could 
indicate that the real options logic can be applied to the context of advisors and SI.  
First, a significant relationship between the level of SI communication and expected 
financial return of SI must be observed. This indicates that expected financial return matters 
significantly for advisors in SI; otherwise neither the NPV logic nor the real options logic 
must be considered.  
Second, a low absolute level of SI communication must coincide with a high absolute 
level of expected financial return of SI, relative to traditional investments. In that case, 
advisors appear to forgo a decision that is financially attractive and which, based on the NPV 
logic, should not be forgone. This observation would infer that advisors might not apply the 
NPV logic in SI.  
Third, a significant negative relationship between SI communication and all or some 
of the variables related to complexity and risk must be identified. The observation outlines 
that aspects other than financial performance alone matter for advisors in the context of SI. 
This legitimizes the application of these aspects in the real options logic. 
Fourth, a high absolute level of perceived complexity and/or risk has to coincide with 
a low absolute level of SI communication. This shows that the negative relationship between 
these constructs does not only exist (Condition 3), but it is also economically relevant. 
Advisors appear to consider the real options logic if all four conditions are found 
supported. In that case, they care about the financial performance of SI, which they deem 
attractive; but at the same time perceive SI as complex and risky, and defer the decision to 
communicate about SI. We summarize the four conditions in one hypothesis.  
H10: The stronger perception of SI as complex and risky has a more negative effect on 
SI communication than the expectation of attractive financial returns of SI has a 
positive effect. 
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Based on the traditional usage of real options logic, Hypothesis 10 considers only financial 
benefits. In accordance with the outlined non-financial benefits of SI, we expand Hypothesis 
10 with the potential non-financial benefit that communicating about SI could have for 
advisors. If advisors have a high level of self-transcendent values, and they believe that 
investment decisions have an effect on society or the natural environment, then 
communicating about SI could have a non-financial benefit for advisors. To test for 
Hypothesis 11, we expand the second condition. We add the expectation of a high absolute 
level of self-transcendent values and perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE). Thus, the 
expanded second condition goes beyond ‘a high absolute level of expected financial return of 
SI’. It is formulated as follows: A low absolute level of SI communication must coincide with 
a high absolute value of expected financial return and/or non-financial benefits of SI 
communication. This leads to Hypothesis 11. 
 
H11: The stronger perception of SI as complex and risky has a more negative effect on 
SI communication than the financial and non-financial benefit of SI has a positive 
effect. 
 
3.4 Methods and Data 
3.4.1 Research Case 
The investment advisors covered in this study focus on clients that have more than USD 
300’000 in freely investable assets at their disposal. More than 85% of the advisors focus on 
clients with more than USD 1 million (Table 4). These clients are called high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs), or ultra high net worth individuals (UHNWIs) if they govern more than 
USD 30 million (Capgemini & RBC Wealth Management, 2012). We focus on advisors to 
wealthy private investors for three reasons. Firstly, their clients are economically significant, 
and understanding the segment better can provide insights to a large part of the SI-gap. 
HNWIs and UHNWIs make up only 0.7% of the world population, yet they govern more than 
40% of global household wealth (Shorrocks et al., 2013). Secondly, the dyadic relationship 
between advisors and wealthy clients is likely to be particularly close. West (2012) found that 
older, more educated individuals, employed in managerial or professional roles, with higher 
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income and higher net worth, were more likely to engage advisors; a profile that suits 
specifically to the segments covered in this study (see, e.g., Fidelity Investments, 2012). 
Third, wealthy private investors appear to be interested in considering sustainability topics, 
and are particularly enabled to invest along their interests, since they “have access to 
investments that are normally closed to smaller retail investors, and the freedom to move 
funds quickly without having to perform the extensive due diligence required by institutional 
investors” (Eurosif, 2012b, p. 7).  
Overall, it appears that wealthy private investors would be likely to engage in SI, yet 
the observed SI-gap persists. That puzzle, and the magnitude of the potential impact of 
wealthy private investors’ behaviour on financial markets, lend themselves to scholarly work. 
Research into this group appears to be non-existent, however, probably because these people 
are hard to access due to secretive private banks, consultants and advisors. Insights on the 
relationship between advisors and wealthy private investors in the context of SI are therefore 
particularly required (Schrader, 2006), which is where this study contributes due to its 
original sample. 
 
3.4.2 Sample and Data Collection 
The survey was developed based on the above hypotheses. To increase its reliability the 
questionnaire underwent five testing rounds with 20 practitioners, management- and 
psychology scholars (Presser et al., 2004). The online self-reported survey was programmed 
and administered via the web-based survey tool Unipark. The survey invitation and two 
consecutive reminders were sent via email from within two private banks to all of the banks’ 
advisors based in the Swiss market. Out of a total of 240 recipients, 95 complete responses 
were received at a response rate of 40%, which is a typical rate for an online survey (Couper, 
2000). Descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 1. We observe no particular skews apart 
from a strong overweight of male respondents, which is rather typical in the financial services 
industry. The average responding investment advisor is male, holds a Bachelor degree, is 45 
years of age, has children, and serves clients that are 60 years of age and that govern between 
USD 1 million and USD 30 millions in wealth (Table 4). Further insights into the distribution 
within the measured categories are provided in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N = 95) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
SI communication 1.00 5.00 2.77 0.89 0.80 
Gender 1.00 2.00 1.12 0.36 0.13 
Kids 1.00 2.00 1.56 0.52 0.27 
Education 1.00 7.00 4.43 1.78 3.16 
Bank 1.00 2.00 1.55 0.50 0.25 
Language 1.00 2.00 1.17 0.38 0.14 
Age 1.00 4.00 2.51 0.89 0.80 
Age.CL 1.00 3.00 2.34 0.54 0.29 
PCE 1.00 5.00 3.61 0.96 0.91 
Vola 1.00 5.00 2.89 0.74 0.55 
Return 1.00 5.00 2.77 0.78 0.61 
Complex 1.80 5.00 3.50 0.68 0.47 
PR 1.00 5.00 2.47 0.94 0.89 
Trust 1.00 5.00 3.51 0.91 0.84 
Values 1.33 5.00 4.16 0.74 0.55 
Wealth.CL 1.00 3.00 1.97 0.52 0.27 
InvHor.CL 1.00 4.00 2.70 0.78 0.60 
 
3.4.3 Variables and Data Analysis 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is defined as individual advisor’s level of 
activity in communicating about SI in client discussions; i.e. their level of ‘SI 
communication’. The level of SI communication is measured via four items on a 5-point 
Likert scale. The items were developed throughout the iterative questionnaire development 
process and are provided in Table 2 in the Appendix; the reliability as calculated through the 
Cronbach’s Alpha value is satisfactory (0.836). 
 
Independent variables. The advisors’ expectation of the return and the volatility of SI 
compared to traditional investments was measured on a 5-point Likert scale anchored at 
‘much lower’ and ‘much higher’. They are indicated in the regression model as the ‘return’ 
and ‘vola’ variables. The following constructs were measured via three items each, on a 5-
point Likert scale. We apply the items suggested by Stern et al (1998) to measure self-
transcendent values, i.e. the ‘values’ construct (Cronbach’s Alpha .717). During the iterative 
questionnaire testing process we developed measures for the constructs ‘PR’(-stunt) (.768), 
‘Trust’ (.632) and ‘Complexity’ (.612). Both latter constructs obtained the lowest Cronbach’s 
Alpha value in the study, yet are kept in the regression model since the value is potentially 
underestimated in smaller samples (Sijtsma, 2009), and the obtained values are above what 
has been recommended (Nunnally, 1967). In regard to perceived consumer effectiveness, i.e. 
the ‘PCE’ construct (.744), we follow Nilsson (2008, 2009) in the application of two items 
that are adapted to the context of SI. Range categories to choose from by the advisors were 
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applied to measure their clients’ average investment time horizon, the ‘InHor.CL’ construct, 
and wealth bracket, the ‘Wealth.CL’ construct. The two real-options related hypotheses are 
tested along the outlined four conditions, based on the variables that are employed to measure 
advisors’ level of SI communication, and their perception of the return, complexity and risk 
(volatility, PR stunt, Trust) of SI. Table 2 in the appendix outlines the specific questionnaire 
items of the outlined constructs. 
 
Control variables. Socio-demographic variables that are prevalent in research on pro-
environmental behavior or SI were likewise included as control variables in this study. 
Compared to conventional investors, investors interested in SI appear to be younger, more 
educated, and female (e.g., Cheah, Jamali, Johnson, & Sung, 2011; Deni Greene Consulting 
Services, 2001; McLachlan & Gardner, 2004; Rosen et al., 1991; Schueth, 2003). We thus 
include advisors’ age, gender and level of education as control variables. Further, research in 
the field of psychology emphasizes that the future time orientation of individuals has an effect 
on pro-environmental behavior (Milfont & Gouveia, 2006; Rabinovich et al., 2010). We 
therefore also include whether advisors have kids, i.e. heirs, as well as the age of their clients 
as control variables. Since the survey was conducted at two banks and subjects could choose 
between German and English we include a variable for the respective bank and language. 
 
Data analysis. With a rather standard regression issue at hand we employ the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model for the data analysis. In a first step the control variables are 
entered in Model 1, whereas no significant effects are identified. The independent variables 
are then introduced in Model 2. Since advisors work with a range of financial products that 
are usually complex, the Complexity variable is introduced as a binary in the regression 
model, with ‘1’ for indications of SI as very complex, and ‘0’ for values below that. Model 2 
has good explanatory power with an adjusted R-squared of 0.36 at 95 total observations 
(Table 3). 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Advisors’ Level of SI Communication and Perception of SI 
About 25% of the covered advisors communicate about SI rather frequently with their clients. 
35% rarely or never mention SI, while about 40% are indifferent. The average (median) 
advisor perceives the financial return and the volatility of SI as similar to that of traditional 
investments. 15% expect that SI performs substantially better than traditional investments, 
while 34% expect a lower performance. 17% relate a comparatively low volatility to SI, while 
26% expect a higher volatility. Most advisors perceive SI as rather complex, have a low fear 
of SI being a PR stunt, and appear to trust the providers of SI products. In regard to perceived 
consumer effectiveness (PCE), most advisors appear to believe in a high or very high effect 
that investment decisions have on society or the natural environment. Further, most advisors 
appear to have a high or very high level of self-transcendent values (Table 4). 
 
3.5.2 Regression Model Predicting Advisors’ Level of SI Communication 
A highly significant positive relation with SI communication shows for the Return construct 
(p<0.001), thus confirming Hypothesis 1. No significant effect is found for the Volatility 
construct, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2. A strongly significant effect is found for the 
Complexity binary (p<0.01), thus the perception of SI as highly complex relates negatively to 
SI communication (Hypothesis 3). We find a significant negative relation with the PR stunt 
construct (p<0.05), which supports Hypothesis 4. No support is found for Hypothesis 5, 
which relates to the effect of self-transcendent values. Hypothesis 6, related to the PCE 
construct (p<0.05), receives significant support; the same applies to the Trust construct 
(p<0.05) and Hypothesis 7. Strong support is also found for Hypothesis 8, which pertains to 
the effect of clients’ wealth category (p<0.01). In regard to the effect of clients’ investment 
time horizon, which pertains to Hypothesis 9, no significant relation is identified. The 
regression model is provided in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Regression model predicting advisors’ level of SI communication 
  
 
In terms of the correlations between variables, the variable correlation matrix that is displayed 
in Table 5 outlines no particular considerable relationships. 
 
3.5.3 Real Options Logic as a Conceptualization of Advisors’ Activity in 
Communicating about SI  
We move along the four conditions outlined in the development of Hypothesis 10, drawing 
from the descriptive findings and the regression results.  
The first condition is fulfilled, as we find a significant relation between the perceived 
financial return of SI and the level of SI communication. Thus, financial return matters to 
advisors in the SI context. 
The second condition is not fulfilled. While we do observe an overall low level of SI 
communication, most advisors also do not expect a substantially better performance of SI. 
Thus, no substantial mismatch between the two aspects was found. However, the condition, in 
this form or reversed, might well be fulfilled for a share of advisors. As an indication, the 32 
advisors that communicate never or rarely about SI also perceive SI as more risky and volatile 
than the sample average. The 23 advisors that show a high level of activity in communicating 
about SI also perceive SI as less complex than the average, have less fear of SI as a PR stunt, 
and more trust in SI product providers. They also perceive SI as slightly more volatile than 
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what the average was in this survey; yet that aspect did not turn out to be of significance in 
the regression model.  
The third condition can be deemed fulfilled. A significant relationship between the 
communication of SI and three of the four considered variables related to complexity and risk 
was identified (Complexity, Trust, PR stunt; no support for the effect of Volatility). Thus, 
such aspects matter for advisors in the SI context, beyond just financial return. 
The fourth condition is confirmed. A high absolute measurement level was found for 
the Complexity construct, and the variable was also found related to SI communication.  
Overall, however, only a share of the advisors perceive SI as financially more 
attractive than traditional investments (condition 2), thus Hypothesis 10 cannot be confirmed; 
though it might well hold for a subset of advisors. 
 
Hypothesis 11 differs from Hypothesis 10 through the modification of the second 
condition. In addition to financial benefits of SI communication, potential non-financial 
benefits are considered as well, namely self-transcendent values and perceived consumer 
effectiveness (PCE). We find that advisors on average perceive no difference between SI and 
traditional investments in terms of financial return. We do, however, find a high absolute 
level of potential non-financial benefits. Thus, the overall benefit of SI communication 
appears to be positive. This, together with the low observed level of SI communication, leads 
to the second condition being fulfilled. Since the first, third and fourth conditions are fulfilled 
as well, we deem Hypothesis 11 as confirmed. Therefore, the real options logic can be 
applicable to conceptualize the behavior of advisors in the context of SI, if non-financial 
benefits of SI communication are considered as well as financial benefits. 
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3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Implications for Sustainable Investing Scholars and Practitioners 
Our results show a low level of SI communication amongst advisors. The applied regression 
model shows a good explanatory power and identifies a number of particularly interesting 
relationships between SI communication and explanatory constructs, which we discuss as 
follows. 
We do not find a significant relation between the volatility that advisors expect from 
SI and their level of SI communication. This finding is surprising and contrary to what we 
know from behavioral finance and specifically prospect theory (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It is also contrary to findings on the behavior of people in 
decisions related to the natural environment (e.g., Karp, 1996; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Stern 
et al., 1999), or specifically in the context of SI (e.g., Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000). Therefore, 
the role of volatility in the context of the decision-making process of advisors generally and in 
the context of SI might deserve further scholarly exploration. 
A significant positive relationship was identified for advisors’ expected financial 
return of SI. This is in line with existing research (e.g., J. Nilsson, 2009) and confirms the 
importance of the popular investigation of the relationship between sustainability and 
financial performance (e.g., Orlitzky et al., 2003). For practitioners, this indicates that 
arguments related to the potential outperformance of SI solutions as opposed to lower 
volatility might be more effective to motivate advisors’ SI communication. 
Beyond the common focus in SI literature on financial performance (Gond et al., 
2011), however, our results also indicate that the financial return of SI is not the only 
important aspect for advisors. In fact, we find that advisors on average perceive no substantial 
difference in the return and volatility of SI compared to traditional investments. It might 
rather be risks and complexity associated to SI that keep advisors from SI. In particular, we 
find that the complexity of SI could overwhelm not only investors (J. Nilsson et al., 2012), but 
also their advisors; to understand and mitigate this barrier might be of interest to scholars and 
practitioners alike. 
It is specifically the significant role of perceived complexity, together with financial 
and non-financial return, that points us to the logic of real options as a potential avenue to 
conceptualize why most advisors communicate less on SI then what might be expected. 
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Surveys and market data on SI point to a market opportunity for advisors. Thus, a high level 
of advisors’ SI communication could be expected. The real options logic and our findings on 
the as high perceived complexity of SI indicate that advisors might face the embedded real 
option to learn about SI, before the actual decision on SI communication occurs. To exercise 
this first option would reduce the perceived complexity of SI, and thus reduce the value of the 
(real) option to defer the latter decision to communicate about SI. Because the first option is 
deferred, however, advisors might be more likely to also defer the second option to 
communicate about SI, even against their expectation of attractive financial and non-financial 
benefits. This leads to an actual level of SI communication that our study and market data 
suggest is rather low. Thus, a mismatch is observed between the potential market opportunity 
of SI and the actual level of advisors’ SI communication. This could provide an explanation to 
the observed SI gap; i.e. the low level of engagement in SI by private investors. The proposed 
conceptualization is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Advisors deferral of two embedded real options leads to a mismatch between the 
market opportunity of SI and the actual level of SI communication 
 
We invite scholars to test and further develop the proposed conceptualization. For 
practitioners and scholars alike, assessing the effect of trainings regarding SI (real option 1) 
on SI communication (real option 2) would be interesting. Particularly for practitioners, our 
results reiterate the importance of training and of reducing the actual as well as the perceived 
complexity of SI. This paper also indicates the way for a quantitative real option model that 
could shed light on the two mentioned options: the option to decrease SI complexity and to 
communicate about SI as well as on their characteristics: strike price, underlying value and 
risk. 
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3.6.2 Implications for Social Responsibility Scholars and Practitioners 
Beyond the context of advisors and SI, we generalize a selection of our results to the context 
of salespeople advising consumers on products that consider social responsibility. 
Contrary to previous findings from literature on the behavior of consumers, we did not 
find a significant relation between SI communication and advisors’ self-transcendent values. 
Similar results have been obtained in the realm of management professionals. Jansson and 
Biel find that professional investors within investment institutions express self-transcendent 
values significantly less than their beneficiaries, and “investment institutions underestimate 
the importance of environmental, social and ethical issues for their beneficiaries but 
overestimate the importance of financial returns” (Jansson & Biel, 2011:141). Further, Craig 
and colleagues (1993) found that UNCED staff separate their personal desire for social 
responsibility values from their behavior at work. Nilsson and Biel (2008) arrive at similar 
findings in regard to business managers, who react more negatively on decisions related to 
social responsibility when they are in their professional role compared to when they are in 
their private role. Based on these and our findings, we suggest that salespeople are less 
receptive for social responsibility when they are in a professional role compared to when they 
are in the role of a private citizen. The identified focus on financial aspects, as opposed to 
self-transcendent values, might even incur a chasm in situations where clients care about self-
transcendent values. This chasm could have significant negative implications for the 
dissemination and market success of products that specifically consider social responsibility, 
and might attract the attention of scholars and practitioners. 
A similar pattern might occur in regard to socio-demographic variables. The relation 
between age, gender, education, etc., and pro-environmental decisions has been well 
documented in regard to private individuals. However, that relation was not found in our 
results in the context of advisors. This might be due to the responding investment advisors 
being situated in their working environment at the time of the survey, where they might 
decide different or opposed to their personal view. This pattern might arise with salespeople 
at large and further distance their actions from their personal preferences and the interest of 
their clients. 
Lastly, our finding on the significant effect of the perception of SI as a PR stunt and 
the fear of untrustworthy product providers reiterates the corresponding suggestions by 
Nilsson (2008) and Crane (2000); practitioners that develop and market products that 
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integrate socially responsibility must provide strong evidence for the credibility of their 
products and the trustworthiness of their organization. That is especially true in light of 
frequently occurring cases of ‘greenwashing’ or outright scandals. Avenues and mechanisms 
to assess and manage the trustworthiness of the topic of SI and social responsibility and 
related solution providers might be a topic of relevance for practitioners, and provide fertile 
ground for future research. 
 
3.6.3 Limitations and Further Avenues for Future Research 
The geographical focus or size of our sample and the selection process may have influenced 
our results. We encourage scholars to further test and specify the effect of the aspects 
included in this study. To better understand the behavior of individual advisors, we encourage 
the introduction of concepts such as framing and institutional logics, which scholars interested 
in organizations have studied (Beunza & Garud, 2007; Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001; 
Zuckerman, 1999), or the construction of investment advisors as frame-makers (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; Beunza & Garud, 2007). The difference in the role of self-transcendent values in 
a professional versus a private context might deserve further attention, such as through the 
specific application of Value Belief Norm (VBN) theory (Stern et al., 1999; Stern, 2000). 
Lastly, an assessment of salespeople across cultures would allow for the inclusion of the 
cultural distance variable from Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory (Hofstede, 1984), which 
is useful in understanding how different cultures operationalize social responsibility (Hawkes, 
2001; Park, Russell, & Lee, 2007). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This is the first study that empirically investigates the role of investment advisors to explain 
the ‘SI-gap’ phenomenon, i.e. the low relative engagement of private investors in SI despite a 
high interest in SI. Our results indicate that advisors are not particularly active in 
communicating about SI with their clients. That is surprising, since market data suggests that 
SI is a business opportunity for advisors, and a chance to prove their financial worth to 
clients.  
We develop a model of aspects that can help to explain why some advisors are more 
active in communicating about SI than others. No effect is found for the volatility that 
advisors associate with SI is surprising; a finding that is contrary to current literature and 
lends itself to further research. In line with literature, a significant relation is found between 
advisors’ level of SI communication and their expected financial return of SI, as well as their 
perceived complexity of SI. This leads to the dynamic real options logic as a potential avenue 
to conceptualize the observed mismatch between SI as a market opportunity and advisors’ 
low level of SI communication. 
Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between private 
investors and investment advisors. We provide insights into the understanding of SI by 
advisors to particularly wealthy private investors, and generalize our results to salespeople in 
the context of social responsibility. Therefore, this study explores micro-foundations of 
decision making by advisors and salespeople in the context of SI and social responsibility at 
large. For example, salespeople in the context of social responsibility might react less to their 
self-transcendent values or socio-demographic profile, and could systematically deviate from 
the interest of their clients. 
Finally, we hope that this study provides a motivation to go beyond the common focus 
on the business case of social responsibility, and to create more attention for the important 
and interesting role of salespeople; for the benefit of salespeople and their firms, their clients 
and society. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Constructs (Cronbach’s Alpha value), questionnaire items 
QUESTION: To what extend do you agree with the following statements regarding your personal 
view / your clients / (name of bank)? (5 point Likert scale anchored by do not agree at all and 
fully agree) 
 
SI engagement (.836) 
 I regularly inform clients about the option of investing in SI in client meetings. 
 I actively recommend options in the area of SI to clients as new or alternative investment 
options. 
 SI does NOT belong to my standard offers when I talk to new clients about their portfolio 
composition. (reversed) 
 I inform clients about SI only upon their request. (reversed) 
 
Perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) (adapted from Nilsson, 2007) (.744) 
 By investing in SI every investor can have a positive effect on the environment.  
 Every person has the opportunity to influence social problems by investing in 
responsible companies.  
 
Complexity (.612) 
 I personally perceive SI as a complex field. 
 The field of SI is sufficiently defined for me. (reversed) 
 I need more information to be confident about discussing the field of SI. (reversed) 
 My clients have very different views about what makes a company sustainable (e.g., 
philanthropy; ESG). 
 
PR stunt (.768) 
 I personally perceive SI as a marketing stunt. 
 SI is generally a fad that is used for short-term marketing purposes. 
 The majority of my clients perceive SI as a marketing stunt. 
 
Trust (.632) 
 I trust that providers of sustainable mutual funds do not invest in companies that 
manufacture weapons and tobacco.  
 I trust that providers of sustainable mutual funds do their best in trying to get companies 
to act in a way that reduces social and environmental problems. 
 Providers of sustainable mutual funds can be trusted to follow the sustainability 
guidelines used in their marketing documents.  
 
 
QUESTION: How important are the following guiding principles for you personally and for 
your life? (5 point Likert scale anchored by not at all and very important) 
 
Values (following Stern et al, 1998) (.717) 
 Protecting the environment, preserving nature. 
 Support a world at peace, free of war and conflict. 
 Social justice, correcting injustice, care for the weak. 
 
QUESTION for measurement of Volatility (5 point Likert scale anchored by -2 / much higher 
and +2 / much lower):  
 How do you assess the general level of the risk, or the volatility of financial returns of SI 
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compared to traditional investments?  
 
 
QUESTION for measurement of Return (5 point Likert scale anchored by -2 / much lower and 
+2 / much higher): 
 How do you assess the general level of financial returns of SI compared to traditional 
investments?  
 
Table 4: Expanded descriptive statistics (N = 95) 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
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4 Complex Markets vs. Complex Customer Needs: How 
Investment Advisors’ Narratives Enable or Constrain 
Sustainable Investing 
Abstract 
 
Organization theorists have not analyzed investments advisors, although advisors play a key 
role in a finance-centered economy by making access to capital easier—or more difficult—for 
companies, sectors, or countries. We address this gap with a qualitative analysis of the 
narratives that investment advisors use to understand their role in the context of sustainable 
investing. Based on 22 interviews, we find two narratives: investment advisors at firms that 
lag in sustainable investing describe financial markets as highly complex, and their customers 
as simplistic, with sustainable investing a nuisance that they reject to deal with. In contrast, 
advisors at leading firms use a narrative that highlights customer needs as complex, and 
sustainable investing as the solution for problems of overly complicated financial markets. 
We thus document a complexity shift in investment advisors’ narratives from complex 
financial markets to complex customer needs. These findings suggest that all types of 
investment firms, including those focused on sustainable investments, depend on 
“complexity” to sell financial services and products. We also contribute to research on 
sustainable investing by outlining how investment advisors’ narratives either constrain or 
enable sustainable investing within investment firms, which has important implications for the 
mainstreaming of sustainable investing. 
 
Key Words: complexity, investment advisors, narratives, private investors, sustainable 
investing 
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Introduction 
Over the last 30 years, financial markets have become the “brain of the economy” (Mishkin, 
2006). Along this significant development, and in particular as a reaction to the financial 
crisis of 2008, organization theorists (e.g., Davis, forthcoming; Munir, 2011) started to call 
for more research on the different factors that contribute to this “movement toward a finance-
centered economy” (Davis, 2009b, p. 27).  
While organization theorists have investigated the role of some actors in financial 
markets, such as institutional investors (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Gond & Piani, 2013) and 
securities analysts (Beunza & Garud, 2007; Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001), organization 
theorists have not analyzed the role of investment advisors. Investment advisors at banks and 
other investment firms consult and influence investors, i.e. their customers, on where they 
invest their assets. Advisors thereby make access to capital easier for some companies, 
sectors, or countries—and more difficult for others. They play a key role in a finance-centered 
economy, influencing the allocation of capital and what types of change occur in financial 
markets (e.g., Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). 
Despite their influence on capital allocation, the economic value of investment 
advisors for their customers has been challenged as econometric studies find that their advice 
does not pay out for their customers (Hackethal et al., 2012; van de Venter & Michayluk, 
2008). Indeed, studies over the last 40 years have found that most investors would be better 
off with a passive investment strategy that merely buys and holds a diversified portfolio 
(Fama, 1970; French, 2008; Malkiel, 1973). 
Beyond research from financial economists on the outcomes of the interaction 
between investment advisors with their customers, however, the underlying mechanics of this 
interaction remain a “black box”. Organization theorists should therefore use qualitative 
methods, which are complementary to the quantitative methods of financial economists, to 
open the “black box” of investment advisors’ cognition and decision-making as the 
fundamental basis of their interaction with customers (Gond et al., 2011; Paetzold & Busch, 
2014; Schrader, 2006). 
One key element within this “black box” are the narratives that investment advisors 
use to make sense of their role. Narratives involve stories, a time sequence, focal actors, and 
“a sense of what is right and wrong, appropriate or inappropriate” (Pentland, 1999, p. 713). 
Actors use narratives to make sense of the world around them and to act in it (Haack, 
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Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). Indeed, as Pentland (1999, p. 711) points out, narratives are 
“especially relevant to the analysis of organizational processes because people do not simply 
tell stories—they enact them.” That is, narratives shape how investment advisors interact with 
their customers, thereby influencing investment decisions, and, ultimately, capital allocation 
in a finance-centered economy. 
To study how investment advisors’ narratives influence capital allocation we focus on 
how they enable or constrain a new investment approach: sustainable investing. Sustainable 
investing refers to investment practices that—in addition to financial return—take into 
account environmental, social, and governance considerations into investment decisions  
(Eurosif, 2012a). While today many investment firms offer such products, products in which 
the majority of private investors are interested in (Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 2014), the 
market share of sustainable investing remains small, between 5 and 10% of overall 
investments (Eurosif, 2012a; US SIF Foundation, 2012). This conundrum indicates that in the 
context of sustainable investing, challenges exist at the nexus of investors and investment 
products, i.e. in the communication between investment advisors and their customers. This 
paper therefore raises the following research question: What narratives do investment 
advisors use in the context of sustainable investing, and how do these narratives enable or 
constrain advisors to communicate with customers about sustainable investing? 
We address this research question with a multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010) that compares investment advisors’ narratives in investment 
firms that are either laggards or leaders in terms of their sustainable investing offering. 
Laggard firms offer sustainable investing products, but their investment advisors rarely sell 
such products; leader firms successfully sell sustainable investing products. Based on 
interviews with 22 investment advisors at such firms we identify the narratives that 
investment advisors use to make sense of their role and sustainable investing. We then 
analyze how these narratives enable or constrain sustainable investing within different 
investment firms.  
We find two antagonistic narratives. In the laggard firm, investment advisors employ 
the nuisance narrative, which construes their customers as simplistic and sustainable 
investing as out-of-scope as it adds complexity to their work with financial markets that are 
already highly complex. In contrast, investment advisors at the two leading firms use the 
savior narrative, which stresses that customers have complex needs and positions sustainable 
investing as the solution to many problems of financial markets that are simple, but 
wrongfully complicated by non-sustainability focused actors. We thus find a complexity shift, 
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that is, a shift in terms of what the two narratives highlight as complex: In the laggard firm, 
financial markets are seen as exceedingly complex, while at the two leaders, investment 
advisors argue that financial markets should be simple, but that customer needs are 
irreducibly complex. 
Our paper makes two major contributions. First, we contribute to the emerging 
organization theory literature on financial markets (Davis, 2009a; Marti & Scherer, 2014; 
Munir, 2011) by analyzing the influential yet precarious role of investment advisors. Our 
comparison of the narratives used within the laggards and leaders suggests that all investment 
firms depend on “complexity” to sell financial services and products. While investment 
advisors at the two leaders in their narrative deny that financial services are complex, they 
create another source of complexity, which lies in customers’ needs. Second, our paper adds 
to research on sustainable investing (Markowitz, Cobb, & Hedley, 2012; Slager, Gond, & 
Moon, 2012) by outlining how investment advisors’ narratives either constrain or enable 
sustainable investing. Our findings suggest that selling sustainable investing products might 
only be possible for investment firms that develop certain narratives, which can constitute a 
major impediment for large incumbents. This insight can provide a potent explanation for the 
limited mainstreaming and low market share of sustainable investing. 
4.1 Theoretical Background 
4.1.1 Narratives 
Financial economists find that investment advice, on average, does not pay out for customers 
(Hackethal et al., 2012; van de Venter & Michayluk, 2008), but they do not open the “black 
box” of how investment advisors interact with their customers. To open that black box, we 
use a social constructivist approach (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) that builds on different 
assumptions than economic theory. Most economic theory assumes that individuals act in 
rational and self-serving ways (Abell, 2000; Scherer, 2003), that is, individuals assess the 
outcomes of different options and then choose the option that best serves their interests. This 
parsimonious theory of human behavior is the basis for many economic theories that provide 
useful insights into social phenomena that range from credit rationing (Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981) to bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). 
At the same time, this theory of human behavior is not ideal to explain some social 
phenomena (Scherer, 2003). This is particularly so when humans are embedded in strong 
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social relations, and under the influence of powerful cultural norms (Granovetter, 1985). To 
study human behavior under such conditions, many organization theorists draw on a social 
constructivist approach that sees individuals not as primarily rational but as influenced and 
shaped by societal influences. According to this approach, humans often act because they 
were socialized in specific ways, because they want to meet expectations from society or 
peers, or because they take it for granted that one has to act in a specific way without thinking 
about it (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Social constructivist approaches have developed different theories to explore factors 
that shape human actions. These theories engage in an “inquiry from the inside” to understand 
how individuals see the world (Evered & Louis, 1981, p. 385). For example, some researchers 
explore the “institutional logics” (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) that shape the 
worldview and actions of individuals. Other researchers look at how individuals “frame” 
(Benford & Snow, 2000) what is problematic about situations, and what would be possible 
solutions. Still other researchers analyze the “sensemaking” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) 
that actors engage in after they perceive discrepant cues in their environment. In this paper we 
use a narrative approach (Pentland, 1999; Rhodes & Brown, 2005) as a suitable perspective 
that has become widely used in organization theory over the last 20 years (Froud, Nilsson, 
Moran, & Williams, 2012; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; O’Neill, 2001; Wright, Nyberg, & Grant, 
2012). A narrative approach is ideal for an inquiry from the inside when actors have already 
dealt with a new development—such as sustainable investing—for a certain time; whereas, 
for example, a sensemaking approach would be ideal to investigate how actors deal with a 
new development when first encountering it. 
According to Pentland (1999), narratives involve a time sequence, focal actors, and 
give guidance on what is right and wrong. Such narratives, or stories that are part of a 
narrative and that people tell themselves and others, help individuals to see complex 
environments in a certain light and, ultimately, to act in these environments. People therefore 
“do not simply tell stories—they enact them” (Pentland, 1999, p. 711). This study analyzes 
narratives investment advisors use to understand their own role and their interaction with 
customers—in the specific context of sustainable investing, as outlined below. 
4.1.2 Sustainable Investing  
Sustainable investing (SI) describes variants of investment approaches that aim for financial, 
non-financial or combined returns through a focus on certain industries (e.g., clean 
technology), the exclusion of specific business activities (e.g., production of tobacco), or by 
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considering environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria within investment 
decisions (Eurosif, 2014; Sandberg et al., 2008).  
This expansion to traditional investment decision-making in financial markets can 
drive the equitable and resource-conscious development of society as a whole ahead (Clark & 
Hebb, 2005; Scholtens, 2006). For example, sustainable investing motivates businesses to 
improve their performance on sustainability measures as many firms today aim to “satisfy 
professional fund managers and meet the expectations of the capital market” (Williams, 2000, 
p. 6). Investors pursuing sustainable investing can also pressure businesses to strengthen their 
sustainability related activities and to move beyond greenwashing (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004).  
The achievement of that potential, however, critically depends on whether sustainable 
investing is “mainstream or backwater“ (Dunfee, 2003, p. 247), i.e. the share of assets 
invested along the principles of sustainable investing relative to overall assets invested in 
financial markets. That relative market share of sustainable investing remains rather low at 
between 5% and 10% of overall investments (Eurosif, 2012a; US SIF Foundation, 2012). 
Sustainable investing remains particularly neglected by private investors, even though surveys 
suggest that the majority of private investors are interested in sustainable investing (Eurosif, 
2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 2014). While private investors govern almost as many 
assets as institutional investors (USD 50 trillion vs. USD 80 trillion), private investors own 
just 3% of the total financial assets that are invested in sustainable investing in Europe, 
compared to 97% owned by institutional investors (Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; Eurosif, 2014; 
Shorrocks et al., 2013). As such, the sustainable investing-market potential amongst private 
investors “is far from being realized” (Schrader, 2006, p. 200).  
In light of the low relative market share of sustainable investing, a body of research 
explores barriers for sustainable investing amongst institutional investors (for a review, see 
for example Juravle and Lewis, 2008). It remains largely unclear, however, why some 
individual, i.e. private investors practice sustainable investing while others do not (Glac, 
2008). Most related studies cover private investor characteristics, motivations, and 
comparisons of different types of private investors, while barriers remain largely unexplored 
(for an overview and indicative exploration, see, e.g., Paetzold & Busch, 2014). This study 
answers to calls for the exploration of such barriers for sustainable investing, especially in 
regard to investment advisors that play a particularly important role in the context of 
sustainable investing (Paetzold & Busch, 2014; Schrader, 2006). 
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4.1.3 Investment Advisors 
Investment advisors are diffusion agents of financial products and change agents (Rogers, 
2003) in financial markets as they represent the main point of interaction between an 
investment firm and its customers (Schrader, 2006). The important relationship between 
private investors and investment advisors has been met with calls for a deeper understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms, especially following the 2008 financial crisis (Inderst, 2011; 
Mullainathan et al., 2012; West, 2012). While organization theorists have studied securities 
analysts (Beunza & Garud, 2007; Rao et al., 2001; Zuckerman, 1999), they so far have 
neglected investment advisors. This is an important gap given investment advisors’ influence 
on how capital gets allocated within the economy. 
Existing research indicates that private investors are overwhelmed by the breadth of 
information in regard to sustainable investing mutual funds (J. Nilsson et al., 2012), or lack 
actionable information on sustainable investing and suitable products (Eurosif, 2012b; 
Hummels & Timmer, 2004). It is especially in such situations that private investors rely on 
advisors to structure and select the most relevant information (Inderst, 2011). As such, 
sustainable investing provides advisors with the opportunity to add value to their services and 
allow for more salient business relationships (Eurosif, 2012b). This might be particularly 
attractive for advisors since the general benefit of their work for customers is increasingly 
challenged (van de Venter & Michayluk, 2008), since “advisors end up collecting more in 
fees and commissions than any monetary value they add to the account” (Hackethal et al., 
2012, p. 521).  
The low market share of sustainable investing indicates, however, that advisors are 
less active in communicating about sustainable investing than what the potential opportunity 
would suggest (Paetzold & Busch, 2014; Schrader, 2006). As such, this study explores why 
investment advisors appear to refrain from selling sustainable investing to their customers by 
analyzing investment advisors’ narratives, and how these narratives constrain or enable 
selling sustainable investing. 
4.2 Methods and Data 
Given the research gap around the “black box” of how investment advisors understand their 
role and interaction with their customers, we chose an inductive, theory-building research 
approach. Data was gathered through semi-structured face-to-face interviews with investment 
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advisors, which allowed us to obtain the subjects’ points of view in their own words (Kvale, 
1996, 2007). In our analysis we applied the iterative process of analytic induction following 
an exploratory multi-case study approach (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), which allowed us to 
identify and compare advisors’ narrative patterns (Haack et al., 2012). 
4.2.1 Research Setting 
This study explores the narratives of investment advisors at private wealth management firms 
in Switzerland. Switzerland is “one of the world’s leading financial centers and plays a 
particularly important role with respect to cross-border private wealth management, where it 
is number one in the world” (Eurosif, 2014, p. 61). A total of about 283 banks govern USD 6 
trillion in assets under management, of which 50% originate from abroad (Swiss Bankers 
Association, 2014). Thus, Switzerland is of particular significance in the international wealth 
management industry, and provides a suitable choice of country for the empirical data 
collection of this study. 
Furthermore, Switzerland is “widely acknowledged as a strong player in sustainable 
and responsible finance” (Eurosif, 2014, p. 61), with firms that are lagging in terms of 
offering sustainable investing products as well as those that lead in this regard. Empirical data 
for this study is collected at both types of organizations. One firm is a large private wealth 
manager whose offering includes sustainable investing products, yet with very little success in 
terms of the relative share of clients’ assets invested in these products. We also cover two 
leading firms that have a strong focus on sustainable investing products. With sustainable 
investing being a rather new topic, both ‘leader’ firms are smaller than the ‘laggard’ firm in 
terms of staff and client assets. As this paper focuses on narratives, which are largely 
unrelated to company size, differences in size are no impediment for our research design. 
Comparing the two types of firms allows us to contrast, identify, and compare significant 
differences in story elements and aggregate narrative patterns (Haack et al., 2012).  
The investment advisors that are covered in this study usually serve customers that 
have more than USD 1 million in freely investable assets at their disposal. We focus on the 
segment of wealthy private investors for three reasons. Firstly, such wealthy private investors 
are economically significant, governing more than 40% of global household wealth while 
making up only 0.7% of the world population (Shorrocks et al., 2013). Secondly, these 
customers tend to be older, more educated individuals (see, e.g., Fidelity Investments, 2012) 
that work with advisors in a close dyadic relationship (West, 2012). Third, wealthy private 
investors appear to be interested in sustainable investing, but at the same time are 
 131 
underrepresented in terms of total assets invested in sustainable investing (Eurosif, 2012b, 
2014; Paetzold & Busch, 2014). As such, although the relationship between advisors and 
wealthy private investors lends itself to scholarly work and is required (Schrader, 2006), 
corresponding research is rare or non-existent, possibly due to the secretive nature of the 
private wealth management industry (Paetzold & Busch, 2014). 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
We conducted semi-structured interviews following the process proposed by Kvale (2007), 
allowing the stimulation of subjects narration of, first, their own role, second their clients and 
firm, and, third, sustainable investing. Based on the research question of this study, the 
interviewees are investment advisors, i.e. wealth management staff with constant or 
occasional customer contact in the context of advising private investors on investment 
decisions.  
The process of selecting interviewees was based on the constant comparative method 
and in particular the concept of theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The desired 
interviewee profiles and questions were defined based on initial theoretical ideas. Following 
each interview, the questions and interviewee profiles were reviewed in order to identify 
emerging theoretical ideas (Yin, 2003a), and to strengthen the questions’ internal and 
construct validity (Gibbert et al., 2008). Particularly insightful were interviews with advisors 
that represent polar types in regard to their function and seniority, affinity with sustainability, 
and affiliation with a laggard or leader firm. The spectrum of interviewee profiles was 
covered at each firm. 
After 22 interviews, additional theoretical insights became marginal and we thus 
stopped the data collection (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003a). A 
list of the interviewees is presented in Table 1. To ensure confidentiality the interviewees are 
named and numbered as Lead_A for one leader firm, Lead_B for the other leader firm, and 
Lag for the laggard firm. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interviews lasted 
60 minutes on average and were conducted mostly in German; the authors translated such 
quotations presented in the findings section. 
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Table 1: List of interviewees 
 
Code Function Date Length in minutes Language 
Lead_A1 SI expert 13-May-2014 42 German 
Lead_A2 Chairman 22-Jan-2014 47 German 
Lead_A3 Advisor 16-Dec-2013 79 German 
Lead_A4 SI expert 13-May-2014 56 German 
Lead_A5 COO 17-Apr-2013 68 German 
Lead_A6 CEO 8-Nov-2014 18 German 
Lead_B1 Advisor 27-Nov-2013 64 German 
Lead_B2 Advisor 3-Dec-2013 78 German 
Lead_B3 SI expert 14-Feb-2014 69 German 
Lead_B4 CEO 14-Jan-2014 44 German 
Lead_B5 SI analyst 18-Dec-2013 75 German 
Lag_1 Advisor; market head 23-Oct-2013 59 German 
Lag_2 Advisor 16-Oct-2013 68 German 
Lag_3 Advisor 27-Nov-2013 68 German 
Lag_4 Advisor 19-Nov-2013 70 German 
Lag_5 Advisor 18-Nov-2013 56 German 
Lag_6 Advisor 11-Dec-2013 65 German 
Lag_7 Advisor; desk head 21-Oct-2013 97 German 
Lag_8 Advisor 22-Oct-2013 70 English 
Lag_9 SI expert 11-Dec-2013 49 German 
Lag_10 SI expert 2-Dec-2013 71 German 
Lag_11 SI expert 8-Nov-2014 13 English 
 
4.2.3 Data Analysis 
The software NVivo was used to code and analyze the collected data. The data analysis had 
three phases and was based on the approach of analytical induction and pattern matching 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003b). In the first phase, we applied the process of open coding to 
two thirds of the interview manuscripts based on initial theoretical ideas. This yielded a set of 
71 story elements; i.e. recurring patterns of aspect interpretations (e.g., ‘customers are 
overpowered by advisors’, or ‘sustainable investing performs poorly’). 
In the second phase, we identified clusters and patterns of story elements to iteratively 
validate emerging structures of surface stories (e.g., ‘financial markets are complex due to 
high regulation and irrational market developments’). Surface stories can be likened to what is 
called ‘constructs’ in variance-based research, or “conceptual models used in explanations of 
observed data” (Pentland, 1999, p. 711). Based on these insights we developed and applied a 
codebook that also included open coding categories to capture new story elements. 
 133 
In the third phase, emerging surface stories were iteratively applied to validate 
emerging patterns of narratives, which were then critically reviewed based on the underlying 
original text passages. A narrative provides the framework wherein the latent sequence and 
meaning of stories becomes visible, as outlined in the Findings section.  
 
4.3 Findings 
In this section we outline the identified narratives, i.e. “the ways in which individual narrators 
come to understand and articulate their social ‘reality’” (Stalker, 2010, p. 4). Examining our 
data we identify two predominant narratives: the nuisance narrative and the savior narrative. 
We outline the narratives and their constituting surface stories based on the structure 
developed by Haack et al. (2012), followed by a comparison of both narratives. 
4.3.1 Laggards’ Narrative: Complex Markets and Sustainable Investing as a Nuisance 
The nuisance narrative construes sustainable investing as out-of-scope as it adds complexity 
to processes and situations that are already complex. It is solely told by representatives of the 
laggard case and can be summarized as follows: 
Nuisance narrative: sustainable investing adds even more complexity to financial 
markets that have already become very complex and difficult to navigate. Customers might be 
interested in sustainable investing, but overall are simplistic in that they are busy with their 
lives and seek an easy way to manage their wealth and related family aspects. Advisors help 
their customers navigate complex financial markets by building long-term trusted 
relationships that extend to customers families. However, advisors are also salespeople; they 
ignore sustainable investing because it is a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of difficult questions, or a 
nuisance, that takes too much time to discuss and challenges advisors technical efficiency. 
The nuisance narrative begins with the complex markets story that describes 
financial markets as an increasingly challenging and risky environment to navigate, and 
introduces the responsible actors. The story illustrates that how investment advisors see 
financial markets has a substantial influence on how they see sustainable investing. On 
one hand, regulatory changes and requirements constitute “by far the biggest challenges”; 
they are inflicted by regulators “from abroad, in Switzerland, from the bank, [on] various 
levels”, and are comprehensive in effecting financial markets “in a global sense, in a 
holistic sense” (Lag_2). Especially since the financial crisis that started in 2008 led to an 
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increase in regulation, “having the time to really get into an in-depth conversation with the 
customer [is] the biggest roadblock” (Lag_8) for advisors to discuss sustainable investing. 
On the other hand, financial markets have become fast-paced, as other investors 
utilize technology to operate globally, and government interventions incur illogical and 
counter-intuitive developments. As such, managing customers’ investment portfolios has 
become more difficult, because “since 2008 … none of the logical models work anymore“ 
(Lag_1), a situation wherein one has “to analyze the portfolio again and again, because 
things change so fast” (Lag_6). This speaks against the consideration of sustainable 
investing, since “sustainable investing just lags that development, because these days other 
criteria matter” (Lag_1). Beyond these specific developments, the story puts into question 
the financial performance of sustainable investing generally, since “if you consider the 
whole definition of ‘sustainable’, then you have the problem that you can’t produce 
economically” (Lag_4), or looking for sustainable firms one would find “zero of those, so 
you will hold only cash” (Lag_5). 
Overall, the complex markets story is the focal point in the narrative in regard to 
the positioning of financial markets as the main source of complexity, complexity defined 
as “the number of items or elements that must be dealt with simultaneously” by actors 
(Scott, 2003: 230). The story positions regulators, governments and other investors as 
parties that inflict that complexity; focal actors against which advisors position themselves 
in the later following trusted salespeople story. The complex markets story also provides 
the background against which advisors serve their customers, as introduced in the 
following simplistic customers story. 
The second story is that of simplistic customers, professionals that are very busy with 
their life and that seek an easy way to manage a breadth of changing aspects regarding their 
wealth and related family aspects, with a latent but ambivalent interest for sustainable 
investing. Customers “have to take care of many other things”, and simply outsource the 
management of their wealth; “and we’ll speak again in three or six months” (Lag_5). In the 
simplistic customers story, customers sometimes “do not act rationally”, and some “cannot 
really be advised although it would be the best for them” (Lag_3). Simplistic customers rather 
want to have advisors navigate potentially difficult wealth-related topics between family 
members, such as inheritances, as “they can’t mention that, but because you really know the 
entire family, and you have another role, you can approach them” (Lag_6). Customers’ 
interest in sustainable investing is latent but ambivalent, since they “are businessmen 
themselves with a certain pragmatism in the sense that they say ‘I want profit and I don’t care 
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about sustainability’”; at the same time, however, they say: “I am a business man … we have 
to produce somewhat sustainable anyways” (Lag_2). Therefore, “the conclusion is that many 
customers say [that sustainable investing] doesn’t matter, but there are the customers that 
have an exclusions process [i.e., they implement sustainable investing principles] and I see 
that a lot more in reality” (Lag_2). 
Overall, the simplistic customers story introduces customers as a focal actor, as 
well as their motivation to access various investment solutions and the management of 
their wealth and related family issues. The alleged simplicity builds a tension between 
customers and complex financial markets that is released by the introduction of advisors in 
the following trusted salespeople story. 
In the nuisance narrative, the tension between complex financial markets and 
simplistic customers finds its resolve within the story of advisors as trusted salespeople. 
Advisors are trusted long-term partners that take the complexity-threat away from customers 
and their families. As such, “the goal of an advisor is to build a long-term trusted relationship 
… a position where one accompanies the customer life-long on that finance side and 
everything related to that” (Lag_7). To build that trust, advisors seek opportunities to 
effectively and efficiently prove the personal commitment to customers, as well as to other 
members and generations of the family; one example is given as follows: “I make a point of 
taking [the customer’s] youngest daughter horse-back riding … building a relationship with 
the next generation of the family; costs me nothing” (Lag_8). The advisor is presented as 
focused on carefully and strategically building trust, while exploring customers’ needs as the 
basis for the business relationship, as illustrated in the following statement: “I spend a lot of 
time on a plane traveling to see customers to meet them face to face to build that trust and to 
extend the share of wallet that we have from our customers” (Lag_8). 
It is at this point that the salespeople aspect comes into the story, with the advisor 
holding an ambivalent position between the interests of customers and the bank. Beyond the 
pure focus on customers’ interests, “a good advisor is a person of trust in all financial matters 
for the customer, on whichever level or service, that sells or offers the services of the bank 
most optimally in the interest of both sides, the customer and the bank” (Lag_2). Advisors are 
also “ideas- and storytellers, and story-sellers” that “always have to come up with newer and 
better models, like the car industry [that sells new models every year]” (Lag_1).  
When sustainable investing, then, is introduced to the setting of advisors as 
salespeople, however, sustainable investing is considered as out-of-scope. This is not because 
sustainable investing would not be interesting for customers, since “in fact, sustainable 
 136 
investing is coupled with systematically selecting firms that in the near or far future will be 
better anyways, simply because in the end they work more efficiently” (Lag_3). Rather, 
investment advisors tend to ignore sustainable investing because they see this investment 
practice as a threat to their technical efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987): 
“Stupidly, if a customer were totally interested [in sustainable investing], he would come back 
with a lot of questions. … Well, if you open the Pandora’s Box, a lot of questions come back. 
… How much do I invest for [discussing sustainable investing with customers]? How much 
return do I get back? … Sorry, this sustainability topic could be a big one, no question, and 
personally I find it a massively good topic; but purely as a businessman, it’s a question of 
efficiency … so I just leave it.” (Lag_2). 
In summary, the trusted salespeople story introduces advisors as the focal actors that 
help simplistic customers to navigate financial markets that become ever more complex due 
to the activities of regulators and other investors. Against that backdrop, advisors decide to 
ignore sustainable investing; a Pandora’s Box‘, or nuisance, of additional information that 
would have to be processed in the context of sustainable investing (Nilsson, Siegl, & Korling, 
2012).  
As such, advisors refrain from sustainable investing as it appears to compromise what 
they perceive as technically efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). Thus, the 
claim of advisors to provide their customers with all products that could be helpful for them, 
or “simply to realize what the person wants, and to react accordingly” (Lag_3), might be more 
‘ceremonial’ than actually implemented (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
In terms of its structure, the nuisance narrative is complete with three sequential 
stories and “a clear beginning, middle, and end” (Pentland, 1999, p. 712). The stories 
introduce the focal actors in their setting, their motivations and relevant events, and taken 
together allow the construction of a causal connection between them. The result, or 
“evaluative frame” (Pentland, 1999, p. 712) of the narrative is that sustainable investing is 
out-of-scope for advisors. Table 2 presents the surface stories that underlie the narrative, 
as well as the story elements and illustrative example quotes. 
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Table 2: Nuisance narrative: Underlying surface stories, story elements, and illustrative example quotes 
 
Surface 
stories 
Story 
elements 
Example quotes 
Complex 
markets 
Disruptive 
regulation 
“I think the challenge for an advisor today is the fast growth of regulation. …  You are constantly in a cover-
my-ass position. … I think it is not about making five or ten or 15 percent of return, but about protecting the 
worth of the wealth for the client in all circumstances … with all the issues that they have in their countries, 
with the currency, with all the taxes, all these new issues, that have come forward” (Lag_6) 
 
 Erratic 
markets 
“I think everyone realized since 2008 that the buy-and-hold model has actually died. You have to analyze the 
portfolio again and again, because things change so fast” (Lag_6) 
 
 Poor per-
formance 
“Well, often the production of sustainable products is more expensive. … I think [sustainable investing] should 
have a space in today’s society … for those that want to do something good for themselves mentally” (Lag_4) 
 
Simplistic 
customers 
Broad 
needs 
“My clients … built up companies, and one could see how they grew and how everything changed, the 
different needs, that hey had during any point in time” (Lag_3) 
 
 Delegate 
wealth ma-
nagement 
“I see that many clients have to take care of many other things and don’t want to have to deal with buy-or-sell 
decisions. Instead, they say:“ You take this over and we’ll speak again in three or six months. I want it to be 
invested in such and such a way”” (Lag_5) 
 
 Irrational “… and when you come into the finance world, you realize that it’s all psychology. … There are theorems that 
say rationality is paramount. But I really must say: No. When it comes down to decisions, people do not act 
rationally.  … Sometimes the person wants to pick up an advice that, in fact, is not ideal, but that the person 
feels good with personally” (Lag_3) 
 
 Cover the 
family 
“… you know a lot about the family, about the children … they ask you if you could discuss the whole 
inheritance-thing with the dad … they can’t mention that, but because you really know the entire family, and 
you have another role, you can approach them … and that’s really valued by the clients” (Lag_6) 
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 Ambi-
valent 
interest 
“Many clients say that [sustainable investing] doesn’t matter. But there are the clients that have an exclusions 
process and I see that a lot more in reality. They don’t come and say, in a positive sense “I only want 
sustainable investing or green”, or whatever, but they just say “I don’t buy that and I don’t give my capital into 
such a firm”” (Lag_2) 
 
Trusted 
sales-
people 
Strategic 
focus on 
building 
trust 
“I spend a lot of time on a plane traveling to see customers to meet them face to face to build that trust and to 
extend the share of wallet that we have from our customers” (Lag_8) 
 
“The goal of a relationship manager is to build a long-term trusted relationship. That you get into a position 
where one accompanies the client life-long on that finance side and everything related to that. … That you 
really succeed with this trust basis” (Lag_7) 
 
 Across ge-
nerations 
“A client of mine ... is the second generation of a family that I know. I make a point of taking his youngest 
daughter horse-back riding … building a relationship with the next generation of the family; costs me nothing” 
(Lag_8) 
 
 Salesman-
ship 
“We are ideas- and storytellers and story-sellers.  … What we advise is essentially this: I sell, it’s always about 
an advisor and a sale. I sell my view of the world. … We always have to come up with newer and better 
models, like the car industry. We say: ‘You already have a BMW, but we have got the new 5-series just here. 
We can trade that in now. … We try to – I always come back to the BMW – to bring something new to the 
client, something that he does not have yet, and that he would not get from the other [investment firms]” 
(Lag_1) 
 
 Too 
complex 
“[Sustainable investing] always sounds great. … But … sustainable investing is not a concrete approach like 
value or growth are… it’s very complex, complex” (Lag_1) 
 
“I feel [that talking about sustainable investing] is relatively difficult. But I have heard from colleagues at other 
banks that it’s doing quite well” (Lag_5) 
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4.3.2 Leaders’ Narrative: Complex Clients and Sustainable Investing as a Savior 
The savior narrative develops the argument of sustainable investing as the solution to 
many problems of financial markets. This narrative was used by advisors at both leaders in 
remarkably similar ways and only differed in respect to the weight of ethical versus 
financial merits of sustainable investing. This narrative can be summarized as follows: 
Savior narrative: Financial markets might commonly be perceived as complex, but 
are overly complicated in the interest of advisors that are really salespeople, and that are 
detached from the interests of the customers and the real world. Sustainable investing as a 
‘savior’ solves many of these problems. Together, customers and advisors form a 
community to develop that solution ahead. 
The narrative is comprised of three stories, the flawed markets story, the savior 
story, and the community story. The flawed markets story acknowledges that financial 
markets are often seen as complex, but develops the argument that this is because 
‘traditional’ (i.e., not sustainable investing focused) actors within financial markets have 
over the past decades created that complexity to the disadvantage of customers and the 
natural environment. The story begins by describing and challenging the focus of 
traditional advisors on quantitative analysis. In traditional advisory “all the energy goes 
into inventing new mathematical [analysis tools]”, which is “ever farther away from the 
customer; the customer doesn’t want that at all”; a criticism that extends to the natural 
environment, as “the purpose of the finance industry is, simplified, to make money with 
money…[and] lost touch with the real things of life”; the finance industry therefore „has 
become decoupled [from customers and the natural environment]” (Lead_A2). The focal 
actors are customers and traditional advisors in a “situation in financial markets where a 
customer expects advice and sits across from an advisor…. But really it’s a product 
salesperson. … So you have someone who is really relying on trust; on the other side you 
have someone who might misuse that trust” (Lead_A2). 
The result is that “many customers have been pushed into products that they did 
not really want”; the reason being that traditional advisors’ primary concern is “only about 
the bonus and revenue”; while this used to be less so in the past, when “there used to be 
really the [trustworthy] ‘bankier’. And then the bankier became a ‘banker’ or ‘private 
banker’ and that has led to completely wrong incentive structures” (Lead_A3). The 
message of the story is that these “conflicts of interests towards the customers are 
enormous. The opacity for the customer is higher than in any other industry“, with 
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traditional advisors being like “criminals, really, but they are not recognized as such” 
(Lead_A2). 
Overall, the flawed markets story introduces the focal actors of customers that over 
the past decades have become overpowered by ‘traditional’ advisors that act as 
salespeople and overcomplicate financial markets for their personal gain. As such, the 
story provides the backdrop for sustainable investing as the savior solving many of these 
problems, as outlined in the following story.  
Against the background of the flawed markets story, the savior story first 
establishes sustainable investing as the logical or better type of investment process, since 
sustainable investing-related “risks and opportunities … should be considered by a good 
portfolio manager or analyst anyways”; and establishes sustainable investing-focused 
advisors accordingly, which state, for example: “If I analyze a firm, and the firm is an 
iceberg, then I see more of the iceberg if I integrate sustainability criteria” (Lead_B3). 
Thus “when you invest sustainable, for a certain period, you’re doing at least as well [as 
with a traditional investment portfolio]” (Lead_A3). As such, sustainable investing is 
about “going back to the roots” (Lead_A5) of investing, and sustainable investing-focused 
advisors understand investments “similar to the beginning of my career in the late 80s. We 
buy firms [i.e. stock equity] where we know what they produce…”, whereas „[traditional] 
advisors today, they could just sell products that they don’t understand themselves” 
(Lead_A3). Further, advisors through sustainable investing also “have gotten rid of all 
those conflicts of interests” (Lead_A2). They are “transparent on costs; the customer 
knows who earns how much“, which, similar to the back-to-the-roots type of investing, is 
“in a way the rediscovery of the most normal thing” (Lead_A5).  
Thus, the story positions sustainable investing and advisors through sustainable 
investing as the ‚savior‘; focal actors that help customers that are overpowered by the 
‘traditional’ advisors that established flawed, overcomplicated financial markets. The 
realization of that solution is then illustrated in the community story. 
In the community story, sustainable investing-focused advisors distinctively 
distance themselves and their organization from flawed traditional financial markets. The 
following statement makes a specific illustration: “I don’t think we see ourselves as a 
bank. We don’t call ourselves bankers”; instead the position illustrated is that of 
collaborating with customers “to make a contribution, together with our customers, to 
move the finance world, the capital markets, and this sustainable development somehow 
onto a sensible trajectory” (Lead_B4). As such, the sustainable investing focused wealth 
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management firm is “not a bank … that’s a community” of likeminded advisors and 
clients (Lead_A2). 
In its illustration of customers, then, the story recognizes that “everyone has 
different ideas about what sustainability is and how it relates to his money“, yet advisors 
accept that „to bring that together is certainly one of our main tasks” (Lead_B4). 
Customers are „very demanding”, as they “want to feel ‘what’s happening with my 
money’” (Lead_A3). To fulfill that need, strong emphasis is put on discussing details of 
specific investment themes and firms. Advisors overcompensate for potential confusion 
about sustainable investing with extensive reporting, as “every customer gets a reporting 
on the sustainability and financial information on the firms in their portfolio” (Lead_A1); 
or “when I see my customers, it’s very important to … bring my customer two or three 
examples so that they can see what thoughts we applied that they have that position in 
their portfolio. And that’s not always easy, as every human is different and has a different 
background” (Lead_A3). The complexity of customers’ interests in sustainable investing, 
which goes beyond just financial performance data, is used to contrast, again, sustainable 
investing against overcomplicated traditional markets. Markets should be simple, and the 
focus is put on actual investments and customers’ interests instead: 
“We consciously provide the customers with two- to three lines on the sustainability 
aspects of each of the securities in their portfolio, which is a heck of a lot of work. That’s 
always like “the (financial) performance in Q3 was such and such …”, but on the 
sustainability aspects, that’s where we always get very good feedback. … When I compare 
that to my last firm; we don’t just talk about performance … that’s done in 30 seconds. 
It’s about content” (Lead_A3). 
In sum, the community story serves to illustrate how sustainable investing-focused 
advisors together in a community with customers engage sustainable investing as a savior to 
resolve the problems that were outlined in the flawed markets story. The community story as 
well as the savior narrative overall contrast sustainable investing against specific aspects that 
appear in the nuisance narrative as well, specifically in regard to the mentioned but criticized 
discussion of complex financial markets and advisors as salespeople. As such, contrasting 
images, such as bankers and non-bankers, are employed to develop and complement the 
arguments of the savior narrative. Table 3 below again presents the surface stories that 
underlie the narrative, as well as story elements and illustrative example quotes.
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Table 3: Savior narrative: Underlying surface stories, story elements, and illustrative example quotes 
 
Surface 
stories 
Story 
elements 
Example quotes 
Flawed 
markets 
Overly 
compli-
cated 
“Most energy is spent on internal conflicts, it’s all male driven, and that leads to that nothing in the finance 
industry is really developed for the future. All the energy goes into inventing new mathematical things, ever 
farther away from the client. The client doesn’t want that at all. … I realized in the past that we were not really 
advising our clients honestly” (Lead_A2) 
 
 Decoupled 
from 
nature 
“The purpose of the finance industry is, simplified, to make money with money… one has lost touch with the 
real things of life, to the things on this table here, to clothes, food, drink. … The finance industry has become 
decoupled” (Lead_A2) 
 
 Conflict of 
interest 
“Many clients have been pushed into products that they did not really want. If the incentives are wrong, that’s 
the problem ... if it’s only about the bonus and revenue” (Lead_A3) 
 
“The conflicts of interests towards the clients are enormous. … We have the topic of exorbitance in our economy 
today” (Lead_A2) 
 
Savior Better; 
back to the 
roots 
“I think we are going back to the roots. We can explain our client exactly what’s in his portfolio; we know pretty 
well what the companies do. The client knows where his money is invested” (Lead_A5) 
 
“We defend ourselves against the sustainability topic being seen only in the ethical, ecological or green corner. 
For us, sustainability is a risk-tool, if you wish; the conviction that the integration of extra-financial aspects in 
the valuation of companies and asset classes, aspects that the traditional financial analysis usually does not 
consider, allows me to build more robust and better portfolios” (Lead_B1) 
 
 Solved 
conflict of 
interest 
“We are also transparent on costs. The client knows who earns how much. … that’s something taken for granted 
for us. … that’s the rediscovery of the most normal thing. It’s a bit paradox … an open and transparent business 
model is apparently stuff to talk about, because it does not adhere to the norm” (Lead_A5) 
 
“If we would … pay out huge bonuses, our clients would not understand that” (Lead_A2) 
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Commu-
nity 
Not banks/ 
bankers 
“Q: You just mentioned that you would never have worked for a normal bank? A: No, never … when we grow, 
we really have no idea yet where will get these advisors. But we are convinced that we will not get them out of 
the industry as it is now … frankly, I think the industry needs a totally different type of advisors” (Lead_B2) 
 
 Common 
interest 
“One thing that differentiates us … we do no client segmentation when we have events. We have one event per 
year. And we invite all clients to that, if old or young, if small or large. And that’s no five-star gala dinner, but 
that’s usually talks. Content-driven in the field of quality of life. … That’s actually a common factor of the 
community … It’s like, we are not a bank … that’s the community - that’s the point where we all like to meet 
and talk, all together” (Lead_A2) 
 
 Complex 
clients 
“Our clients are very demanding. … Such clients are the biggest challenge for us. And that’s where we learn a 
lot, as they do from us” (Lead_A3) 
 
“Our clients have ideas about energy supply, about social topics, about human rights and such; sometimes very 
deep, very informed – or not, or a bit unrealistic or so. And the coaching and guidance and the interaction about 
these topics with the clients is certainly one of our main tasks” (Lead_B4) 
 
 Overcom-
pensate 
“Every client gets a reporting on the sustainability and financial information on the firms in their portfolio. … 
And, well, they really track that, and are very interested. I don’t know if I would read all this, but they do” 
(Lead_A1) 
 
“I feel that the clients value if I can tell them that Danone fulfills our sustainability criteria for these and these 
reasons. Nestlé has 22 pages of controversies. I´ll read five pages to you, then everyone will say: “I believe 
you”” (Lead_A3) 
 
 Fin. return 
is trivial  
 
“We don’t just talk about performance, but about content. … all these creative figures that were invented in the 
past 20 years, that doesn’t interest the client by far … that’s done in 30 seconds. And then it’s about content” 
(Lead_A3) 
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4.3.3 Comparing Narratives: Leaders’ Complexity Shift 
We now compare the two narratives by analyzing what is seen as the main challenge in 
each narrative and what is seen as the solution. In the nuisance narrative, investment 
advisors describe financial markets as exceedingly complex, whereas customer needs are 
seen as relatively straightforward. In this narrative, investment advisors see their role as 
building trust with customers and to ‘protect’ them from complex financial markets. 
By contrast, the savior narrative describes financial markets and investment services as 
something that should ultimately be simple. In the savior narrative, existing financial services 
are chastised for being unnecessarily complex and ridden with conflicts of interest. The 
problem for investment advisors that follows from his narrative, however, is that simple 
financial markets tend to undermine the position of investment advisors, as customers would 
not need costly investment advisory services in such a scenario. 
Interestingly, the savior narrative circumvents that challenge as it opens up a new 
source of complexity by describing customer needs as multi-layered and highly complex. 
Most investment advisors at the sustainable investing-leading firms assume that, ultimately, 
most customers care about sustainability but that they do not have a clear image of what they 
want, and that it is complex to identify and match these interests with investment products. In 
this narrative, investment advisors carve out a new niche for their services: rather than helping 
simplistic customers deal with complex markets, they help customers find investment 
solutions that correspond with customers’ complex needs. The two narratives also have clear 
implications for the role of investment advisors: At the laggard firms, where investment 
advisors describe customer needs as less complex (see the simplistic customer story), 
investment advisors also see their role as less complex (see the trusted salesperson story). By 
contrast, at the leader firms, seeing customer needs as highly complex also implies that 
investment advisors see their own role as more complex. We describe this shift from complex 
financial markets to complex customer needs as a complexity shift. Figure 1 illustrates this 
complexity shift. 
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Figure 1: Complexity shift from complex financial markets to complex customer needs 
 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Complexity as Indispensable for Investment Services 
The first major contribution of this paper is that is takes up calls for more organization theory 
research on financial markets (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Marti & Scherer, 2014; Munir, 2011). 
While organization theorists have studied the role of institutional investors (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994; Gond & Piani, 2013) and securities analysts (Beunza & Garud, 2007; Rao, 
et al., 2001) in a finance-centered economy, organization theorists have not analyzed the role 
of investment advisors. The puzzle around investment advisors is why they can justify their 
role despite clear evidence that these services, on average, do not pay of for their customers 
financially (French, 2008; Malkiel, 1973). 
Our findings show that complexity plays a key role for investment advisors. To sell 
their services, investment advisors have to position their services in relation to a source of 
complexity. For mainstream investment advisors, financial markets are a source of 
complexity that legitimizes their services. Future research should analyze how narratives of 
complexity relate to complex financial products, which help investment firms create higher 
margins for their services (Célérier & Vallée, 2013). It may be that mainstream investment 
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advisors use the complex market story to convince their customers that they need complex 
products to deal with complex markets. 
Interestingly, investment advisors at the sustainable investment-focused firms also 
need a source of complexity, and they create this complexity by highlighting how complex 
the interests of customers are. This suggests that all investment firms depend on some type of 
“complexity” to sell financial services and products. 
4.4.2 The Role of Narratives for the Legitimacy and Mainstreaming of Sustainable 
Investing 
The second major contribution of this paper is to the emerging literature on sustainable 
investing (Markowitz, et al., 2012; Slager, et al., 2012). Our study provides insights on what 
advisors think is “right and wrong” (Pentland, 1999, p. 713) about sustainable investing. We 
thus show how advisors make sense of their role in that context and of how to work with their 
customers (Haack, et al., 2012). Since advisors in their work either strengthen or weaken the 
legitimacy and market success of sustainable investing, we explore how investment firms 
create legitimacy at this “micro levels of analysis” (Lok, 2010, p. 1305). Future research 
should extend this micro level work beyond the prevalent focus on the establishment of 
legitimacy of sustainable investing at the field level (see also Arjaliès, 2010; Delmas, Etzion, 
& Nairn-Birch, 2013) or the firm level (Markowitz, Cobb & Hedley, (2012, p. 3). 
Our analysis of the narratives of investment advisors has implications for the 
mainstreaming of sustainable investing (e.g., Dunfee, 2003). Our findings on how investment 
advisors’ narratives either constrain or enable sustainable investing suggest that selling 
sustainable investing products will only be possible for investment firms that develop certain 
narratives. It appears that investment advisors at sustainable investing leaders operate in their 
narrative based on the shift of complexity away from financial markets and because “we don’t 
call ourselves bankers“ (Lead_B4). This would mean that these stories and narratives are part 
of the value chain of sustainable investing leaders and cannot be easily transferred to 
sustainable investing laggards (Porter, 1985). 
Thus, our findings suggest that investment firms that do not specialize on sustainable 
investing are in a poor position to sell sustainable investing products because their advisors 
cannot credibly use those narratives that help to legitimize sustainable investing. Put 
differently, firms where advisors in their narrative focus on complex markets, simplistic 
clients and their own role as trusted salespeople, might face insurmountable cognitive barriers 
or cognitive dissonance to embrace sustainable investing as an opportunity (Festinger, 1957).  
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This finding helps explain why many investment firms fail to sell sustainable investing 
products and services despite investors’ substantial interest in sustainable investing (Peifer, 
2012; Schrader, 2006), and provides fertile ground for further scholarly inquiry. Future 
research could compare our results to the context of other geographical areas and develop 
statistically derived robust insights from work with larger samples. We encourage exploring 
the extend to which narratives constitute a major impediment to the mainstreaming of 
sustainable investing, which would then remain a niche activity for specialized sustainable 
investing firms, or avenues for mainstream incumbents to adapt their internal narratives or 
circumvent the mechanisms identified in this study. 
4.5 Conclusion 
We investigate the narratives investments advisors of wealthy private investors employ in the 
context of sustainable investing. Our main contributions are, first, to the emerging 
organization theory literature on financial markets, and, second, to research on sustainable 
investing. 
Investment advisors are mediators between their customers and their bank. They play 
a key role in a finance-centered economy, especially in regard to rather new and complex 
approaches such as sustainable investing. Thus, sustainable investing is a business 
opportunity for advisors. Many of their customers are interested in sustainable investing, 
while the financial value of traditional advisory services for customers is challenged. The low 
relative market share of sustainable investing indicates, however, that advisors largely neglect 
this business opportunity. 
We find answers for this conundrum by identifying two narratives and their underlying 
stories that either support or limit investment advisors’ appreciation of sustainable investing. 
Advisors at firms that lag in sustainable investing describe financial markets as highly 
complex, and their customers as simplistic, with sustainable investing a nuisance that they 
reject to engage with. In contrast, advisors at leading firms use a narrative that describes 
financial markets as excessively and unnecessarily complicated, highlights the complex needs 
of customers, and positions sustainable investing as the back-to-the-roots solution, or savior, 
for many problems of financial markets. 
As such, we document a complexity shift in investment advisors’ narratives from 
complex financial markets to complex customer needs. These findings suggest that all types 
 148 
of investment firms, including those focused on sustainable investments, depend on 
“complexity” to sell financial services and products. 
Further, our findings indicate that the narratives that are currently predominant in 
many large ‘mainstream’ investment firms that are not focused on sustainable investing are 
incompatible with sustainable investing. If sustainable investing, then, is limited to 
specialized firms, sustainable investing may remain a niche product, despite its financial and 
non-financial merits for customers, advisors, society and the natural environment. 
Considering the substantial potential significance of narratives for the field of 
organizational theory in the context of financial markets and sustainable investing, we hope to 
encourage further research in this regard. For example, beyond tests and expansions of our 
findings to other samples, the extend to which sustainable investing can or does become 
mainstream due to client-focused regulation or societal demands provides fertile ground for 
further research; but that is, of course, yet another story. 
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